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This dissertation concerns the history of land politics in South Africa and, 
equally, land as a vehicle for understanding the transition from apartheid to the 
post-apartheid order. In 2004, after a decade in power, the ANC government’s 
failure to carry out widespread land reform began to test the country’s 
democratic possibilities. In the lead up to that year’s national election, social 
movements urged landless people to boycott the polls and occupy land instead 
as part of a “No Land! No Vote!” campaign. With this clash as its entry point for 
analysis, this dissertation examines historical factors that have shaped South 
Africa’s neoliberal democracy and prospects for redistribution. It offers insights 
into some of the most significant questions facing the country: What is the 
historical relationship between land dispossession, citizenship, and politics in 
South Africa? And why, well into the Mbeki years, was the country unable, or 
unwilling, to reckon with it? 
 Broad in scope, this dissertation examines a number of institutions that 
shaped the politics of land, economic development, and citizenship in South 
  
 
Africa over the last century. It is particularly focused on period of the 1940s-2004, 
encompassing the apartheid era and the first ten years of democracy. I begin by 
recasting the history of apartheid pass laws in the mid-twentieth century, 
widening the scope beyond their role in containing labor mobility and 
controlling access to cities. I show how vagrancy laws were one piece of a 
continuum that stretched through jails and prisons to rural plantations, 
supplying labor to farms and subsidizing agricultural development. Later 
chapters examine how, beginning in the 1970s, the World Bank and other 
international institutions helped shape the contours of land and housing policies 
and the relationship between states and citizens. My research also shows how, 
during the apartheid transition and through the Mandela and Mbeki 
administrations, private prisons and harsh criminal justice reforms became 
integral parts of neoliberal economic development. This dissertation weaves 
together the history that has shaped South Africa’s ‘dispossessed democracy’ 
and concludes with a discussion of the implications for social movements and 
political change.   
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In 2004 South Africa held its second national election after the transition 
from apartheid a decade earlier. Most adults had clear memories of casting a vote 
for the first time in their lives in the election that brought Nelson Mandela and 
the African National Congress (ANC) to power in 1994. Yet the government’s 
failure to carry out widespread land reform had begun to test the country’s 
democratic possibilities. Despite promises to redistribute 30 percent of 
agricultural land within five years, less than two percent of land had changed 
hands from white to black South Africans. As the 2004 election approached, a 
national organization called the Landless People’s Movement (LPM) urged 
landless people to boycott the election and occupy land as part of a “No Land! 
No Vote!” campaign. The LPM argued that South Africa had achieved only a 
“ballot box democracy” since it had failed to democratize property relations, and 
that the “hard won right to vote” was a poor substitute for economic 
redistribution. The movement issued demands that it argued would give teeth to 
the democratic project: a moratorium on all evictions and immediate delivery of 
land to the landless. By boycotting the election, the LPM explicitly called into 




Only a small fraction of the population took up the LPM’s charge to 
occupy land rather than vote on election day. But the land question weighed on 
the minds of many.1 Indeed, a 2001 study found that over two-thirds of black 
South Africans agreed that “land must be returned to blacks in South Africa, no 
matter what the consequences are for the current owners and for political 
stability in the country.” 2  While pundits, election observers, and democracy 
‘experts’ watched the election closely, seeking assurance that it was free and fair, 
                                                        
1 The “land question” encompasses many sub-questions and often goes undefined. Hall 
and Ntsebeza offer a useful description of the land question: “Issues at the heart of the 
land question are how to reverse [colonial and apartheid-era dispossession] and how a 
large-scale redistribution of land can contribute to transforming the economy and 
reducing poverty.” Still, as Raj Patel notes, the land question often stands in for a 
number of concepts: “[A] clear definition of the question seems elusive. Or, better, it 
seems clear that the ‘land question’ refers to different clusters of social, political and 
cultural problems, for different people, different scholars, different groups. It is an issue 
that invokes complex issues of history, entitlements, politics, economies, geographies, 
religions and social relations. …Yet despite its original complexity, the land question 
invariably gets collapsed into a range of slightly more tractable, manageable, problems 
whether this collapse is authored by the state, the party, the coalition or the community 
organization.” Raj Patel, “Electing Land Questions: A Methodological Discussion with 
Reference to Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Durban Shackdweller Movement,” Paper for 
the CODESRIA Multinational Working Group on Land, April (2007), 4. Ruth Hall and 
Lungisile Ntsebeza, eds., The Land Question in South Africa: The Challenge of 
Transformation and Redistribution (Cape Town: HSRC Press, 2007).  
 
2  James Gibson, Overcoming Historical Injustices: Land Reconciliation in South Africa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), 32 (citing James Gibson, “The Land 






a majority of black South Africans still looked for deeper proof of democracy. 
Land must be redistributed, political stability be damned.  
Why was the slow pace of land reform reason to boycott an election? 
Expressing disappointment over sluggish economic change is one thing, 
declaring the country’s democracy null and void another. Why did the lack of 
economic redistribution bring the very premise of South Africa’s new experiment 
in democracy into question? This dissertation confronts these questions. My 
research in South Africa began over a decade ago when I conducted interviews 
with members of the Landless People’s Movement. Since then, my work has 
brought me to the archives of the World Bank and the South African 
government, into personal papers collections and newspaper archives, and 
across tables from interview participants. When I conducted interviews with 
LPM members in 2003, many of them insisted that, to understand the transition 
from formal apartheid and deconstruct questions of citizenship, democracy, and 
racialized inequality, historians and other scholars must explore land 
dispossession and land reform.  
A brief overview of land policy under segregation and apartheid supports 




dispossession and the denial of citizenship rights and political control. 3 
Beginning with the 1913 Natives’ Land Act, a series of segregationist laws 
created a landless majority in South Africa and stripped black people of South 
African citizenship. Under the 1913 act, only seven percent of the country’s total 
land surface was set aside for “Native reserves,” leaving the white minority with 
ownership in land comprising an area ten times larger than that of the black 
majority. (The amount of land reserved for black Africans would be increased to 
13 percent by the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act). In 1927 the Native 
Administration Act established the Native Affairs Department, a set of 
institutions intended to deal solely with black people. In 1959, the apartheid 
government passed the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, which 
provided for the eventual self-government of fabricated “tribal homelands,” or 
                                                        
3 See Colin Bundy, “The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry,” African 
Affairs 71 (285) October (1972); Harvey Feinberg, “The 1913 Natives Land Act in South 
Africa: Politics, Race, and Segregation in the Early 20th Century,” The International Journal 
of African Historical Studies. 26(1) (1993): 65-109; Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: 
Contemporary African and the Legacy of Late Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996); 
Christina Murray and Catherine O’Regan, eds., No Place to Rest: Forced Removals and the 
Law in South Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Lungisile Ntsebeza, 
Democracy Compromised: Chiefs and the Politics of the Land in South Africa (Leiden: Brill 
Academic Publishers, 2005); Sol Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa: Before and Since the 
European War and the Boer Rebellion (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1916/1991); 
Harold Wolpe, “Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa: From Segregation 
to Apartheid” in Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa, ed. William 





Bantustans. With the creation of the Bantustans, the apartheid government 
claimed that there were no longer any black citizens of South Africa. Black 
people were to become citizens of the Bantustans—or, rather, subjects of 
customary authority in those areas. 4 Given this history, it is not difficult to 
understand why many in the dispossessed majority assumed that the advent of 
democracy and broadened political control could only be facilitated by a 
redistribution of land.  
Yet, a decade after the transition from formal apartheid, only a small 
amount of land had changed hands. The reasons for this can be traced back to 
two key outcomes of the negotiations that ended apartheid: property provisions 
in South Africa’s new Constitution and the ANC’s adoption of a neoliberal 
approach to economic development and ultimately land redistribution. The 
South African Constitution, adopted in 1996, allowed for comprehensive land 
reform through three channels: redistribution to ensure equitable distribution of 
land ownership, restitution to provide land or compensation to those who were 
dispossessed, and tenure reform to formalize land rights and provide security 
under various forms of locally-appropriate tenure. 5  Yet the land reform 
                                                        
4 See Mamdani, Citizen and Subject. 
 
5 The Constitution allows for redistribution under section 25(5): “The state must take 




provisions were one half of a fiercely contested compromise. The other half was 
the Constitution’s property clause, which provided strong protection for existing 
property rights acquired through colonialism and apartheid. 6, 7 Crucially, the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an equitable basis.” Section 
25(6) addresses tenure security: “A person or community whose tenure of land is legally 
insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the 
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to 
comparable redress.” Section 25(7) provides the basis for restitution: “A person or 
community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially 
discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act of 
Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.” Republic of 
South Africa, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996).   
 
6 The property clause is under Section 25 of the Constitution: “(1) No one may be 
deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, and no law may 
permit arbitrary deprivation of property. (2) Property may be expropriated only in terms 
of law of general application—(a) for a public purpose or in the public interest; and (b) 
subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of 
which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 
(3) The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just 
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including—(a) 
the current use of the property; (b) the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c) the market values of the property; (d) the extent of direct state investment and 
subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital improvement of the property; and (e) 
the purpose of the expropriation.” Republic of South Africa, Constitution.  
 
7 On the property clause and constitutional negotiations regarding land, see Bernadette 
Atuahene, We Want What’s Ours: Learning from South Africa’s Land Restitution Program 
(Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2014); Fred Hendricks, “Does the South African 
Constitution Legitimate Colonial Land Alienation?,” paper presented at RAU 
Anthropology and Development Studies Seminar, March (2004); Lungisile Ntsebeza, 
“Land Redistribution in South Africa: The Property Clause Revisited,” in Ntsebeza and 
Hall, The Land Question in South Africa, 107-132; Ruth Hall, “Restitution and the Politics 
of Land Reform: Stepping Outside the Box,” Paper presented at a Conference on Ten 
Years of Democracy in Southern Africa, Queens University, Kingston, May 2-5 (2004); 




ANC also opted for a market-led approach to land redistribution, based on 
“willing buyer, willing seller” principles recommended by the World Bank. This 
approach restricts the role of the state in redistributing land—and helps avoid 
the politics of racialized redistribution—by transforming land redistribution into 
a question of market outcomes. Scholars of South African land reform have 
debated the relative roles that the property clause and the willing buyer-willing 
seller policy played in slowing, or preventing, land reform.8 Nonetheless, it is 
undisputed that these policies resulted in drastically unequal patterns of land 
distribution remaining virtually unchanged from the apartheid era. Ten years 
after the transition from apartheid, 86 percent of the country’s land was owned 
by 60,000 white farmers and the state.9   
                                                                                                                                                                     
of Property Rights in the Interim Constitution,” South African Journal on Human Rights 11 
(1995): 222-240.  
 
8 See, e.g., Fred Hendricks and Lungisile Ntsebeza (2000) and Hendricks (2004), who 
argue that the property clause forecloses large-scale expropriation. By contrast, Hall 
(2004) argues that the property clause is not insurmountable and that the government 
has powers to expropriate land, but has failed to use them. On this debate, see Ntsebeza, 
“Land Redistribution in South Africa: The Property Clause Revisited;” Fred Hendricks 
and Lungisile Ntsebeza, “The Paradox of South Africa’s Land Reform Policy,” SARIPS 
Annual Colloquium, Harare, Zimbabwe (2000); Fred Hendricks, “Does the South 
African Constitution Legitimate Colonial Land Alienation?;” Ruth Hall, “Restitution and 
the Politics of Land Reform: Stepping Outside the Box.” 
 
9 See “Black farmers in South Africa still struggling with land reform,” Voice of America, 
Oct. 29, 2012, http://www.voanews.com/content/black-farmers-in-south-africa-still-




The link between land dispossession and loss of citizenship, combined 
with what appeared to be structural impediments to rectifying historical 
injustice, helps to explain the LPM’s criticism that South Africa had not yet 
‘arrived’ at democracy. But the critique went deeper still. For there was a second 
key component to the LPM’s negative assessment of the ANC’s land policies: the 
policies focused only on rural, not urban, land. The ANC government had 
established a rigid separation between urban housing policy and rural land policy. 
This separation became evident when a series of urban land occupations 
garnered media attention around July 2001. 10 The government construed the 
occupations as the result of failed housing and “basic services” (e.g. water and 
electricity) delivery—not a lack of land reform. Indeed, President Thabo Mbeki 
declared that “the problem in South Africa is homelessness, not land.”11 Those 
occupying land were portrayed as homeless, not landless, actors; they were 
acknowledged as having land needs insofar as they needed land for building 
homes, but not necessarily for other purposes. Their relationship with urban land 
was thus mediated through a right to housing lens, but was not recognized by 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Reform in South Africa,” PBS POV: Promised Land, Jul. 6, 2010, 
http://www.pbs.org/pov/promisedland/land_reform.php#.UZUpWCsaf2Q. 
 
10 For a full discussion see chapter five. 
 




the ANC as a direct right to land. Yet squatters facing eviction from urban high-
rises in Johannesburg’s Hillbrow and Berea districts and others contemplating 
occupations of vacant state-owned land near shack settlements such as Protea 
South persisted in calling themselves “landless” rather than homeless or poor. As 
members of the LPM, these urban residents were articulating land rights claims 
rooted in historical land theft that did not fit easily within the government’s rigid 
separation of urban housing policy and rural land policy.  
In addition to challenging the lack of land redistribution, the LPM was 
also rejecting the “rural-urban divide” in South African policy and politics. A 
fuller account of the problem of land dispossession would need to take stock of 
the historical relationship between urban and rural areas under apartheid—and 
the institutional politics that continued to bind them. The LPM’s rejection of the 
urban-rural divide thus raised another layer of questions. How did the urban-
rural divide become so politicized and contested? And what did the ANC gain, 
politically, by continuing to promote that division?  
*    *    * 
My dissertation concerns the history of land politics in South Africa and, 
equally, land as a vehicle for understanding the transition from apartheid to 




shaped the politics of South Africa’s transition from apartheid and that 
continued to resonate in the first decade of democracy under ANC rule. This 
dissertation offers insights into some of the most significant questions still facing 
South Africa: What is the historical—and contemporary—relationship between 
land dispossession, citizenship, and politics in South Africa?12 And why has the 
country been unable, or unwilling, to reckon with it?  
This dissertation examines the history of how the ANC came to adopt a 
neoliberal approach to land redistribution and economic development.13 More 
                                                        
12  While this study is focused on South Africa, issues of land claims and political 
community are certainly pertinent in many parts of the globe. As James Gibson has 
observed, “One of the most compelling issues for worldwide socio-legal studies has to 
do with how to reconcile competing historical claims to land. Countries as diverse as the 
United States, Argentina, and the Philippines are confronted with extremely complex 
and divisive issues of rectifying land injustices from the past. These conflicts are 
intractable in part because they implicate exceedingly difficult issues of law, justice, and 
history.” Gibson, Overcoming Historical Injustices, 1.   
 
13 Neoliberalism is a political economic theory and policy approach characterized by 
privatization, market deregulation, and fiscal austerity. In David Harvey’s definition, 
“neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that 
proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual 
entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by 
strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to 
create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices” David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2. 
Brenner, Peck, and Theodore have cautioned that “the widespread use of the concepts of 
neoliberalism and neoliberalization has been accompanied by considerable imprecision, 
confusion, and controversy—in effect, they have become ‘rascal concepts.’” Neil 
Brenner, Jamie Beck, and Nik Theodore, “After Neoliberalization?” Globalizations 7(3) 
(2010): 328. I have been careful to avoid such imprecision here, and my working 




than that, it analyzes the implications that a neoliberal approach carries for 
politics and political demands in South Africa’s democratic order. In opting for a 
market-led approach to land redistribution, based on the World Bank’s “willing 
buyer, willing seller” principles, the ANC government restricted the role of the 
state in redistributing land. But, as we have seen in the case of the Landless 
People’s Movement, popular experiences and demands regarding land 
consistently overflowed the bounds of official post-apartheid policy and 
discourse well into the Mbeki years. 14  The existence of the LPM and other 
movements demonstrated that demands for widespread redistribution had not 
disappeared, even though such demands lay outside the official political 
framework of a neoliberal and officially non-racial post-apartheid South Africa. 
(Here, political framework denotes the ‘developmental’ path that those in power 
set for the country and the accompanying types of political engagement this path 
                                                                                                                                                                     
builds upon Brenner et al.’s concept of “variegated neoliberalization,” which recognizes 
that neoliberalization processes are never pure, unified or all-encompassing. To the 
contrary, “neoliberalization represents an historically specific, unevenly developed, 
hybrid, patterned tendency of market-disciplinary regulatory restructuring.” Ibid., 330. 
My dissertation, particularly Chapter 3’s discussion of the World Bank, depicts 
neoliberalization as a stumbling, highly adaptable social process that manifests in 
different ways depending on local histories.   
  
14  President Thabo’s administration ran from 1999-2008. The Landless People’s 
Movement was founded in 2001 and had its heyday in 2004-2005, after which its 





entailed for post-apartheid citizens.15) Drawing on historical investigation and an 
engagement with political theory, my dissertation examines how that political 
framework was created in South Africa and how it was contested. From a 
historical perspective, I argue that is important to understand the breadth of 
apartheid institutions that relied upon land dispossession and urban-rural 
division. This allows us to understand the popular significance of land and its 
relationship to citizenship and democracy. It is this popular significance, 
propelled by groups like the LPM, that refused to be commodified for market 
exchange through the “willing buyer, willing seller” program.  
The Landless People’s Movement’s critique of South Africa’s democracy 
and its challenge to resist urban-rural dichotomies provided a starting point for 
my inquiries. In studies of South African land reform, the LPM is generally on 
                                                        
15 David Scott’s concept of a “problem-space” is useful for understanding competing 
political frameworks. Scott defines a problem-space as “an ensemble of questions and 
answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-
political stakes) hangs. That is to say, what defines this discursive context are not only 
the particular problems that get posed as problems as such (the problem of “race,” say) 
but the particular questions that seem worth asking and the kinds of answers that seem 
worth having. … Problem-spaces alter historically because problems are not timeless 
and do not have everlasting shapes. In new historical conditions old questions may lose 
their salience, their bite, and so lead the range of old answers that once attached to them 
to appear lifeless, quaint, not so much wrong as irrelevant.” David Scott, Conscripts of 
Modernity: The Tragedy of Colonial Enlightenment (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004), 
4. I argue that the ruling ANC and the Landless People’s Movement held distinct, 
conflicting notions of the post-apartheid problem-space. For the ANC, the LPM’s 
demands for redistribution and democratization were out-of-bounds, unintelligible, and 





the margins. Some scholars discuss it as a fringe movement, or a short-lived 
effort that succumbed to institutional failures.16 It would be difficult to dispute 
either characterization, and I do not intend to do so here. My aim is different. As 
a student of history and legal theory, I see value in grappling with political 
critiques that come from the margins. Though its heyday was short (just a few 
years between roughly 2003-2005), the LPM raised important questions that shot 
at the heart of South Africa’s democratic project and the direction of neoliberal 
development under President Mbeki. Even though most South Africans did not 
don red shirts and occupy land with them on election day, their questions and 
                                                        
16 Gibson, Overcoming Historical Injustices, 18 (“The Landless People’s Movement sought 
to mobilize ordinary South Africans on the land issue. However, by late 2006, the 
movement seemed to be in complete disarray” [citing Ntsebeza, “Land Redistribution in 
South Africa: The Property Clause Revisited,” 128]). On the LPM’s relationship with its 
host non-governmental organization, the National Land Committee, see Ntsebeza and 
Hall, “Introduction,” in Ntsebeza and Hall, The Land Question in South Africa, 13-16. See 
also Deborah James, Gaining Ground: ‘Rights’ and ‘Property’ in South African Land Reform 
(London: Routledge, 2007) (at 131: “The links forged by the LPM with cognate 
organisations in the global arena represent a tacit admission that it has failed to mobilise 
the landless on its own doorstep, and an attempt to substitute for this omission by 
bolstering its membership transnationally”). But see Rick de Satge, A Scan of Rural Civil 
Society (Cape Town: Institute for Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies: 2013) (“While the 
LPM has shrunk significantly, with its current membership largely located within 
selected urban informal settlements in Gauteng, in September 2011 an article appeared 
on the Abahlali website inviting the media to a press conference in Johannesburg, 
‘where together with friendly CSOs and La Via Campesina leaders, LPM will launch the 
revival of the struggle for land and agrarian reform after a moment of apparent silence’” 
[citing Landless People’s Movement, “Revival of the Mass Struggle for Land and 






frustrations were shared by many. And although the movement did not sustain 
the height of its numbers and visibility for long past 2005, its chants of “No Land! 
No Vote!” continue to echo. Other social movements, including the Western 
Cape Anti-Eviction Campaign and Abahlali baseMjondolo (shackdwellers’ 
movement), have waged similar campaigns, using “No Land! No House! No 
Vote!” as their rallying cry.17    
Thus this dissertation originates in a desire to revisit urban-rural 
dichotomies in order to understand the nexus between agricultural development, 
urban-rural connection, and citizenship. I begin by re-examining certain 
apartheid institutions such as the pass laws that forbade black South Africans 
from entering cities without identification.18 I argue that key aspects of apartheid 
history that are often studied separately—for example, urban development19 and 
                                                        
17 See, e.g., “No Electricity, No Vote, Say Protesters,” Mail & Guardian, Oct. 30, 2008; 
Sinegugu Ndlovu and Bronwyn Fourie, “No Land! No House! No Vote!,” IOL News, 
May 19, 2011; Mdu Hlongwa, “The No Land, No House, No Vote Campaign Still on for 
2009,” ZMag, Feb. 1, 2007; Symphony Way Pavement Dwellers, No Land! No House! No 
Vote!: Voices from Symphony Way (Cape Town: Pambazuka Press, 2011).  
 
18 See chapter two.  
 
19 For an overview of this literature see Paul Maylam, “Explaining the Apartheid City: 20 
Years of South African Urban Historiography,” Journal of Southern African Studies 21(1) 
(1995): 19-38; Patrick Bond, Cities of Gold, Townships of Coal: Essays on South Africa’s New 
Urban Crisis (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2000); David Smith, ed., The Apartheid City and 
Beyond: Urbanization and Social Change in South Africa (London: Routledge, 1992); Martin 




rural livelihoods20—are actually linked, with profound consequences for present-
day South Africa. With this reframing, apartheid policies such as the pass laws 
take on a new significance beyond containing labor mobility and controlling 
access to cities. So focused on the indignities associated with carrying a pass, 
some scholars have overlooked the fates of black Africans without a pass, who 
were ordered to work on white-owned farms as punishment. 21  A study of 
vagrancy laws through this lens—as one piece of a continuum that stretched 
through jails and prisons to rural plantations—reveals how deeply entwined 
economic development, criminal law, and prisons have been, and carries 
                                                                                                                                                                     
(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 2008); Anthony Lemon, ed. Homes Apart: South Africa’s 
Segregated Cities (London/Claremont: Paul Chapman/David Philip, 1991). More 
recently, see the work of the University of Cape Town’s African Center for Cities. See 
also the literature on globalization and urban slums, e.g., Mike Davis, Planet of Slums 
(London:Verso, 2006); Robert Neuwirth, Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, A New Urban 
World (New York: Routledge, 2005).   
 
20 See, e.g., the body of work from the University of the Western Cape’s Institute for 
Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) and the University of Cape Town’s NRF 
Research Chair in Land Reform and Democracy in South Africa; Govan Mbeki, South 
Africa: The Peasant’s Revolt (London: Penguin, 1964); Martin Klein, ed., Peasants in Africa: 
Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1980); William Beinert and 
Colin Bundy, Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: Politics & Popular Movements in the 
Transkei and Eastern Cape (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987); Colin Bundy, The 
Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (Cape Town: David Philip, 1988). 
 
21 As chapter two discusses at length, the historiography of pass laws has focused on their role in 
regulating migration and urban labor markets. See Doug Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban 
African Proletariat in South Africa (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987); Gary Baines, “A 
Progressive South African City? Port Elizabeth and Influx Control, ca. 1923-1953,” Journal of 
Urban History 31 (2004); Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and 




implications for efforts to reform many institutions (such as courts, policing, 
prisons, and rural labor markets) inherited by present-day South Africa.  
Later chapters examine the role of the World Bank and other international 
institutions in shaping the contours of land and housing policies and notions of 
“urban” and “rural,” first in other parts of Africa and Latin America during the 
1970s and later in South Africa. These chapters show how the World Bank came 
to promote a neoliberal version of the state, restricting the government’s role to 
“enabling” the market to meet people’s needs. This entailed a reshaping of the 
relationship between government and citizens, which helps explain the clash 
between popular expectations for what the post-apartheid government would do 
to improve the majority’s economic well-being and what the government in fact 
intended to deliver. Essentially, these sections examine the political and 
economic narratives that have been constructed in order to de-legitimate 
government-led expropriation and redistribution processes. 
Next, I revisit the thread between economic development, criminalization, 
and prisons that begins in the chapter on pass and vagrancy laws.  Focused on 
the transition from apartheid and the first five years of ANC rule, this chapter 
examines the ANC’s adoption of private prisons and harsh criminal justice 




ANC was committed to making the country safe for foreign investment and 
white commercial farming. South Africa’s “war on crime” also involved new 
public-private partnerships to build super-maximum prisons, with the 
government careful to frame such projects as examples of black economic 
empowerment and service delivery. Since land dispossession, economic 
development, and criminal legal institutions (such as courts, jails, and parole 
practices) formed a powerful nexus under apartheid, it is worth continuing an 
examination of these forces alongside each other in the post-apartheid era.  
 Together, these chapters reveal much about the ongoing significance of 
land dispossession and its relationship to citizenship and politics in South 
Africa’s neoliberal democracy. The dissertation’s timespan is broad, covering 
much of the 20th century and extending to the beginning of the 21st century. 
Drawing on my training in international and global history, the geographic reach 
is also wide, stretching well beyond South Africa’s borders to examine the role of 
international institutions and foreign political actors. Given this range, the 
dissertation does not comprise chapters that follow a tight chronology, but 
instead examines dynamics that shaped politics and prospects for redistribution 
over time. Together, these chapters offer insight into a range of historical forces 






I. Historiographical and theoretical literature 
 While each chapter engages with its own relevant historiography and 
theoretical literature, the dissertation as a whole draws upon and extends four 
main literatures: the history of economic and political development in urban and 
rural areas in South Africa; post-colonial transitions; neoliberal democracy; and 
prisons, criminology, and criminal justice. I will discuss them here in turn.  
a. Urban-rural division and politics 
Historians and theorists of colonialism, segregation, and apartheid in 
South Africa have long debated the relationship between urban and rural areas. 
Since the country’s economy and society was engineered into a system of rural 
black African reserves (Bantustans), white-owned plantations, cities with tightly 
policed racial borders, and migrant labor, it is no wonder that historians focused 
on understanding the functions of these geographic institutions. Yet for many 
years the historiography on South Africa’s urban and rural areas was divided. 
Beginning in the 1960s, liberal historians of South Africa began to study the 
economic and social impetus for apartheid in a systemic way. The prevailing 




societies: a white urban and capitalist agrarian system on the one hand and a 
rural impoverished and stagnating African sector on the other.”22 Interactions 
between the parallel economies were perceived to be minimal. The actual 
dependency of the “white urban” sector upon the “rural black” sector was 
largely ignored, as was the reality of intermixing between the “societies.” Sub-
fields of study grew up around land and agrarian studies23 quite separate from 
sub-fields on “the apartheid city” and the urban proletariat. 24  As a result, 
scholars in these sub-fields tended to ask very different questions about social 
phenomena and the nature of historical change, and rarely engaged with each 
other around policies that affected both areas. At times this disciplinary divide 
resulted in truncated analyses that stopped at spatially defined boundaries rather 
than pursuing a line of thought that more accurately tracked lived experiences of 
                                                        
22  Richard Levin and Daniel Weiner, eds., “No More Tears”: Struggles for Land in 
Mpumalanga, South Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1997), 7.  
 
23 See, e.g., the body of work from the University of the Western Cape’s Institute for 
Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) and the University of Cape Town’s NRF 
Research Chair in Land Reform and Democracy in South Africa; Mbeki, South Africa: The 
Peasant’s Revolt. Martin Klein, Peasants in Africa; Beinert and Bundy, Hidden Struggles in 
Rural South Africa; Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry. 
 
24 For an overview of this literature see Paul Maylam, “Explaining the Apartheid City;” 
Bond, Cities of Gold; Smith, The Apartheid City and Beyond; Murray, Taming the Disorderly 
City; Lemon, Homes Apart. More recently, see the work of the University of Cape Town’s 
African Center for Cities. See also the literature on globalization and urban slums, e.g., 





movement and connection.25  
Historian Colin Bundy’s influential work on the South African peasantry 
took aim at the dual economy thesis, placing blame for the “underdevelopment 
of the peasant sector” squarely at the door of capitalist development.26 Neo-
Marxist historians, most notably Harold Wolpe, extended this analysis. Wolpe’s 
“cheap labor thesis” argued that segregation produced a supply of cheap African 
migrant labor that fueled South Africa’s unique process of industrialization.27 
The cheap labor thesis was the first to acknowledge that people, namely black 
Africans, were regularly and systematically moving between urban and rural 
areas, and that South Africa did not consist of two distinct societies. 
Furthermore, the divide was viewed as inherently exploitative. Still, while the 
cheap labor thesis of the early 1970s recognized the underdevelopment of rural 
                                                        
25 See chapter two for a discussion of how this pertains to the historiography of pass 
laws. 
 
26 Colin Bundy, “The Emergence and Decline of a South African Peasantry,” African 
Affairs 71 (1972), 20. (“If I have adequately demonstrated that which I set out to, then the 
dualist model of the South African economy is a misleading one: the distance between 
the races in economic, cultural, and political spheres was not an original state lessened 
by capitalist development, but rather the outcome of that development; and 
explanations of the underdevelopment of the peasant sector which rest upon the 
inherited backwardness and inadequacy of that sector are incorrectly premised”).  
 
27  Harold Wolpe, “Capitalism and Cheap Labour-Power in South Africa: From 





areas as a direct product of industrialization, the scholarly divide between urban 
and rural research remained largely intact through the 1980s. 
Mahmood Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject (1996) constituted a 
methodological shift in the study of rural areas in Africa and of the relationship 
between urban and rural spaces. Mamdani’s analysis de-emphasized the mode 
of livelihood and focused instead on the mode of rule in understanding 
distinctions between urban and rural spaces. In this view, South Africa was, as 
other African colonial states were, a bifurcated state, organized differently in 
urban areas than in rural ones.28 This state “contains a duality: two forms of 
power under a single hegemonic authority.”29 The organization of the colonial 
state, according to Mamdani, was a response to the central dilemma of the 
“native question,” which essentially asked, “how can a tiny and foreign minority 
rule over an indigenous majority?” 30  Both direct and indirect rule were 
attempted in South Africa, and they became complementary. When forced to 
deal with the “native question,” the apartheid government chose to prop up and 
rule through traditional authorities, thus making blacks into subjects of tribal 
                                                        
28 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 18. 
 
29 Ibid., 18. 
 





authority rather than citizens of the South African nation. The ultimate move was 
the creation of “homelands,” which were intended to completely remove blacks 
from South African territory and political life. As a result, the urban and the rural 
became distinguishable as the sites of urban citizens of democratic states and 
rural subjects of customary authority.   
Mamdani has been criticized for drawing too straight a line from colonial 
divide-and-rule tactics to the contemporary politics of sovereign post-colonial 
states; he has been charged with “leap-frogging” over the history that came in 
between. 31  Still, Mamdani’s intervention was—and remains—valuable for its 
insistence that the relationship between urban and rural spaces had implications 
not just for the economy, but for politics and political identities. Mamdani 
explicitly called for political actors and scholars to challenge the political 
structure of the urban-rural divide. He wrote: “Any effective opposition in 
practice, and any theoretical analysis that would lead to one, must link the rural 
and the urban in ways that have not yet been done.”32 
                                                        
31  Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005), 17-18; see also, Bill Freund, “Democracy and the 
Colonial Heritage in Africa: Revisiting Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject,” Left History 7.1 
(2000): 101-108 (“[I] am skeptical of whether it is really possible to jump as quickly as 
does Mamdani from the subjects and citizens of colonial despotism to the current 
problems of the African countryside. I think too much water has run under the bridge.”) 
 




For the past decade, scholars, particularly anthropologists and 
geographers, have thought about urban-rural linkages in careful and nuanced 
ways. For example, Steven Robin’s study of social movements and NGOs after 
apartheid cuts across urban and rural activist efforts to understand evolving 
‘rights’ discourses.33 Mark Hunter’s ethnographic work on HIV, inequality, and 
gender traces economies of exchange through informal settlements and rural 
areas.34 Gillian Hart’s argument that we must rethink the land question in terms 
of a social wage is grounded in empirical research in former white towns and 
adjacent black townships, as well as careful attention to rural land 
dispossession.35 These richly researched studies cutting across urban and rural 
areas are a welcome departure from previous scholarship that viewed urban and 
rural as separate areas of inquiry.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
33  Steven Robins, From Revolution to Rights in South Africa: Social Movements, NGOs & 
Popular Politics after Apartheid (Suffolk: James Curry Press, 2008). 
 
34  Mark Hunter, Love in the Time of AIDS: Inequality, Gender, and Rights in South 
Africa. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press; Pietermaritzburg, University of 
KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2010); Mark Hunter, “From Migrating Men to Moving Women: 
Trends in South Africa’s Changing Political Economy and Geography of Intimacy,” in 
Felicity Thomas, Mary Haour-Knipe, and Peter Aggleton, eds., Mobility, Sexuality and 
AIDS (London: Routledge).  
 
35  Gillian Hart, Disabling Globalization: Places of Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa 




My own work builds from Mamdani’s insistence that we must analyze 
urban-rural bifurcation as a political construct with implications for political 
subjectivities. I elaborate on my analysis of the politics of urban-rural division at 
several points in the dissertation. First, by re-examining the literature on pass 
laws in chapter two, and next, in chapter three, by tracing the history of how the 
World Bank constructed “urban” as an analytical concept and target for 
intervention. In chapter five, I discuss the LPM’s efforts to bridge the urban-rural 
divide through the creation of a “landless” identity that knows no urban or rural 
bounds. Also in chapter five, I examine how the ANC reinforces spatial and 
economic division through its conception of South Africa as being composed of 
“two economies,” thereby justifying a neoliberal, trickle down relationship 
between the rich and poor.    
b. Post-colonial transitions 
 To understand why land remains an underlying preoccupation in South 
African politics and why this fixation matters, I argue that we need histories that 
span the political and intellectual “break” represented by the end of apartheid in 
1994. In this way, my dissertation builds upon the work of theorists who have 




signify.36 By analyzing the ways in which post-colonial spaces continue to be 
inhabited as colonial spaces, we might begin to understand the poverty not only 
of these terms but also of a historiographical language of “rupture” and 
“continuity.” In other words, we can better understand how the past is 
implicated in the present. This allows us to question clean narratives of 
“emancipation” or “liberation” and focus instead on the continuity and 
expansion of the forms of human experience that are excluded from the realm of 
politics. 37  I argue that there is merit in understanding how such political 
exclusions were maintained through a period portrayed as a transition away 
from the “dark days of colonialism.”  
                                                        
36 See Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 2006); Jean Comaroff and John L. Comaroff, “Millennial 
Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming,” Public Culture 12(2) (2000): 291-343; 
Grant Farred, “The Not-Yet Counterpartisan: A New Politics of Oppositionality,” The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 103(4) (2004): 589-606; Joseph Massad, “The ‘Post-Colonial’ 
Colony: Time, Space, and Bodies in Palestine/Israel,” in Fawzia Afzal-Khan and 
Kalpana Seshadri-Crooks (eds.), The Pre-Occupation of Postcolonial Studies (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000); Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001); Scott, Conscripts of Modernity; David Scott, Refashioning Futures: 
Criticism After Postcoloniality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); Sylvia Wynter 
and David Scott, “The Re-Enchantment of Humanism: An Interview with Sylvia 
Wynter,” Small Axe 8 (2000).  
 
37  For example, in the context of the 19th century United States, Saidiya Hartman 
examined the ongoing forms of racial subjugation that continued in notions of 
humanity, protection, and rights in the aftermath of slavery. Saidiya Hartman, Scenes of 
Subjection: Terror, Slavery and Self-Making in Nineteenth Century America (Oxford: Oxford 





 Debates over whether South Africa is “neo-colonial” or whether the ANC 
has ushered in a form of “neo-apartheid” are beside the point. These labels tend 
to obscure more than they reveal. Instead, I argue that we should examine the 
shifts that were already afoot before South Africa’s spectacularly heightened 
“transition” moment of the early-mid 1990s. As chapters three and four reveal, 
instead of either rupture or continuity, this period saw a shift in the boundary 
lines for what political demands would be permitted and what claims could be 
made on the state. Because of neoliberal shifts that had taken place both 
domestically and internationally in the 1970s and 1980s, the arena for claims for 
economic redistribution, much less redistributive justice, were sharply curtailed. 
Calling this dynamic a “hold over” from the previous political era oversimplifies 
the workings of state power, and underestimates the adaptive qualities of both 
the National Party (NP) in the 1980s and the ANC in the 1990s.   
 I am interested in these questions not as abstractions, but rather in terms 
of their concrete political significance. In this vein, I am intrigued by the LPM’s 
refusal to validate a ‘post-apartheid’ political order which maintained 
apartheid’s exclusions and their rejection of the political subjectivity which that 
order produced for them.38 The LPM recognized the post-apartheid order as 
                                                        




being founded upon, not the end of landlessness, but the death of the ‘landless 
subject’ (producing the ‘homeless’ or ‘urban poor’ in its place). More broadly I 
am interested in how subjectivities projected by the ‘post-colonial’ state conflict 
with the subjectivities which people embrace for themselves based on alternate 
conceptions of what decolonization must entail in order for ‘post-colonial’ to 
carry any meaning. 
c. Neoliberalism and democracy 
  In addition to engaging theoretical work on the “post-colony,” my 
dissertation builds upon two other fields of scholarship that cut across the 
disciplines of history, anthropology, and economic theory: (1) theories of 
neoliberalism and citizenship; and (2) the political economy of race and processes 
of racialization. In recent years, a number of anthropologists have grappled with 
questions about how neoliberalism (characterized by privatization, market 
deregulation, and fiscal austerity39) has altered the nature of citizenship and 
people’s abilities to make claims upon states and other sources of power and 
control.40 Drawing on Foucault’s notions of governmentality and the production 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
39 See definition and discussion in footnote 13 above. 
 
40 Julia Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession: NGOs, Economic Development and the State in 
Cairo (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005); James Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in 




of political subjects, many of these thinkers have rethought the categories of ‘the 
market’ and ‘the state’ in an attempt to understand how such categories and 
notions are produced, and what political and economic subjectivites are being 
produced alongside them.41 Julia Elyachar’s work on NGOs and the state in 
Cairo, for example, departs from ideas of the market as a pre-exisiting corollary 
to the state, instead highlighting how ‘the market’ has been conceived of as an 
end to be created through political machinations. Here we see the state and 
international financial institutions such as the World Bank working to bring 
about the market and, in the process, advancing certain ‘entrepreneurial’ 
subjectivities to match.42 Julia Elyachar, James Ferguson, and Timothy Mitchell 
have focused on the role of experts and expert knowledge in particular in 
transforming political questions into technocratic questions to be ‘managed’ 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa,” 
American Anthropologist, 107 (2005): 377–382; James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, 
“Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of Neoliberal Governmentality,” American 
Ethnologist 29(4) (2002): 981-1002; Aihwa Ong, Neoliberalism as Exception: Mutations in 
Citizenship and Sovereignty (Durhan: Duke University Press, 2006); Janet Roitman, Fiscal 
Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). On methodological challenges for scholars conducting 
empirical research on governmentality, power/resistance, and subjectivity, see Stina 
Hansson, Sofie Hellberg, and Maria Stern, eds., Studying the Agency of Being Governed 
(London: Routledge, 2015).  
 
41 Michel Foucault, “Governmentality” in The Foucault Effect, ed. Graham Burchell et al. 
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rather than resolved. 43  This scholarship provides a useful framework for 
understanding post-apartheid land reform processes, in which deeply political 
discussions of land and liberation have become technicist debates over urban 
land use management, shelter provision, service delivery, and market efficiency. 
My work examines the subjectivities that technocratic, market-led approaches to 
land reform aim to produce (chapter three), and the popular subjectivities being 
asserted in their place (chapter five).   
  In addition, given the transnational character of neoliberal market 
deregulation, many scholars of neoliberalism and citizenship have attempted to 
understand the spatial dynamics of governmentality.44 My work builds upon 
                                                        
43  Elyachar, Markets of Dispossession; James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: 
“Development,” Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1994), 256 (“By uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a technical 
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oppressed people, the hegemonic problematic of ‘development’ is the principle means 
through which the question of poverty is de-politicized in the world today”); Timothy 
Mitchell, “The Work of Economics: How a Discipline Makes Its World,” European Journal 
of Sociology 46 (2005); Timothy Mitchell, Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics and 
Modernity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). See also Donald MacKenzie, 
Fabian Muniesa and Lucia Siu, eds., Do Economists Make Markets?: On the Performativity of 
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(Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 2006); A. Haroon Akram-Lodhi, “Land, Markets and 
Neoliberal Enclosure: An Agrarian Political Economy Perspective,” Third World 
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such spatial and geographical theories in two ways. First, since South Africa’s 
experiments in neoliberal reform have been informed by both international and 
domestic agendas, South Africa is a particularly useful site for theorizing the 
relationship between institutions of international governmentality (such as the 
World Bank) and individual states. Second, since the Landless People’s 
Movement contested the politics of space in a very concrete sense (and explicitly 
argued against politicized notions of urban and rural division), the movement 
provides insight into how spatialized concepts of governmentality were 
experienced and contested in the Mbeki years. In this way, the movement also 
provides insight into the spatiality of resistance, a theme which marks the history 
of southern Africa and the struggle against apartheid, which was waged across 
township boundaries and international borders.     
  Overall, my research shows that the development of neoliberal 
approaches and experiments to implement them—particularly by the World 
Bank and through public-private partnerships for prison construction—often 
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were rife with difficulties. While the imposition of the Washington Consensus is 
frequently billed as a slick endeavor in global economic re-ordering, the reality 
was much more of a stumbling process. As I explain in chapter three, the World 
Bank “experts” were often engaged in trial-and-error when it came to developing 
an approach to housing and “service delivery” in cities. Similarly, the flurry of 
international consultants that came to shape the transition from apartheid 
regularly worked at cross-purposes and without clear long-term blueprints, 
resulting in a patchwork of various policy trends that were not always consistent 
across sectors.45 Neoliberal austerity measures came out on top, but the process 
was not as smooth as some would have imagined or as writers have since 
depicted it. Often the adoption of such measures had less to do with the ANC’s 
susceptibility to neoliberal ideas and more to do with certain policy areas (like 
criminal justice reform and prisons) being low on a dauntingly long list of 
priorities, or of a particularly passionate individual stepping in to fill a void in 
leadership.46  
                                                        
45 See Dirk van Zyl Smit and Elrena van der Spuy, “Importing Criminological Ideas in a 
New Democracy: Recent South African Experiences,” in Criminal Justice and Political 
Cultures: National and International Dimensions of Crime Control, ed. Tim Newburn and 
Richard Sparks (Portland: Willan, 2004). 
 
46 See, e.g., chapter four’s discussion of Sipho Mzimela, first Minister of the Department 





  In terms of the political economy of race, scholarship on post-apartheid 
South Africa was surprisingly weak, well into the Mbeki years, when it came to 
theorizing the ongoing articulations between race and class. Given the rise of a 
small black middle class in the country, some theorists writing a decade into 
ANC rule argued that we had seen a shift “from race to class apartheid.”47 
However, such formulations are unable to capture the reality of how 
neoliberalism has created, consolidated, and mobilized certain racial formations. 
I aim to bring insights from the aforementioned scholarship on neoliberalism 
together with insights from scholarship on race.48 Some theorists have begun to 
examine what Jodi Melamed has called ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ by 
examining how “race remains a procedure that justifies the nongeneralizability 
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of capitalist wealth.”49 Achille Mbembe has argued that race in South Africa “did 
not simply become a crucial, pervasive dimension of colonial domination and 
capitalist exploitation. Turned into law, it was also used as a privileged 
mechanism for turning black life into waste—a race doomed to wretchedness, 
degradation, abjection and servitude.” 50  In the face of a neoliberal capitalist 
regime that produces both immense wealth and “entire categories of unwanted 
people,” Mbembe argues that the challenge ahead “is nothing less than the re-
foundation of democracy as a community of life.”51 I build upon work in this 
vein by analyzing how neoliberal democracy in South Africa has depended upon 
ongoing articulations of race.  
South Africa is a compelling site to engage such scholarship on post-
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colonialism, neoliberalism, and race, since many narratives of post-apartheid 
South Africa have relied on teleological notions of progress from the “racist” 
apartheid era to a “non-racial” present and future post-apartheid country. 52 
Contemporary social movements, including the Landless People’s Movement, 
have often questioned such narratives by arguing that there are important 
continuities between the apartheid and post-apartheid eras, especially around 
the perpetuation of racialized economic inequalities. The differences in these 
historical narratives are critically significant, as they help to either negate or 
support the basis for continued, post-apartheid struggle.  
As a liberal ideology of inclusion, the ANC’s “non-racialism” has proven 
particularly well-suited to legitimating South Africa’s political economy and 
managing a neoliberal, market-based project. Rather than being an “anti-racist” 
ideology, “non-racialism” did not actually break with apartheid categorizations 
of race, but instead accepted the idea of distinct, biologically-defined “national 
groups.” It merely asserted the liberal desire for equality between these groups, 
and thus has proven useful in creating a small black middle class and 
simultaneously denying claims for more widespread redistribution.53 Michael 
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MacDonald has examined the role of liberal racial ideology and racial 
nationalism in spurring the ANC’s Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) 
program, 54 while simultaneously suffocating opposition to neoliberal 
capitalism.55 As MacDonald writes, the ANC “can absorb the political costs of 
maintaining neoliberal economic policies because it draws on racial solidarities, 
because it appeals to Africans as Africans.”56 
In chapter four I examine parliamentary debates over prison privatization 
and legislation that lengthened prison sentences and made the criminal justice 
system more “tough on crime.” Here too ANC members of parliament defended 
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the process of awarding private prison contracts because such contracts would 
“contribute to the black empowerment,” as some of the private consortia 
included black partners.57 While prisons generally epitomize a lack of freedom, 
the MPs suggested that prison contracts would lead to black empowerment on 
two fronts; they argued that black-owned consortia would be enriched and that 
conditions for black people, who were the majority of those crowded in the 
country’s prisons, would improve. This may have been a convenient talking 
point (deployed to defend against accusations of corruption) or an actual 
conception of economic development—or both. Either way, it chimes with the 
ANC’s overall BEE approach, which mandated black representation on private 
consortia bidding for government contracts, thereby increasing the number of 
blacks among the millionaire ranks. This is but one example of how liberal racial 
ideology—which sought equal representation of all “racial groups” among the 
highest economic ranks—has provided justification for neoliberal policies that 
continued to exclude the majority of South Africans from economic prosperity. 
By this logic, black tenders for private prison construction can be presented as 
evidence of inclusivity and transformation. Meanwhile, more black South 
Africans are serving prison terms, with longer sentences, in institutions that, 
                                                        




under apartheid and after, exemplify unfreedom. 
d. Prisons, criminology, and criminal justice 
My dissertation also draws upon and extends the literature on prisons and 
criminal justice in South Africa. Academic criminology—the study of the nature, 
causes, and consequences of crime and criminal behavior—is a well-established 
discipline in South Africa, dating back to the 1930s.58 Dirk van Zyl Smit has 
traced the emergence of academic criminology alongside Afrikaner nationalism, 
describing early Afrikaner criminologists’ preoccupations with “the poor white 
problem,” “the black danger,” and “organic differences” between “racial groups” 
that demanded strict territorial segregation.59 In response to Afrikaner nationalist 
criminology, a diffuse field of legal reformist criminology began to emerge in the 
1950s, which sought to make the criminal justice system more humane and 
efficient. 60  In the 1980s, critical criminology or “criminology for a new 
democratic South Africa” focused on examining the relationship of criminology 
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to the state and was committed to the abolition of apartheid.61 As van Zyl Smit 
has observed, these three currents map onto the tripartite conservative, liberal, 
and radical streams that characterize criminological thought in most societies 
where the discipline is established.62 Today the reformist and critical currents 
remain robust, led by research institutions including the University of Cape 
Town Centre of Criminology, the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, the Institute for Security Studies, and the Wits Justice Project. 
Much of the research output focuses on the core areas of inquiry of modern 
criminology: crime rates, courts, policing, and prison conditions.63  
My dissertation, particularly chapter two on pass laws and prison labor, 
adds a historical dimension to a discussion of punishment and prisons that is 
often dominated by sociologists and legal theorists. In so doing, this study 
focuses attention on an area that has received short shrift in South African 
historiography and political theory: the relationship between punishment, 
imprisonment, and labor markets. Over the past decade, scholars in the United 
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States have begun to focus on the economic and political causes of mass 
incarceration and, in some cases, the role of prisons in controlling a surplus labor 
force.64 Most notably, Bruce Western has argued that “rising economic inequality 
in America and the failure of urban labor markets to provide good jobs for young 
unskilled men” precipitated mass imprisonment in the last decades of the 20th 
century.65 I argue that, in apartheid South Africa in the middle of the century, the 
economic relationship between labor markets and incarceration was more 
extreme—criminalization and imprisonment were not merely a coercive way of 
dealing with unemployment, but were integral to the creation of a labor force. 
Criminalization and imprisonment helped bring about cheap labor markets and, 
later, helped manipulate them. Until the end of the 1950s, this system was baldly 
coercive and punitive. After a media uproar and several court cases exposed the 
use of prison labor on farms in 1959, the South African government attempted to 
change the face of the system from coercive and punitive to contractual and even 
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welfarist. Still, as chapter two shows, these cosmetic reforms did little to change 
the experiences of those caught in the tripwires of pass laws and sent to work on 
farms and for other employers.  
Chapter four (on crime, prisons, and neoliberal development) focuses on 
the intense period of criminal justice reform in the first five years after apartheid. 
South African criminology studies of this period have tended to focus on prison 
conditions (with a heavy focus on violations of Constitutional law and human 
rights),66 prison privatization,67 or critical (most often Foucauldian) analysis of 
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crime discourses and governance.68 While these studies have contributed much, 
few studies link the broad literature on service delivery and market-driven 
development through austerity to prisons and criminal justice. I do so here. I 
contribute to the literature on private prisons, but also push further to 
understand the place of private prisons and harsh new criminal procedure and 
sentencing laws within a broader shifts toward neoliberal economic development 
strategies. Since the vast majority of South Africa’s prisons remained under 
public control—only two of the country’s 240 prisons were privately-run—a 
focus on private prisons can overshadow more systemic trends. The relationship 
between criminal justice reform and neoliberal development goes far beyond the 
small number of “public-private” partnerships with U.S. and British consortia 
and companies like Wackenhut and Geo Group. 
I argue that “tough-on-crime” criminal justice reforms and prison 
expansion helped to propel a neoliberal approach to economic development in 
the years immediately after South Africa’s democratic transition (1995-2000). 
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While public safety and crime were no doubt valid concerns in this period, there 
are many possible solutions to these problems. South Africa adopted a particular 
solution, borrowing heavily, as we shall see, from carceral technology and “war 
on crime” rhetoric developed in the United States. Indeed, there exists no better 
model than the United States for expanding a national prison economy during an 
era of neoliberal austerity. I argue that, in South Africa, prisons and harsh 
criminalization were meant to spur the economy in two ways: 1) by showing that 
the ANC was “tough on crime” and committed to making the country safe for 
foreign investment and white commercial farming; and 2) by generating 
development through the punishment economy. That is, prison contracts were 
framed as a form of “service delivery,” as they were meant to create jobs in 
construction and corrections as well as secondary markets such as prison food 
vending.  
As I describe in more depth in chapter four, the emergence of prisons as a 
vehicle for economic development in post-apartheid South Africa begs the 
question: what are prisons for in post-apartheid South Africa? Historians and 
social theorists from a range of disciplines have grappled with the role that mass 
incarceration plays within neoliberal democratic societies. While punishment 




(particularly scholars of late 20th century United States, the most heavily 
incarcerated country on the planet) have sought to contextualize exploding 
incarceration rates within broader economic shifts—namely, the intensification of 
neoliberal deregulation and privatization over the past 30 years.69 Within this 
focus, scholars have expanded on Foucault’s call to understand incarceration as a 
form of statecraft,70 focusing on penal expansion as a political project, one that is 
fundamentally about the state’s continued control of poor, predominately black 
people. Specifically, this literature focuses on the role of prisons in: warehousing 
surplus labor;71 maintaining a racial caste system;72 and constituting a market for 
private interests. 73  In the South African context, Gail Super has made a 
compelling argument for understanding the ANC’s crime discourse as a way of 
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consolidating power and defining “criminals” as traitors of the new nation in the 
years after the transition from formal apartheid.74 My dissertation, especially 
chapter four, adds to this literature by examining how prisons came to be framed 
as a mechanism for nation-building and economic development by the ANC in 
the first years of its rule.   
 
II. Sources 
 My research draws upon correspondence, reports, internal memoranda, 
newspaper articles, draft articles, interview transcriptions, labor contracts, 
parliamentary debates, and other records found in archives and personal paper 
collections in South Africa and the United States. Most of these sources were in 
English, but some contained passages in Afrikaans or Zulu, of which I had a 
working reading knowledge. Since much of my historical inquiry focuses on 
closed institutions, including the World Bank and the apartheid prison system, I 
was fortunate to find personal archives that provided some access and insight 
into these restricted institutions. For example, my research on the convict leasing 
system in South Africa is based in large part on documents found in the 
Benjamin Pogrund papers at Yale University. Pogrund was one of South Africa’s 
                                                        





leading liberal journalists during apartheid, and he conducted extensive research 
on prisons and prison conditions. My chapter on the World Bank’s urban 
assistance programs draws on internal memoranda, mission reports, and staff 
reviews found in the archives of Michael Cohen, a head staffer in the World 
Bank’s urban division from 1972-1999. When Cohen joined the faculty of the 
New School in 2001, he brought his personal archive of published and 
unpublished World Bank materials and has made them available for research 
purposes. 
The dissertation’s fifth chapter draws on interviews I conducted with 35 
Landless People’s Movement members and organizers between 2003 and 2006. 
The original set of 2003 interviews was conducted as part of my B.A. thesis 
research on the movement. The urban component of the interviews was 
conducted in Johannesburg and its surrounding townships. I conducted 
interviews in areas where LPM activity was particularly intense, including the 
townships of Protea South in Soweto, Eikenhof, and Thembelihle, and in the 
township of Orange Farm, where it was less robust. In inner-city Johannesburg, I 
interviewed LPM members in the neighborhoods of Hillbrow and Berea. For the 
rural component, I interviewed farm workers near the rural town of Ingogo in 




home to the LPM’s national organizer at the time, Mangaliso Kubheka, and so 
was selected as the rural basis for the study because of the level of LPM 
involvement and activity surrounding Kubheka’s presence. Interviewees 
represented a range of age groups, from members in their late teens to those in 
their 60s. A relatively equal gender balance was achieved in urban areas, while 
rural interviewees were disproportionately male. Interviews were conducted 
both individually and in groups of two to four. About half of the interviews were 
conducted in English, when the interviewee was comfortably fluent and 
preferred to be interviewed in English. The rest of the interviews were conducted 
in Zulu through an interpreter. Zulu was the first language of those interviewed 
in KwaZulu-Natal, and was spoken fluently by interviewees in urban areas.   
 
 
III. Chapter plan 
 
 This dissertation is organized into six chapters, including this 
introductory chapter. Each chapter is designed to tell a full story of its own, so 
chapters tend to span decades. As such, while the dissertation proceeds roughly 
chronologically, some chapters cover overlapping time periods. The second 
chapter, “‘The Authorities Cannot Meet Demand’: Prison Labor, Pass Laws, and 




apartheid pass laws. Previous studies of pass laws have primarily focused on the 
indignities associated with possessing a pass—having to procure it, carry it, and 
produce it on demand. While pass laws were certainly aimed at containing labor 
mobility and controlling access to cities, I focus on the underside of these 
regulations—that is, the equally important function of those without a pass, who 
were ordered to work on white-owned farms as punishment. Studying vagrancy 
laws in this way—as one piece of a continuum that stretched through jails and 
prisons to rural plantations—reveals how the apartheid state and white 
agricultural development were bolstered by a system of prison labor.  
Chapter three, “‘A Disciplining Mechanism for Holding Standards Down’: 
The World Bank, Urban Planning, and South Africa’s Transition from 
Apartheid,” tells the history of the World Bank’s attempts to frame the 
relationship between states, markets, and citizens through its urban assistance 
programs during the 1970s and 1980s. Over this period, the World Bank 
encouraged governments to withdraw from providing public housing directly 
and to act instead as an ‘enabler’ of market forces, with lasting economic and 
political consequences. The chapter concludes with a focus on South Africa in the 
early 1990s, when the World Bank (after two decades of practice in promoting 




policies. In the years since, these policies have resulted in explosive 
confrontations with civil-society activists, including the LPM, who remain 
committed to alternative visions of the role of the state in housing and service 
provision. 
Chapter four, “‘To All Who Live In It’: Crime, Prisons and Neoliberal 
Development,” focuses on the broad range of criminal justice and prison reforms 
adopted in the first five years after the end of formal apartheid. In this period, 
parliament passed legislation that imposed mandatory minimum sentences, 
made access to bail more difficult, imposed ‘truth-in-sentencing’ and limited 
parole, and allowed the government to enter into contracts for private prisons. I 
argue that “tough-on-crime” criminal justice reforms and prison expansion 
helped to propel a neoliberal approach to economic development. Public-private 
prison contracts and new super-maximum prisons were framed as a form of 
“service delivery,” as it was said they would create jobs in construction and 
corrections as well as secondary markets.  
Chapter five, “Rights Beyond the Urban-Rural Divide: South Africa’s 
Landless People’s Movement and the Battle for Post-Apartheid Democracy,” 
examines the confrontation between the Landless People’s Movement and the 




focuses on the LPM’s “No Land! No Vote!” campaign in the lead up to the 2004 
national elections. The LPM made it clear with this campaign that any 
democracy which grants the right to vote but denies rights to land (and the 
problem of landlessness itself) was a democracy at odds with their conception of 
themselves not as passive recipients of rights but as people still struggling to give 
weight to the demands of liberation struggle. In closing, I discuss some of the 
implications of these historical dynamics for South Africa’s political power 



























“The Authorities Cannot Meet Demand”: Prison Labor, Pass Laws, and 





Imprisonment is the order of the day for the smallest contravention of the 
law and of the thousands of regulations that surround every step of the 
citizen, and unfortunately our natives are the greatest sufferers: a raw and 
unsophisticated native coming from his kraal to one of our towns, to look 
for work, will almost surely find himself in prison within 24 hours of his 
arrival for unwittingly contravening some regulation, probably a pass 
regulation.75 
 
-- Justice F. E. T. Krause, Judge-President of the Orange Free State, South 
Africa, 1936 
 
  In a speech at the 1936 National Conference on Social Work in 
Johannesburg, Justice F. E. T. Krause condemned the series of legal tripwires that 
awaited any black person who entered a city with pass regulations and who 
could not justify his or her presence with proof of employment. Krause’s 
observations, paternalistic as they were, highlighted how swift and pervasive 
pass arrests had become. Although localities had used pass controls for 
centuries—as early as the 1760s, enslaved people in the Cape Colony were 
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required to carry documents signed by their masters when moving between rural 
and urban areas76—pass law convictions had increased over the previous decade. 
Such convictions accounted for by far the largest number of criminal convictions 
in the Transvaal, with around 40,000 per year by the end of the 1920s.77 While the 
web of laws mandating passes and curfews was aimed at preventing vagrancy or 
idleness—by compelling black Africans to seek employment—the laws’ 
underside was just as efficient in manipulating the labor market. For those who 
could not produce passes were often sent to jail, but they did not remain there 
long; most were leased out to farmers and others who relied on a steady stream 
of cheap prison labor to keep production costs down.  
 Historical accounts of pass laws have typically focused on their role in 
maintaining “influx control,” or ensuring that cities did not become 
“overcrowded” with what the government deemed “surplus people.”78 Some 
accounts have also focused on the role of pass laws in creating a supply of forced 
                                                        
76  Doug Hindson, Pass Controls and the Urban African Proletariat in South Africa 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 15. 
 
77 Martin Chanock, The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and 
Prejudice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
 
78 See, e.g., Gary Baines, “A progressive South African city? Port Elizabeth and influx 
control, ca. 1923-1953,” Journal of Urban History 31 (2004); Hindson, Pass Controls; 
Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid, 1948-1961: Conflict and Compromise (Oxford: 





labor insofar as the laws prevented the development of a free labor market.79 
Pass laws were certainly aimed at containing labor mobility, but that is only the 
beginning of another story. The story of what happened to people after they 
were picked up on pass law violations—as an estimated 20 million black men 
were between 1920 and 198080—is an essential, but under acknowledged, part of 
this history. Reframing a study of vagrancy laws in this way—as one piece of a 
continuum that stretched through jails and prisons to rural plantations—reveals 
how the apartheid state and white agricultural development were bolstered by a 
system of prison labor. 
While convict leasing in the U.S. South has been fairly widely studied, far 
less has been written about the use of prison labor on South African mines and 
farms under segregation and apartheid. This is partly due to a sharp division in 
the historiography on South Africa’s urban and rural areas. Beginning in the 
1960s, liberal historians of South Africa began to study the economic and social 
impetus for apartheid in a systemic way. The prevailing view became one of 
South Africa as a “‘dual economy’ with two distinct societies: a white urban and 
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capitalist agrarian system on the one hand and a rural impoverished and 
stagnating African sector on the other.” 81  Interactions between the parallel 
economies were perceived to be minimal. The actual dependency of the “white 
urban” sector upon the “rural black” sector was largely ignored, as was the 
reality of intermixing between the “societies.” Sub-fields of study grew up 
around land and agrarian studies quite separate from sub-fields on “the 
apartheid city” and the urban proletariat. As a result, scholars in these sub-fields 
tended to ask very different questions about social phenomena and the nature of 
historical change, and rarely engaged with each other around policies that 
affected both areas.82 This disciplinary divide has led to a blind spot around the 
continuum of vagrancy laws, prison populations, and captive farm labor.  
I argue that studies of pass laws have focused on the function of carrying 
a pass, while largely overlooking the underside of these regulations—that is, the 
equally important function of those who did not carry a pass. Pass law studies, 
particularly the valuable work done by social historians, have tended to focus on 
the indignities associated with having a pass—having to procure it, carry it, 
produce it on demand; not to mention the time limits and curfews placed on 
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someone who was permitted to enter a city only for a narrow purpose. However, 
I underscore the equally important indignities that befell those who did not have 
passes—and the role their labor played in economic development, particularly in 
the agricultural sector. The ability to violate someone who did not carry a pass—
and thus coerce them (using a court sentence or not) into laboring on a farm—
was just as integral to the labor supply. 
This chapter will examine the use of prison labor on farms during 
segregation and apartheid in South Africa. In Part I, I will survey the 
historiography of pass laws and contextualize these laws within broader 
developments in the South African labor market in the early 20th century, with a 
particular emphasis on agricultural development. In Part II, I will place the use of 
prison labor in comparative perspective by outlining the convict leasing system 
in the United States. While the two systems paralleled each other in some 
respects in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the system in South Africa 
persisted for decades longer—well into the 1960s and 70s. In Parts III and IV, I 
will examine the prison farm labor system in South Africa. Existing scholarship 
on prison farm labor in South Africa tends to end the story with the prison labor 
scandal of 1959; I will discuss this earlier period in Part III, but I will also extend 




correspondence, and government documents from the Benjamin Pogrund Papers 
at Yale University.  
This study focuses attention on an area that has received short shrift in 
South African historiography and political theory: the relationship between 
punishment, imprisonment, and labor markets. Over the past decade, scholars in 
the United States have begun to focus on the economic and political causes of 
mass incarceration and, in some cases, the role of prisons in controlling a surplus 
labor force. Most notably, Bruce Western has argued that “rising economic 
inequality in America and the failure of urban labor markets to provide good 
jobs for young unskilled men” precipitated mass imprisonment in the last 
decades of the 20th century. 83 I argue that, in apartheid South Africa in the 
middle of the century, the economic relationship between labor markets and 
incarceration was more extreme in South Africa—criminalization and 
imprisonment were not merely a coercive way of dealing with unemployment, 
but were integral to the creation of a labor force. Criminalization and 
imprisonment helped bring about cheap labor markets and, later, helped 
manipulate them. Until the end of the 1950s, this system was baldly coercive and 
punitive. After a media uproar and several court cases exposed the use of prison 
                                                        





labor on farms in 1959, the government attempted to change the face of the 
system from coercive and punitive to contractual and even welfarist. Still, as we 
shall see, these cosmetic reforms did little to change the experiences of those 
caught in the tripwires of pass laws and sent to work on farms and for other 
employers as punishment.  
 A note on the chapter’s sources: for the comparative section, I have drawn 
upon the rich secondary literature on convict leasing in the U.S.84 Less has been 
written about the history of prison labor in South Africa, particularly after the 
1950s. In addition to secondary sources, I have relied upon primary sources in 
the Benjamin Pogrund Papers in the Manuscripts & Archives of the Yale 
University Library. Pogrund was one of South Africa’s leading liberal journalists 
throughout apartheid, and he conducted extensive research on prisons and 
prison conditions. His papers include newspaper clippings on prisons spanning 
the 1920s-70s, drafts of articles, correspondence and interviews with people in 
prison and former prisoners, documents obtained from prison administrators 
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(including provisions and contracts for prison labor), court files, and other 
research that he gathered for stories. While most accounts of convict leasing in 
South Africa focus on the period between 1870-1940, little has been written about 
the evolution of the system after that point.85 The Pogrund papers reflect his 
attempt to follow up on this system through the 1960s.  
 It is worth noting that Pogrund’s papers—and in particular the newspaper 
clippings he collected—offer a distinct perspective on the history of South 
Africa’s prisons. Closed institutions present a significant challenge for 
investigative journalists and, decades later, for historians. Newspaper reporters 
and editors tended to frame accounts of apartheid prisons and of the farm labor 
system as “exposés” and “scandals,” generating public outcry and eliciting 
harried responses from government officials. This public dialogue—between 
journalists and editors endeavoring to reveal the violence of apartheid (and in 
the business of selling papers) and government officials concerned with the 
regime’s image domestically and abroad—offers glimpses, momentary and 
exaggerated as they may be, into the daily workings of the prison labor system 
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and the activities of police and courts that facilitated that system. These accounts 
give a useful perspective of how government officials sought to justify the labor 
system in the face of public outcry. As we will see, officials tried to make the 
system seem more palatable in these moments not by instituting genuine reforms 
but by describing the aims of the system as “welfarist” rather than punitive and 
by re-articulating the practices in a manner that was in line with international 
norms.   
 
I. Pass laws, labor markets, and the urban-rural divide 
 Perhaps more so than any other policy, pass laws index the injustice of 
apartheid. 86  Yet pass laws’ actual function for the apartheid state is not 
straightforward and has been the subject of debate. Scholars have puzzled over 
whether passes were a means for social and political control, labor market 
manipulation, restricting movement, or a combination of these and other factors.  
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In the 1940s and 1950s, liberal social scientists began to develop coherent theories 
of why the pass laws had developed and the function they served in exerting 
racial control and manipulating labor markets.87 Writing during the first several 
years of apartheid, liberal historians were not sure how pass laws and other 
apartheid policies would impact the economy, but they feared that pass and 
influx controls would inhibit the natural work of market forces.88 Revisionist 
historians writing in the late 1960s and early 1970s argued that, rather than being 
autonomous spheres, the state and the market are interlinked; capitalism and 
apartheid were not antagonistic, but mutually strengthening.89 In the early 1970s, 
Marxist writers, most notably Harold Wolpe and Martin Legassick, re-
conceptualized the historiography of apartheid using a “cheap labor power” 
thesis. 90 Wolpe argued that repressive state interventions, including pass laws 
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and the Bantustan system, worked to ensure access to cheap labor after the 
decline of subsistence production in the reserves.91 To avoid increasing wages 
and to ensure a continual stream of cheap labor, influx control measures and the 
Bantustan system forced black people into temporary migration and worked to 
remove surplus populations from urban areas.92  
 Doug Hindson’s landmark 1986 study, Pass Controls and the Urban African 
Proletariat in South Africa, was the first to acknowledge the role of pass controls in 
creating not only a migrant labor force, but also a permanent urban African 
workforce and a differentiated working class (with influx control serving to 
regulate competition between sections of this class). Although his study focuses 
on the impact of pass controls on urban areas (with little focus on rural areas and 
their effect on the agricultural sector), it remains the foundational text on pass 
laws and influx control. Giving a historical overview of pass controls, Hindson 
locates their origins in the era of slave and servile labor (which continued 
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through most of the 19th century) when they bound workers to particular 
landlords through indenture contracts and restricted movements between white 
colonial settlements and independent black African areas. 93   In the late 19th 
century, pass controls were used to maintain the temporary migrant labor system 
on the mines. 94  Although he touches on the early history of pass controls, 
Hindson’s study focuses on the evolution of pass controls from the mid-1940s 
(after the end of World War II and at the beginning of formal apartheid in 1948) 
to the mid-1980s.   
Hindson focuses on three main functions of the pass system in this period: 
influx control, labor direction, and labor placement.95 Influx control refers to 
measures taken to limit the growth of the urban population, particularly 
unemployed work seekers and those who were not useful for their labor power 
(including elderly people, children, and, in many sectors at the time, women). 
Labor direction aims at channeling workers into particular types of employment 
either by force or by limiting their choice of sectors or occupations. Posel 
describes the objectives of the Native Affairs Department’s labor “canalisation” 
                                                        









program thus: “Its objectives were to ‘match’ labour supply and demand; to 
improve economic ‘efficiency’ by eliminating the ‘wasteful’ use of labour; and to 
‘rationalise’ the distribution of labour by removing labour bottlenecks and easing 
labour shortcomings.”96 Finally, labor placement measures, largely undertaken 
by labour bureaus, provided employment services by disseminating information 
about work seekers and job vacancies. 97  Hindson argues that these three 
functions of the pass system not only ensured a supply of cheap labor and 
manipulated labor markets, but also impacted the reproduction of labor power 
by restricting black Africans’ movement and settlement and creating differential 
access to jobs, incomes, and housing.98 
Hindson deliberately focused his study of pass laws on urban areas; his 
stated intention was to examine the role of pass laws in shaping an urban, black 
African proletariat class. Yet Hindson’s account, for all its strengths, exemplifies 
a larger cleavage along urban-rural lines in South African historiography. For 
years, urban and rural development were viewed as separate phenomena and 
spheres of inquiry. While the cheap labor thesis of the early 1970s recognized the 
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underdevelopment of rural areas as a direct product of South Africa’s process of 
industrialization, the scholarly divide between urban and rural research 
remained largely intact. In the realm of pass laws, this geographical division has 
resulted in a significant blind spot.  
As this chapter demonstrates, the government had the interests of the 
rural agricultural sector in mind as it shaped pass regulations and debated 
questions of urban administration. Pass laws might be thought of as an instance 
of power and influence—and labor—travelling from rural to urban and back. 
Harsh policing, jails, and prisons served as a crucial valve in a system that linked 
urban and rural areas. Because so many historians have neglected to focus on 
this continuum, everyday experiences of jails and prisons have also been 
neglected in the literature. Of course, there are exceptions. Posel gives an account 
of pass law enforcement, prisons, and their role in shaping labor markets in both 
urban and rural areas in her study of the first decade of apartheid.99 Yet the fact 
remains that the historiography of apartheid South Africa has been divided into 
an emphasis on urban and rural areas and has lacked a focus on the role of 
prisons (and related institutions such as the police and courts) in shaping 
economic development and labor markets. This chapter seeks to move urban-
                                                        





rural connection and mechanisms of criminal punishment—that is, arrests, jails, 
and prisons—closer to the center of analysis. 
Arrests and police harassment, including raids of black townships, were a 
pervasive part of everyday life for black people in urban areas. In Townsmen or 
Tribesmen, a study of Xhosa migrancy to and from the town of East London 
during the 1950s, Philip Mayer and Iona Mayer described the extent to which 
black Africans’ presence in urban areas was contingent upon their labor and 
policed by authorities:  
The migrant is not only permitted but compelled to participate in the 
White-dominated world. Under present regulations, if he fails to get 
himself employment in the East London area the authorities can return 
him from there to the country. But the limits of participation are narrow 
and rigid. In the White world the Black man can hardly act but as the 
employee of a White employer or the subject of White authorities . . .100  
 
Mayer and Mayer highlight black Africans’ predicament in the cities—that of 
either laboring for an employer or being arrested and sent to jail or to a farm, to 
labor anyway in the end. Yet the extent of the second part of their observations—
about black people as the subject of white authorities—has been more of an 
afterthought in the historiography of pass laws. The government knew that a 
class of people who could not show passes was ever-present in cities and towns; 
                                                        
100 Philip Mayer and Iona Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen: Conservatism and the Process of 





these people provided a justification for police harassment and township raids. 
Posel has described the impact of policing and pass raids on black townships: 
“The state also used the influx control regulations as a weapon of reprisal against 
whole communities in times of political malcontent. Early morning pass raids by 
the police were stepped up in the wake of protests or riots in the townships, and 
‘hundreds of Africans would be rounded up on infringements of the Pass 
regulations and other minor technicalities.’”101  
As I stated in the chapter’s introduction, we need to focus not just on 
whom the system certified with passes (and in what numbers), but on those it 
did not—the unregistered, the violators, the transgressors. Pass law regulations 
served an economic purpose, but so did pass law violations. People without 
proper documentation were not merely ejected from urban areas but, in many 
cases, were channeled into a system set up to supply them to rural farms in need 
of labor. The system thus assumed the existence of pass law violators—and 
thrived on it. In her study of apartheid’s first decade, Posel compares the amount 
of labor supplied to rural areas through the labor bureau and through the courts. 
She writes:  
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The bureaux’ contributions to farmers’ labour needs were consistently 
dwarfed by the Department of Prisons’ ‘9d a day scheme’ to supply 
farmers with convict labour … In 1952, the ‘9d a day scheme’ forced some 
40,500 on to the farms, 30 per cent more than the number channeled 
through the labour bureaux. By 1957/8 the number of prison labourers on 
farms had shot up to 200,000, more than double the number of labour 
bureaux placements for the year.102  
 
Government schemes, such as the system by which farmers could lease laborers 
from prison for 9 pennies a day (discussed in detail below), thus supplied a 
larger share of the labor force than the actual bureau tasked with supplying 
labor. This shadow system and its role in agricultural development under 
apartheid demands greater attention. First, however, I will turn to a system of 
vagrancy laws and prison labor that has received more scholarly attention, 
perhaps in part because it did not operate in the shadow of a formal pass law 
system—convict leasing in the Southern United States.    
 
ii. Convict leasing in the United States  
While historians have undertaken comparative studies of segregation in 
South Africa and the United States,103 very few have studied vagrancy laws, 
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prison populations, and the creation of captive labor reserves in a comparative 
manner. 104  Convict leasing played an essential role in the industrial and 
agricultural development of the U.S. South and of South Africa. Both societies 
were characterized by segregationist laws and by the hyper-criminalization of 
black persons’ presence in urban areas. Lawmakers in each society looked to 
their own histories for examples of vagrancy laws that could be imposed anew. 
Although there is some evidence that South African lawmakers visited the U.S. 
and observed convict leasing models there in the early 20th century, these models 
had long existed in the Cape Colony.105 
In the United States, convict leasing arose out of a similar desire to sustain 
a plantation model of agricultural development after the end of formal slavery. 
Since there was no large-scale system of passes in the U.S. South, the function of 
vagrancy laws as a system of legal tripwires that channeled people into prisons 
and then to lessees was more obvious. That is, it was not the underside of an 
affirmative pass law regime as in South Africa. The criminal legal system’s role 
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in supplying cheap labor to farms was more immediate. In many locales, there 
was no need for jails at all. As we shall see, in many places, cities and counties 
declined to rebuild the penitentiaries that were decimated during the Civil War, 
electing to send arrestees directly to farms or other private business owners 
instead. 
The practice of convict leasing in the Southern United States arose out of a 
number of economic and political factors in the Reconstruction era. With the end 
of slavery, a “remarkable socioeconomic tug-of-war” took place between planters 
and freedmen in the late 1860s and 1870s.106 They wrestled over the terms and 
conditions of labor, and eventually the sharecrop system emerged, which 
allowed former slaves an amount of independence, while landowners enjoyed 
lower supervision costs in exchange for somewhat lower agricultural outputs.107 
Still, planters sought to reintroduce two aspects of labor discipline that had made 
production rates so high—and labor so brutal—under slavery. 108  First, large 
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plantations had relied on “gang” labor, with field hands divided into gangs and 
commanded by drivers to produce in an assembly-line fashion at a brisk pace.109 
Mancini describes how large plantations often divided laborers into hoe gangs 
and plow gangs: “The labor of each put pressure on the pace of the other, and it 
was in part from this interdependence that the high production levels of the 
slave era were achieved.”110 Second, under the “task” system, field hands were 
given a daily work assignment and quota, and work had to be completed and 
inspected before a laborer could leave the field. 111  Although sharecropping 
arrangements allowed landowners to extract many of the labor benefits they had 
previously enjoyed with slavery, the strict regimes of gang and task labor 
required a level of coercion that was no longer feasible. These modes of labor 
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control were revived under convict leasing—gang labor predominated on 
plantations, and task labor became the norm for mines.112 
 The necessary convict population was created through a rewriting of the 
criminal law in Southern states and through “corrupt networks of sheriffs and 
labor agents.”113 State legislatures dredged up old crimes such as “vagrancy,” the 
offense of not being able to prove on the spot that one is employed.114 Some 
states created “Negro crimes” such as criminal trespass and incitement to 
insurrection.115 Blackmon describes county jail records indicating thousands of 
arrests for “inconsequential charges or for violations of law specifically written to 
intimidate blacks—changing employers without permission, vagrancy, riding 
freight cars without a ticket, engaging in sexual activity—or loud talk—with 
white women.”116 Often these offenses entailed court costs and fines; with no 
other means to pay, convicts were further induced to labor for lessees.117 Surges 
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in arrests did not correlate with crime waves, but rather “rises and dips in the 
need for cheap labor.” 118  Mancini put it succinctly: “The criminal justice 
apparatus was systematically geared for the collection of labor.”119 
Convict leasing was a system of mutual profit for landowners, 
corporations, and other lessees and the state. Ayers has described the extent to 
which Southern penitentiaries were decimated during the Civil War.120 With 
convict leasing, there was no need for states to repair dilapidated penitentiaries, 
as they became mere “outposts” of the massive labor network;121 many convicts 
proceeded straight from sentencing to the farms or mines, without a stay in 
prison. Indeed, the South maintained very few prisons for the 50 years following 
the Civil War. Instead, people convicted of crimes often went straight to those 
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who had contracted with the state for their labor in coalmines, farms, railroads, 
brickyards, or sawmills.122 
Aside from not having to maintain and manage penitentiaries, Southern 
states reaped other financial benefits as well. Initially, states were content with 
breaking even on contracts since convict leasing saved them the cost of 
maintaining prisons, but they soon realized that convict labor could fetch high 
profits. 123 By 1886, Alabama and Tennessee ran the most profitable systems, 
meeting a large demand from the mines. Both states took in roughly $100,000 
annually from leasing prisoners—about one-tenth of each state’s total annual 
revenue.124 Northern states also made money from manufacturing enterprises 
within prison walls, but the profits were not nearly as high as those reaped 
through convict leasing. As Ayers writes, “Nationally, all prisons which did not 
use the lease system earned only 32 percent of their total expenses, while those 
who did take advantage of the demand for convict labor outside the prison walls 
earned 267 percent.”125 Blackmon estimates that revenues from convict leasing 
                                                        
122 Mancini, One Dies, Get Another, 1. 
 
123 Ayers, Vengeance and Justice, 196. 
 







brought the equivalent of tens of millions of dollars into the treasuries of 
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Georgia, Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina.126  
 As the system became more entrenched, the line blurred between state 
and private interests—and, indeed, state and private actors. Politicians accepted 
bribes from prospective lessees to vote certain ways, and corruption permeated 
the system at all levels.127 In an 1887 sermon on prison reform, the Southern 
minister Atticus Haygood stated that every prison official in every Southern 
state, “from the superintendent of the penitentiary down to the merest guard 
that stands sentry over a county chaingang, is a politician, and holds his office 
because he is a politician.” 128  In many places, the same man doubled as 
entrepreneur/lessee and officeholder.129 Jeremiah South, a lessee of Kentucky 
convicts throughout the 1870s, supposedly exerted more power over the state’s 
legislature than any other individual; he was said to have controlled a third of 
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the legislators “as absolutely as he controlled the convicts.”130 Georgia senator 
Joseph Emerson Brown made a fortune leasing convicts in the 1880s.131 Clean 
divisions between state and private interests thus became increasingly harder to 
draw. Indeed, convict leasing systems were thoroughly entrenched within the 
politics and the economy of the U.S. South during this period. 
 
iii. Convict leasing in South Africa through the 1950s 
 Few studies exist on the use of prison labor on South African farms and 
mines. The accounts that have been written tend to focus on the period from 
1870-1930, 132  although some studies have touched on the 1940s and 50s. 133 
Generally accounts have ended with the 1959 prison farm labor scandal 
(discussed in more detail below); after journalist Ruth First published a pamphlet 
exposing the violent regime of prison labor on white farms, the government 
appointed investigatory commissions and adopted new protocols to regulate the 
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use of prison labor.134 I will give a brief overview of early pass controls and then 
discuss their role in the expanding agricultural sector in more depth. 
The diamond mining industry in Kimberley made extensive use of prison 
labor in the last few decades of the 19th century. The Kimberley prison processed 
more than 10,000 prisoners a year throughout the 1870s, most of them black men 
sentenced to short terms for pass law violations. 135  Cecil Rhodes’ De Beers 
Consolidated Mines constructed a private prison in 1885 (using prison workers 
supplied free of charge by the Cape Colony administration) to house 300 “native 
prisoners” to work in the mines. 136 Rhodes, an elected member of the Cape 
Colony government, negotiated a contract with that same government to receive 
“such able-bodied long sentenced native prisoners as they [De Beers] may 
require.” 137  This snapshot reveals the difficulty of disentangling public and 
private actors, or state and market interests—a difficulty that would persist 
throughout the 20th century. Beginning in 1905, the British colonial 
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administration introduced the leasing of black male prisoners in the Transvaal, 
with labor being used primarily by the gold mines.138 In 1911, the new Union 
government passed the South African Prisons and Reformatories Act which 
authorized the leasing of black male prisoners to work where possible on public 
works, primarily at “road camps.”139 Secretary of Justice and Director of Prions 
Jacob de Villiers Roos, the architect of the 1911 Prisons Act, established a policy 
of racial differentiation of prison labor: “the native for outside work and the 
European for inside workshop work.” 140  The government and the mining 
industry were the primary users of prison labor until 1931 when the ‘6d a day 
scheme’ was introduced, which allowed prisoners to be sent to work on private 
farms. 141 The scheme applied to prisoners with a maximum sentence of one 
month—these were mainly black men arrested on pass offenses. In 1932, the 
scheme was extended to men with a maximum sentence of three months.142 The 
government’s stated intention for the scheme was to reduce prison crowding and 
                                                        
138 Cook, Akin to Slavery, 75.  
 
139 Ibid. See also, Van Zyl Smit, South African Prison Law, 25.  
 
140 Van Zyl Smit, South African Prison Law, 25. 
 







prevent first offenders from falling under the bad influence of experienced 
offenders. As Corry observes, “This good intention coincided admirably with the 
acute shortage of farm labour brought about by the sudden industrial expansion 
after the [currency] devaluation of 1932.”143 
In order to tell a fuller story of pass laws in South Africa and to give an 
account of prison labor, it is necessary to give more background on the sector 
that helped spur these systems—the agricultural sector. In the years between 
1910 and 1950, South Africa underwent an agricultural revolution, with white 
farmers heavily subsidized by the government. 144  Beginning in 1910, the 
government introduced harsh segregationist policies, and these policies would 
intensify with the introduction of apartheid in 1948. Over this period, South 
Africa shifted from importing a substantial amount of its food to becoming an 
exporter; after World War I, agricultural exports made up nearly a third of total 
annual exports.145 The total value of white farms’ agricultural output increased 
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from £29 million in 1911-12 to nearly £200 million in 1948.146 Roughly 80 acts 
were passed between 1910 and 1933 to support the farming sector, and support 
included: direct state grants and loans (through the Land Bank, established in 
1912) for fencing, irrigation, and other improvements; artificially inflated 
agricultural and food prices; relief measures meant to protect farmers and farm 
incomes; and a tax system that directed revenue from the mining sector and from 
consumers into agriculture.147 White farmers also pushed for state intervention in 
the labor market to ensure cheap labor. As Jeeves and Crush write, “White 
southern African farmers not only demanded state aid to regulate production, 
prices, and markets, these same sheltered, subsidized, and protected 
agriculturalists insisted also that governments provide them with labor at sub-
market rates.”148 Under the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 and with help 
from the Native Affairs Department, white farmers received special concessions 
to facilitate the recruitment of farm labor, including banning non-farm labor 
recruiters from most white farming areas.149 However, the extent to which the 
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state’s provision of a convict labor force contributed to the growth of the 
agricultural industry has been underappreciated. For example, in an otherwise 
very thorough account of state regulation and agricultural production, Jeeves 
and Crush devote just two sentences to convict labor, and they present it as a 
new draconian measure adopted only after the National Party came to power 
and instituted apartheid in 1948.150  
 Pass law convictions increased after the Urban Areas Act of 1923 was 
passed, which made unemployment a crime and imposed harsher pass controls 
relating to registration, work seeking, and residence. 151  The urban black 
population grew in the inter-war period, but two major depressions (in the early 
1920s and the early 1930s) led to fewer available jobs in the cities. Urban 
unemployment was further accentuated by crop failures in 1935 and 1936, which 
led more black men and women to leave rural areas to seek work in cities.152 In 
1936, the government passed the Native Trust and land Act, essentially 
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consolidating the 1913 Native Lands Act (which had reserved a mere 7 percent of 
the country’s land for black Africans). The Act further restricted the land 
available to black people and severely limited squatting and labor tenancy on 
white farms.153 In addition, more and more municipalities extended local pass 
law provisions, and convictions increased sharply. Between 1920 and 1924, 
around 48,000 people were convicted under pass laws; this figure rose to 94,000 
between 1930 and 1934, and to 183,829 in 1940.154 In 1936, Justice F. E. T. Krause, 
Judge-President of the Orange Free State, gave his account of the extent of 
imprisonment for pass law violations at the National Conference on Social Work 
in Johannesburg. He argued that the whole pass system “seems to serve only to 
extract revenue from the employer and to collect a fine from the underpaid and 
poverty stricken native, or in default send him to prison.” He concluded, “The 
sooner our pass laws are scrapped the better.”155 The pressures and restrictions 
on black men and women who moved to the cities to seek employment persisted, 
and they continued to be imprisoned for being in urban areas without proof of 
                                                        
153 See Essy Letsoalo, Land Reform in South Africa: A Black Perspective (Johannesburg: 
Skotaville, 1987), 39-41; Muller, Coercive Agrarian Work, 46.  
 
154 Hindson, Pass Controls, 45. 
 
155 “African Prisons: Mr. Justice Krause: Vindictive Punishment Condemned: Pass Law 





employment. In 1945, the vast majority of prisoners were employed outside the 
prisons by private parties and by authorities other than the Prisons 
Department.156 
 Beginning in the late 1940s, a new arrangement between some private 
farmers and the state gelled the interests of state and private actors in prisons 
even further. Under this new procedure, private farmers would build prisons on 
their farms according to state specifications, and these buildings would 
subsequently be taken over and run by the Prison Service as state prisons.157 The 
prisoners would work on the farm and neighboring farms in the area. The state-
run farm prisons were highly sought after among white farmers, and more and 
more of them petitioned the state to allow them to build farm prisons in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.158 These facilities were ideal for farmers because they 
could easily access cheap labor while leaving the management and security 
oversight of the barracks to the state.159 
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 In her study of the liberal discourse around prisons in the 1940s, Gillespie 
describes outrage among some members of the public over the new apartheid 
regime’s “permissive relationship to the mistreatment of privatised African 
prison labour.” 160  In November 1949 The Star reported “an angry scene in 
Johannesburg … when a large group of Europeans and non-Europeans crowded 
around a lorry parked in Commissioner Street [containing African prisoners in a 
cage on their way to a Ventersdorp farm] ... Shouts of ‘slavery’ were heard 
among the crowd.”161 The following March the Cape Times reported this account: 
“... the reader, who was driving behind the van, alleged that the wind whipped 
off a covering tarpaulin to reveal Natives huddled in a cage. It was a private and 
not a police van … The van’s number, a Montagu registration, was taken and has 
been passed on by the Cape Times to the Director of Prisons.”162 The use of prison 
labor on private farms shocked the conscience of liberal white South Africans 
and they appealed to the Director of Prisons to stop what they assumed to be 
aberrant instances of neo-slavery.  
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 Liberal citizens were hardly the only ones to condemn the prison labor 
system and the distortions of the judicial system; some prison officials and a 
high-profile commission also voiced grievances with the system in the late 1940s. 
In 1945, the Smuts government responded to pressures from some members of 
parliament who had called for a review of the prison system by appointing a 
Penal and Prisons Reform Commission, chaired by Justice C. W. H. Lansdown.163 
The Lansdown Commission released its report in 1947; it emphasized that the 
aim of imprisonment should be reformation and rehabilitation, achieved through 
education, vocational training, and employment. 164  The Commission 
recommended that the government terminate the ‘6d a day scheme.’ The 
government complied, but immediately introduced a ‘9d a day scheme’ in its 
place. Under this scheme, the daily rate was raised and farmers now paid it 
directly to the prison laborer, rather than the Prisons Department.165 There was 
also a provision stating that prisoners should be consulted about whether they 
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wanted to go work on a farm, but accounts show that men were regularly sent to 
farms over their objections.166  
In late September 1948, the outgoing Director of Prisons, Mr. W. G. Hoal 
(who had run the prison system for 18 years), also had harsh words for the 
prison and judicial systems.167 He condemned the rates at which South Africa 
jailed people for being unable to pay fines. Hoal said that this “dumping” of 
people in prison frustrated the whole intention of the law; he said it accounted 
for about 83 percent of the Native and 67 percent of the European prison 
population, and resulted in extreme overcrowding.168 Hoal also lamented the fact 
that prisons were filled with an enormous number of awaiting trial prisoners, 
prisoners serving sentences of six months or less (40 percent of the total inmate 
population), and people caught up in mass arrests where officials hoped to sort 
out the guilty ones—although he said that class was not kept for long.169 He said 
that in cases where fines were imposed the majority of convicted people were the 
underprivileged classes who could not afford the fines and went to prison; he 
                                                        
166 Ibid., 13. 
 
167 “Union’s prison system condemned by retiring director,” Star, Sep. 30, 1948, BPP Box 









pointed out that the whole object of fines was to save people from prison. “The 
Courts must impose fines which have some relation to the man’s earning 
capacity and ability to pay while keeping himself and his dependants.” Hoal said 
that something had to be done to enable magistrates to assess people’s ability to 
pay fines. He also raised questions about the use of prison labour, saying: “The 
country is crying out for roads and soil conservation work. There is the cockeyed 
Government scheme which starts up construction work in an area and 
immediately attracts all the labour off neighbouring farms. Then the farmers 
come to the Prisons Department and ask for prison labour. The Government 
should use prison labour for their schemes at the standard rate of wages for such 
labour. From this money could be deducted sufficient to keep the prisoners’ 
families, to supply compensation to injured complainants, or to be saved towards 
paying fines.”170 
The ‘9d a day scheme’ that replaced the ‘6d a day scheme’ in 1947 
operated alongside a covert operation for supplying pre-trial arrestees to farms 
that began that same year. The ‘inter-departmental scheme’ was introduced at 
the Fordsburg (Johannesburg) Native Commissioner’s Court and channeled pass 






offenders directly to farms in lieu of prosecution.171 The scheme was wholly 
separate from the Prisons Department (except that it was organized in 
consultation with the Department of Justice, which included the Prisons 
Department); the scheme was coordinated by the Department of Native Affairs 
in consultation with the Department of Justice and the Commissioner of the 
South African Police.172 Over 3,000 men were sent to farms by the Fordsburg 
court each year, and the scheme was introduced in other courts as well.173 Cook 
argues that the ‘9d a day scheme’ and the ‘inter-departmental scheme’ were 
merely different administrative devices for accomplishing the same end of 
getting cheap labor to the farms. The experience of laborers who reached farms 
under the varying systems was identical:  
Once [on the farm], all schemes were the same. Labourers got the same 
‘uniform,’ a sack with holes cut out for the head and arms—a tell-tale 
garment on the country roads should a ‘volunteer’ try to escape. 
Labourers were locked and guarded in the same foul ‘compounds,’ 
whipped and driven with the same whips and sticks, fed with the same 
maize porridge, regardless of which particular ‘scheme’ had ensnared 
them—or even, indeed, if they had gone to the farm of their own ‘free’ 
will. Sometimes farmers also had their ‘free’ labourers arrested and 
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convicted and sent back to them under the ‘9d a day scheme’ because it 
was cheaper than the £4-a-month going wage for farm labourers.174 
 
The ‘inter-departmental scheme’ was officially announced in an internal circular 
dated June 14, 1954, but the circular acknowledged that the scheme had been 
operating for some time already.175 The circular was addressed to officers of the 
Department of Native Affairs and all Magistrates and Justices of the Peace. It 
explained the program and gave instructions on how to implement it: 
 It is common knowledge that large numbers of Natives are daily being 
arrested and prosecuted for contraventions of a purely technical nature. 
These arrests cost the State large sums of money and serve no useful 
purpose. The Department of Justice, the South African Police and this 
Department (Native Affairs) have therefore held consultation on the 
problem and have evolved a scheme, the object of which is to induce 
unemployed Natives now roaming the streets in the various urban areas 
to accept employment outside such urban areas. 
 … When contravention of two of the sections of the Natives Taxation 
Act, 1925, two sections of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act, 1945, and certain 
regulations under this Act, and of the Labour Bureau Regulations are 
alleged—Natives arrested between 2 p.m. on Sunday and 2 p.m. on Friday 
are not charged immediately after arrest, but merely detained by the 
police. Natives so detained are removed under escort to the district labour 
bureau and handed over to the Employment Officer. The Natives must be 
offered such employment as is available in non-prescribed (rural) areas. 
Priority should be given to farm labour ...  
 ... Natives who, on account of their declining to accept employment, 
are not released, are returned to the police for prosecution ...176 
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The legality of the protocol was highly suspect, as it was not authorized by 
statute or common law.177 Officially, transgression of the laws specified in the 
circular was only meant to carry a small fine and less than a month in prison.178 
Yet detainees were forced to sign a three-month labor contract with farmers, a 
period which could be considerably longer than 90 days as off-days, Sundays, 
sick-days, and days that were “unworkable” due to weather did not count.179 
During the 1950s as many as 200,000 prisoners worked on white farms 
every year.180 In August 1956, the liberal newspaper the Rand Daily Mail reported 
on farm labor brutality, drawing renewed attention to abuses on farms that 
would soon receive much more publicity. The Native Affairs Department had 
long been aware of these conditions; throughout the 1950s it received a steady 
flow of letters from farm laborers complaining of abuses and poor conditions. 
(The NAD also received letters from farmers calling for more laborers).181 In the 
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mid-1950s, accounts of farm abuses and working conditions gained more traction 
in the press. In its August 1956 report, the Rand Daily Mail recounted the story of 
a black worker who said he had been found guilty in Johannesburg of a minor 
trespassing offence and had been sent to a farm for a 40-day sentence.182 The man 
described “how he had been mercilessly beaten every day in the fields while 
picking mealies [corn], kept locked up in a concrete room with 50 or 60 other 
prisoners at night, and been forced to work 12 hours at a stretch, with only a ten-
minute break for food—and with nothing to drink.”183 A second farmworker 
came forward with a similar story. The first farmworker was being treated at a 
hospital for injuries he said “were caused by the boss boys’ blows, by the chafing 
sackcloth he was forced to wear, and by a strap round his waist which held a 
heavy mealie bag.” A doctor reported that he had “grossly septic fungating 
wounds overlying both legs from calf to heel” and septic wounds on his hip and 
thigh.184 Despite increased media awareness, the use of prison labor under the 
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‘9d a day scheme’ continued apace. In 1957-58, 199,312 prisoners were hired out 
to farmers under the ‘9d a day scheme’ alone.185 
In 1959, spotty coverage of farm abuses gave way to a full-on scandal 
around the use of coerced labor on farms. Muller, who has written about the 
unfolding of the 1959 farm labor scandal in close detail, writes that “the 
allegations became an unstoppable avalanche of press exposés, court cases, 
protest action and commissions of enquiry.”186 That year journalist Ruth First 
published her 23-page pamphlet, “Exposure! The Farm Labour Scandal,” which 
described the ‘inter-departmental scheme’ and collusion between white farmers 
and the government in great detail.187 Other papers reported on the farm labor 
system as well. In May, the Golden City Post appealed to its readers who had 
missing relatives whom they believed to be working on farms to come down to 
the paper’s office with details. More than a dozen relatives came forward to ask 
for help in tracking down their loved ones. On May 24, the Post recounted its 
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successful campaign to free 30-year-old Daniel Mahloane of Alexandra from the 
Straffontein farm, owned by a Mr. Bazil Feldt.188 Mahloane had been arrested on 
a pass offence and was told that if he did not go to the farm he would be sent to 
Baviaanspoort prison.189 Mahloane’s brother responded to the Post’s appeal to 
readers with missing relatives, showing up to their offices with a letter from 
Mahloane written at Straffontein farm. The Post tracked him down on the farm, 
and contacted a Johannesburg attorney who, along with the advocacy 
organization Black Sash, helped secure his release “in a dramatic habeas corpus 
hearing at the Supreme Court, Pretoria.” 190  Black Sash soon returned to 
Straffontein farm to obtain the release of other farm laborers, including 49-year-
old Paul Anthony, who had been sent to the farm eight months before after being 
arrested for not possessing a passbook. 191  In April-June 1959, judges of the 
Transvaal Provincial Division granted several habeas corpus orders in suits by 
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friends or relatives of people who were “alleged to be wrongfully detained 
against their will by private employers of their labour.”192  
By June 1959, the head of the Bantu Administration and Development 
(BAD) Department, Minister de Wet Nel, was forced to account for the prison 
labor scheme. On June 16, he told parliament that he had appointed an 
investigatory committee. The committee would be tasked with investigating 
practices under General Circular No. 23 of 1954 and determining ways to revise 
the scheme to preclude irregularities or malpractices. 193  De Wet Nel also 
announced that the farm labour system was temporarily suspended. He did not 
say that the program was a bad idea—indeed, he stated that it responded to 
pleas on both sides of parliament for black workers who streamed into towns 
illegally to be diverted to useful employment.194 Rather, he called the program 
“technically wrong,” acknowledging that sending people to be employed on 
farms before they were convicted of any crime constituted a technical error.195 
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The scandal also drew international attention; by June 18, the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions announced that it would submit a complaint 
to the ILO’s Forced Labour Committee about “the exploitation of cheap prison 
labour and other instances of ill-treatment of African workers in South Africa.”196 
On June 27, the Rand Daily Mail reported that, with the suspension of the 
farm labor scheme, black “petty offenders” arrested on vagrancy or other pass 
charges were now being prosecuted in court.197 Arrestees faced the possibility of 
fine or imprisonment, and did not have the alternative of a two to six month 
farm-labor contract. Inducements to seek farm labour still existed, however, since 
urban unemployment levels persisted while black people were required to show 
proof of employment to remain in the city. According to the paper: 
Some Africans are still, however, being offered work in the rural areas, 
including employment on farms.  
Africans, who apply for employment at the Municipality’s Non-
Europeans Affairs Department, are referred to the Department of Bantu 
Administration and Development, if no work is available for them in the 
Johannesburg area. They are taken to the District Labour Bureau in 
Market Street and are offered employment in the rural areas.  
But where an African does not make this voluntary approach—and no 
statistics are available of the number who do so—the ‘vicious circle’ of 
arrest, gaol, release, arrest, etc., continues.198 
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The paper described how this cycle played out in the experience of a man who 
had aged out of his job in the city and now had no rural home to return to: 
On the other side of the fence, there is often heart-break and 
desperation. Take the case of Jeremiah, a 65-year-old African, who made 
his home in Alexandra Township in 1941. 
Until a year ago, Jeremiah was employed as a watchman. He lost his 
job because he was too old. Now—from the official point of view—he 
must return to his home in the Transkei. But, although he has visited his 
old home sporadically, his roots are in Alexandra. 
And even if he wished to return to the Transkei, he has no money to 
pay for his train-fare. His alternatives: to remain here and to become part 
of the vicious circle. Or else he can accept work in a rural area in the hope 
of saving money. But at his age, what work can he do? 
It is a problem for which officials see no solution at present.199 
 
Of course, this was a problem of the officials’ own making. One possible 
solution—allowing for black Africans to remain in urban areas beyond their days 
as able-bodied laborers—was wholly at odds with an administrative system that 
conceived of black Africans entirely through the lens of labor productivity. 
Indeed, Posel writes that the influx control system and Labour Bureau 
regulations “made plain that the state regarded Africans as mere units of labour 
power at the disposal of white employers, with little right to choose if, where, 
and when they wanted to work.”200 








  Revelations about the treatment of prison farm laborers also spurred 
protest from black resistance organizations, including the first national boycott of 
farm produce in South African history.201 In his 1962 memoir, Let My People Go, 
ANC President Albert Luthuli described the conditions on farm prisons that, 
along with the habeas court cases,202 precipitated the boycott: 
On the affected farms, African men—some are no more than boys—dig 
potatoes with their bare fingers. ‘Boss-boys’ and overseers stand over 
them with whips, which they do not hesitate to use. The convicts live in 
hovels, filthy little huts or filthy great barracks, under guard. Their diet is 
unmentionable, a good deal worse than prison fare …. Murders, the result 
of prolonged beatings and semi-starvation, or of sudden fits of anger, are 
committed. Some come to light.203 
 
At the end of May 1959, an ANC activist, Robert Resha, called for a boycott of 
potatoes at the organization’s national Anti-Pass Conference in Johannesburg.204 
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The campaign was conceived of as a short-term protest against the potato 
farmers who used prison labor, as highlighted in the recent court cases and 
media coverage. 205  The ANC launched a boycott calling on black people to 
withhold their purchasing power—estimated to be a £400 million contribution to 
South Africa’s economy on an annual basis—from particular retail 
establishments and to stop buying potatoes in particular.206  The boycott’s slogan 
was “potatoes are blood-stained.”207  
 The boycott took off slowly, but it gained momentum after a series of 
protest marches at Johannesburg markets in June.208 As Muller writes, “Dressed 
in hessian sacks and with potato necklaces strung around their necks, boycott 
supporters paraded through the streets with banners stating: ‘Potatoes are 
produced with slave labour” and ‘Don’t eat potatoes—Don’t buy chips.’”209 A 
Golden City Post reporter who visited a Johannesburg market in mid-June found 
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sacks of second- and third-grade potatoes piled high, with few buyers. One 
auctioneer told the reporter, “If this goes on for long the potatoes will rot in the 
sheds. Normally I sell between 300 and 500 pockets a day. Today I’ve sold less 
than 130.” 210  The boycott’s actual financial impact was disputed, however—
predictably, the National Party and the Afrikaans press downplayed the protests 
and their impact, maintaining that they had only a minimal impact on sales, 
while the ANC and the liberal English press (notably the Rand Daily Mail) 
claimed that the boycott was highly effective.211 The Rand Daily Mail contradicted 
reports by the Potato Board that any dips in sales were due to a poor season that 
had resulted in less lower-grade potatoes (those sold to African consumers) on 
the market. The Mail reported that the Board had been buying large quantities of 
potatoes for export to help subsidize farmers and clear the surplus.212 The Mail’s 
account is supported by documents from the government’s Division of 
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Commodity Services, which show that the boycott had a direct impact on the 
Board’s “stabilization scheme” by which the government subsidized lower-grade 
potatoes for sale in reserves and townships. 213  By the end of August, the 
oversupply of low-grade potatoes became a crisis and the Board proposed that a 
“buy one get one free” scheme be launched to encourage sales in black 
townships near Johannesburg and Pretoria.214 The ANC called off the boycott on 
August 31, 1959, with Luthuli stating, “I hope those white farmers of South 
Africa who are guilty of treating their African workers in atrocious ways will 
repent ... [R]espect for moral standards of behavior demands this of them.”215  
The next year would represent a turning point in the consolidation of 
apartheid and hard-line conservative National Party rule. Urban black African 
resistance had escalated dramatically in the late 1950s. Indeed, most accounts of 
this period overlook the Potato Boycott since it was overshadowed by shop floor 
strikes (between 1955-58, the number of industrial disputes and strikes doubled 
over the levels of five years earlier), protests against forced removals 
(particularly at the Cato Manor squatter settlement in Durban, beginning in early 
                                                        









1959), local bus strikes, a hunger strike by nurses, and other protests—largely by 
women—aimed at prohibitions on the home brewing of beer and new policies 
around cattle dipping in rural areas.216 In December 1959, the Pan-Africanist 
Congress (PAC) and the ANC launched national anti-pass campaigns.217 The 
ANC’s National Executive Committee declared that “the struggle against the 
pass system is in fact a struggle against the very roots of the entire system of 
cheap labour, exploitation and oppression of the African people.” 218  The 
Sharpeville Massacre followed just three months later in March 1960; 67 black 
African demonstrators were killed, most of them shot in the back, and 186 others 
were wounded. 219  Images of police opening fire on crowds in Sharpeville 
brought the violence of apartheid to international attention in an unprecedented 
way. To quell the spread of protests to other parts of the country, the 
government declared a national state of emergency.220 South Africa withdrew 
from the Commonwealth and international confidence in its economic situation 
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plummeted; in 1960 South Africa’s economy saw a net outflow of R180 million 
and its most severe balance of payments crisis since 1932.221 On April 8, 1960, the 
government banned both the ANC and the PAC, declaring them unlawful 
organizations and thus making any organizing efforts on their part illegal.222  
Crucially, the combination of urban protest and economic woes presented 
an excuse for greater national government intervention in the administration of 
local cities. As Posel writes in an unparalleled close study of this period, these 
interventions could have gone in multiple directions. Some reformers thought 
the government could best stabilize turbulent townships by fostering a black 
middle class in urban areas (through allowing greater freedom of movement and 
employment).223 At the beginning of April 1960, three senior Cabinet ministers 
quietly pressured Prime Minister Verwoerd to get rid of the pass system, but 
their request was overshadowed by a would-be assassin’s attempt on his life on 
April 9. 224 While Verwoerd was in the hospital recovering, one of the three 
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cabinet ministers who had pushed for an end to passbooks, Sauer, became acting 
Prime Minister. In that capacity be spoke out in favor of: 
‘[A] new deal for the African’ by way of a far-reaching overhaul of the 
legislation affecting Africans in urban areas. ‘The old book of South 
African history was closed at Sharpeville a month ago,’ declared Sauer; 
‘we must get rid of the pin-pricks which made the Native ripe for the 
propaganda of the PAC and ANC.’”225  
 
Despite the fact that others within the National Party echoed Sauer’s calls for 
reform, a more conservative faction, constituted by Broederbond members, 
would win out.226  
 Instead of loosening restrictions on black Africans in urban areas, 
Verwoerd’s government would move in the opposite direction. The 
Broederbond, a secret society founded in 1918 dedicated to Afrikaner 
advancement, had grown immensely in size and influence over the course of the 
1950s and it entered the forefront of political decision-making when Verwoerd 
became leader of the NP and Prime Minister in 1958.227 By the late 1950s, all three 
key decision-makers in the Department of Bantu Administration and Developent 
(BAD) were members of the Bond (ie. Minister de Wet Nel, Deputy Minister 
                                                        
225 Ibid.,  239. 
 
226 Ibid., 241.  
 
227 Ibid., 242 (stating that the Bond’s membership increased from 3,662 members in 260 





Botha, and Secretary Eiselen). The South African Agricultural Union (SAAU) and 
many of its affiliated agricultural co-operatives were also thoroughly infiltrated 
by Broederbond members by 1960, to the frustration of some Afrikaner farmers 
who disapproved of the Bond. 228 Broederbond members maintained a “tight 
grip” on agriculture by ensuring that fellow Broeders received better loans than 
non-Broeders, as co-operative officials were in charge of allocating tens of 
millions of pounds in loans allocated by the Land Bank. 229  Soon after the 
Sharpeville Massacre, the SAAU’s Liaison Committee met with leading BAD 
Department officials to draft a bill that would extend the amount of state control 
over black Africans in urban areas.230 The “Bantu in European Areas Bill” was 
the most draconian measure drafted by BAD to date, and it sought to: give the 
Minister of BAD sole authority to stipulate the number of black people allowed 
in an urban area to meet its labor requirements; repeal removal exemptions for 
urban residents who had lived in the cities since before World War II; and rob 
local authorities of all power to set regulations regarding urban African 
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administration. 231 Although the bill failed due to opposition from organized 
commerce and industry, it was indicative of BAD’s orientation and several of the 
proposals, including a wide expansion of BAD control over local administration, 
would be implemented in various ways over the next decade.232 The agricultural 
sector would thus continue to exert influence over matters of urban 
administration, pass laws and influx control, and labor regulations. Their access 
to prison labor would also continue, albeit quietly and with some adjustments, 
into the next decade.  
 
iv. The evolution of the prison labor system in the 1960s 
After the prison farm labor scandal broke in 1959, the government made 
cosmetic changes to the prison labor system. These changes allowed the 
government to re-characterize the program in two respects. First, it portrayed the 
system as a “welfare” scheme, downplaying its punitive aspects and instead 
depicting it as an effort aimed as assisting black Africans who were out of work. 
Second, the government depicted the system as “contractual” rather than forced. 
The system was made to resemble a relationship between an employer and a 
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worker who freely chose to labor for a wage. Whether this exchange was actually 
free of coercion is highly doubtful, given that gross manipulations of the labor 
market remained in place and that potential laborers were contracting from 
captivity in police stations or other forms of custody. Between these two changes, 
the government was able to claim that a system of coerced prison labor no longer 
existed even though, as we shall see, the experience of the system for those 
caught up in it and detained on pass law violations changed little.  
The 1959 prison farm labor scandal led to some changes, but mainly, 
parliament moved to push prisons out of the public eye in order to avoid similar 
public outcry in the future. Parliament passed the Prisons Act of 1959 to prevent 
any further publication of information about prisons or the use of prison labor on 
farms. 233 This act was successful in shutting down further public inquiry or 
media coverage of the prison farm labor system. The reports of the investigatory 
committees appointed by Minister de Wet Nel were never published.234 Within 
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two months after the height of the 1959 scandal, the government Information 
Service declared that no system of coercive prison labor existed at all. According 
to a report in The Star from August 27: 
 There is no scheme in operation in South Africa whereby Bantu, 
whether convicted in a court of law or not, are compelled to work on 
farms, states the South African Information Service. 
 Bantu found guilty of minor offences and sentenced to short term 
imprisonment of less than four months may be released for farm work as 
paid wage earners, but only with the full and free consent of the 
individuals concerned.  
 Their accommodation on the farms is subject to periodic inspection by 
prison officials. Such prisoners are free agents while on parole. A farmer 
has no right to deprive them of their liberty of movement or to prevent 
them from terminating their services. 
 Bantu are not sent to farms in lieu of prosecution. The system may 
rightly be called a welfare scheme.235  
 
The Information Service’s statements reflected changes to the ‘9d a day scheme’ 
and the ‘inter-departmental scheme’ which amounted to cosmetic changes, but 
that ultimately preserved both schemes. In order to legitimate the new versions 
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of the schemes, the government reframed them as welfarist and contractual, 
rather than punitive and exploitative.  
In line with this reframing, the ‘inter-departmental scheme’ morphed into 
a system of ‘Aid Centres’ and was described as a mode of welfare provision. 
Immediately after the scandal broke in 1959, the scheme was suspended for 
Africans born in South Africa; however, large numbers of foreign-born Africans 
(who had always been a substantial part of those sent to farms under the scheme) 
were still sent out to farmers. To correct the “technical” error conceded by de 
Wet Nel, new procedures required foreign-born Africans to be charged, tried, 
and sentenced. If found guilty, they were given documents stating that their 
presence in the urban area was illegal. They were forced to leave the town and 
had the choice of returning to their country of origin (at their own expense, 
which very few could afford) or seeking employment on a farm through the 
district labor bureau.236 Most Africans could not afford to pay for the trip to their 
country of origin and some had fines to pay off, resulting in their being forced to 
work on a farm.237   
                                                        







In 1964, the government passed the Bantu Laws Administration Act, 
which provided a new legal basis for dealing with pass offenders—but which 
resembled the old ‘inter-departmental scheme’ quite closely. 238  The “new 
system” was implemented through the Aid Centres and was presented as a 
means of helping black South Africans or residents of Bantustans whose 
documents were not in order. The program gave statutory authority to the 
procedures that had previously taken place outside the law. Though portrayed 
as centers of assistance, the Aid Centres had tremendous authority to arrest and 
detain individuals.239 Yet even though the centers had taken over many functions 
that the courts had previously carried out, they were not considered judicial 
bodies. The experiences and consequences were similar to being processed 
through the criminal legal system, but the procedures were described 
euphemistically. As Cook explains:  
Instead of the procedure whereby the police were instructed to hand pass 
offenders directly to the employment officer of the district labour bureau, 
the new machinery provided for the police to ‘admit’ or ‘refer’ Africans 
directly to the centres, or to transfer them to centres from police cells or 
prisons. Africans would not be ‘detained’ at the centres, but would be 
‘kept’ there. But as the Deputy Minister explained, if they should decide to 
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run away they would do so at their own risk, being liable to arrest by the 
police.240  
 
While the Aid Centres reduced the number of people sent to courts on technical 
violations, the process and outcomes were remarkably similar to those under the 
‘inter-departmental’ scheme. 
 The ‘9d a day scheme’ became a system of ‘parole’ whereby prisoners 
could enter into contracts directly with farmers. The government publicized it as 
a sort of “new deal” for forced laborers.241 The official purpose of the parole 
scheme was the same as that of the ‘9d a day scheme,’ which was to keep short-
term offenders out of prisons. Van Zyl Smit highlights the government’s 
“conscious attempt to (re-)legitimate the system” by invoking international ideas 
and standards.242 He writes, “Parole, as a concept, was, of course, internationally 
acceptable, but what parole meant in this case was something very different. 
Short-term African prisoners were given the choice of being granted parole if 
they entered into a strict contract of employment with a farmer. Failure to remain 
in employment automatically meant that their ‘parole’ was revoked.”243 
                                                        
240 Cook, Akin to Slavery, 24-5. 
 
241 Ibid., 20. 
 






In practice, the parole system operated much as the ‘9d a day scheme’ 
had. Corry describes the parole system as follows: 
The essence of the scheme is that immediately after being sentenced 
prisoners are asked if they would rather serve their sentence in prison or 
be released on parole to work for a private person at market wages. The 
majority of prisoners opt for parole. A standard contract is entered into 
between the employer and the parolee which states that the employer 
must be responsible for the food, clothing and shelter of the prisoner and 
on expiry of the parole period the prisoner must be returned to the prison. 
In addition the employer must pay the parolee the current market wages 
in his particular district. The maximum hours of work are stipulated as 
being ten per day. The employer has no right of restraint over the parolee 
who can leave the employment and return to prison if he wants to do 
so.244  
 
Although the employer technically had no right to keep the laborer on his farm 
against his will, the laborer’s only other option under the terms of the contract 
was to return to prison. While systems of parole in other countries often included 
conditions for remaining on release, this system of totalized control was far 
outside the norm. Whereas other systems were focused on rehabilitative aims 
and transitioning people out of their term of punishment, this system, like its 
previous incarnation, had labor provision at its core.  
After repeated requests to multiple officials, journalist Benjamin Pogrund 
obtained a copy of the provisions and contract for the release of short-term 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 





prisoners on parole from the Commissioner of Prisons, V. R. Verster, in June 
1962.245 The provisions stated that, as of January 1, 1960, prisoners sentenced for 
up to and including four months could be released on parole subject to certain 
conditions.246 Officers and members of the Prison Service were authorized to 
release black male prisoners on parole, but the release of white prisoners (male 
and female) and non-white female prisoners required the approval of the Prison 
Board.247 Among other provisions, the document on the release of short-term 
prisoners on parole stated that prisoners could be placed in the employment of 
white as well as non-white persons, “on the distinct understanding, however, 
that a white prisoner shall not be placed in the employment of a non-white 
person.”248 The document also stipulated that employers were to pay a wage of 
20 cents per day to white laborers and 10 cents per day to non-white laborers, 
although it is unclear how often white men and women were actually paroled to 
employers. This was consistent with the long-standing racial differentiation in 
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prison labor that allowed for black men to be leased for “outside work” while 
white prisoners remained within the prison walls to labor in workshops (more 
often gaining a skill that could serve them after release). The document set out 
conditions applicable to the employer and the parolee, emphasizing that the 
parolee must give their consent to be released to work for the employer. The 
contract resembled other employment contracts, but specified that “although a 
parolee should otherwise be treated as an ordinary free employee he may not 
leave the service of his employer during the period of parole.”249 
 In June 1960, the Star Express newspaper reported that a new wave of 
forced labor had broken out in a farming area south of Johannesburg. The 
paper’s inquiry into farm labour and cruelty to workers revealed that “some 
farmers take advantage of influx control laws to obtain ‘sweat’ labour.’”250  It 
stated that workers were afraid to report these cases because, due to influx 
control laws in cities, they had nowhere to go if they were kicked off farms. The 
paper reported that farmers were using this vulnerability to their advantage.251 
Dr. T.S. van Rooyen, acting chief information officer of the BAD department, told 
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the reporter that the department was taking a serious view of the situation: “A 
few farmers are taking advantage of the influx control laws. Our inspectors are 
misled by Natives who, under threats, will not give a true report. When guilty 
farmers are found they will be ‘blacklisted.’ We will not help them to get 
workers.”252 Despite this strong rhetoric, few farmers were actually blacklisted. 
 The next several years would see a cycle of farmers panicking about 
potential labor shortages and the government rushing to “help them to get 
workers,” to use van Rooyen’s phrasing. In February 1961, 500 Transvaal farmers 
met in Pretoria at a conference called by the Transvaal Agricultural Union to 
discuss ways to retain African farm laborers. The Rand Daily Mail reported that 
farmers were “worried at the rate at which farm workers emigrate to the cities to 
work for shorter hours and higher wages.” 253  The farmers were said to be 
meeting to discuss ways to develop a stable labor force; among the matters to be 
discussed were housing on farms, education, wages, and leave privileges.254 
According to the paper, “Farmers fear that if conditions are not improved an 
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acute shortage of labour could develop.”255 In June, the Sunday Times reported 
that Transvaal Agricultural Union officials were cooperating with the BAD 
Department in an intensive drive to make all farmers fully aware of their legal 
obligations as employers of farm labour. This included sending pamphlets about 
these legal obligations to all district and local unions of the TAU.256 Efforts to 
bring labor conditions up to a standard that would be more appealing to workers 
and that would be more similar across employers was one part of ensuring 
against a labor shortage, but securing prison labor was still a widely used 
strategy.  
 In January 1962, The Star reported that the Bethal farming district (the site 
of a well-publicized farm labor scandal in 1949) hosted nine farm prisons. The 
prisons supplied about 2,000 laborers to surrounding farms.257 The next year, the 
Sunday Times reported, “Many farmers in the Western Cape want more farm 
prisons—they are relying more and more on jail labour, and the authorities 
cannot meet demand.” 258  Farmers’ profit motive seemed to be driving the 
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construction of rural farm prisons as much as ever, and the authorities could not 
keep up with the demand for incarceration and the resulting captive labor force. 
While the balance between government and private interests was more equal in 
the past, by 1962, the demand from farmers seems to have outstripped the state’s 
capacity to supply.  
 In mid-1964, the government reached another solution. Parliament passed 
legislation that provided that farmers could request the Minister of BAD to 
abolish the tenant labor system in their area.259 This allowed for the large-scale 
removal of labour tenants from areas in order to artificially decrease the labour 
supply and ensure that those who remained did not enjoy the same autonomy as 
labour tenants. The Rand Daily Mail reported that “[t]he Government is ready to 
implement its plan to move thousands of African squatter families of platteland 
farms to the African areas …. According to the SA Agricultural Union, which 
supports the removal of squatters, requests from farmers have already been 
received by the Minister.”260 At the same time, farmers in the Western Cape had 
found another way to cope with potential labor shortages—trading convict labor 
on the black market. In November 1965, The Star reported on the emergence of 
                                                        







this black market: “A Wellington wine farmer, Mr. H. N. Brink, alleged here 
today that there was a black market in convict labour among farmers in the 
Western Province. He said it could cost as much as R1,200 to persuade a farmer 
with surplus convict labour to lend one out.”261 This rate chimes with other 
estimates of the profit that white farmers stood to gain for employing prison 
labor. As Corry writes, in 1965 the right to employ prison labor in the Western 
Cape was valued at R1,000 per convict.262 
Benjamin Pogrund wrote to MP Helen Suzman in late 1966 asking for her 
help in discerning the present extent of the farm labor system. He attached lists 
of questions that he hoped she could raise on the parliament floor, along with 
excerpts from newspaper articles that he had collected on relevant matters. From 
his own investigations, he had determined that there were likely five categories 
of farm labor at that time in South Africa:  
1) Farm jails;  
2) The parole system whereby prisoners go out daily from jail;  
3) The BAD Department’s farm labour scheme;  
4) Ordinary farm workers; and  
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5) The squatter system.263  
Although farmers’ use of coerced labor received far less attention after the 
scandal and subsequent cosmetic reformers of 1959-60, Pogrund was quite right 
that these systems continued unabated five years later. Pogrund and others had 
also conducted interviews with prisoners and former prisoners as part of their 
investigations on prison conditions. In an interview from 1965, a 31-year-old 
prison farm laborer named Amos Mosidi described his experiences: 
 I was convicted on a charge of theft. 
 I served two weeks at Modder B. and six weeks at Jacobson’s Farm, 
Belfast. 
I was among prisoners who were sold from Modder B. to Mr. 
Jacobson, a farmer in Belfast. 
While I was at Modder B., I made a complaint to a White warder that I 
could not work as I suffered from kidney trouble.  
The warder ignored me and, instead, ordered me to go and work with 
a ‘span.’ I thought I would die that day, because of pains. 
 When I could not work any further, I made another complaint. This, 
too, was ignored. 
When I arrived at Jacobson’s farm, I repeatedly made complaints to 
Mr. Jacobson himself, who told me: ‘Ek het nie medisiene om jou to gee.’ 
During the six weeks I spent on the farm as a dying man, I was never 
taken to the hospital or a doctor. Instead, I was confined to bed for three 
days when it became evidence [sic] to Mr. Jacobson that I was on the verge 
of death.  
When healthy, I did my work well, starting at 2 a.m. to 8 a.m. and from 
2 p.m. to 6 p.m. For services renders [sic], I was rewarded with a khakhi 
shirt. I was released in August, 1965. I am still not feeling well.264 
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Mosidi’s account stands in stark contrast to the government’s framing of the 
scheme as welfarist and voluntary. The description of being “sold” to the farmer 
remains, an echo of the language used to describe previous prison labor 
schemes—in her 1959 exposé, Ruth First described how common that phrase was 
among black people whose husbands, sons, fathers, or neighbors had left in the 
morning and did not return at night. 265  There is no sense that this was a 
voluntary decision, or a relationship governed by contract. The farmer made no 
effort to seek medical treatment, as required under the contract provisions for 
short-term laborers established in 1960.266 Mosidi’s labor appears to have cost the 
farmer the equivalent of slave labor. 
Corry offers a rare glimpse into the parole labor system of the early 1970s; 
by that time, objections remained that the system allowed farmers to access labor 
at exploitative rates and that it was liable to abuse.267 In 1971, the system received 
harsh criticism after a paroled prisoner was beaten to death by his employer. 
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Oversight of the system was lax, and in some cases prisoners were released on 
parole to farmers whom the Prison Department had blacklisted under the ‘9d per 
day scheme’ because of their poor employment conditions. 268  The judge 
presiding over the case of the farmer who had killed his employee also criticized 
the employment contract used by the Department of Prisons as being so full of 
errors that some phrases did not make sense.269 As a result of the criticisms, the 
Department increased its supervision and during 1972 it carried out 357 
inspections; however, these visits were not numerous enough to adequately 
supervise the conditions of the 124,648 prisoners released on parole that year.270  
In 1980, the liberal South African Institute of Race Relations included in its 
annual survey of race relations the case of a northern Transvaal farmer accused 
of routinely beating up naked parolee prisoners upon their arrival at his farm. 
The farmer testified that no less than 4,000 parolee prisoners had worked on his 
farm between 1972 and 1977, and that he fetched them from as far away as 
Modderbee Prison in Benoni.271 The use of prison labor on private farms would 
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continue until 1988.272 The last prison outstations on farms were closed, at least 
in part, due to international pressure; South Africa was warned that it was a 
contravention of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to export 
goods produced by forced labor.273 However, an Africa Watch study published 
in the final year of apartheid found that people were still being released on 
parole to work in private sector businesses with little or no remuneration.274 As 
for the pass laws, the apartheid government finally abolished the pass system in 
1986, but this hardly meant relief from repression and arrests for black people in 
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As we have seen, incarceration and the use of prison labor played a larger 
role in apartheid than historians have imagined. In this brief concluding section, 
I will discuss some of the implications this may carry for South African 
historiography and for reforms in South Africa today. 276  I will offer some 
provisional answers to the question: How does recasting pass laws within the 
history of prisons and agricultural development help us re-think the history of 
apartheid, and the relationship between urban and rural areas under apartheid? 
Although I can foresee several potential answers, I hope that further research 
into the continuum that stretched from apartheid city streets through jails and 
prisons to rural plantations will open up more lines of inquiry still.   
This history of pass laws reveals that the influence of the agricultural 
sector on the policies that entrenched segregation and apartheid—in both rural 
and urban areas—was more extensive than many historians have thought. This 
carries implications for the farm labor system in South Africa today, and may 
help us better understand the direction of post-apartheid reforms to the rural 
agricultural sector—or, more precisely, the lack of reforms in this area. In 
general, post-apartheid reforms have been heavily biased toward improving life 
and decreasing segregation in urban areas. While the government and policy 
                                                        




advocates have made much of the need to “remake the apartheid city,” their 
conceptions of how cities have related to rural areas in the past and the need for 
reforms that target change in both areas have been rather thin. As discussed in 
chapter one, there remains a stark delineation between “urban” issues (i.e. 
housing and utility service delivery) and “rural” issues (i.e. land reform, tenure 
security, working conditions on farms). Overall, there is very little sense of the 
power the agricultural lobby has wielded in shaping both the urban and rural 
spheres in modern South Africa.  
Although the pass law system and prison farm labor schemes ended in the 
last years of apartheid, the historical relationships, power relations, and 
economic interests that fostered their existence and benefitted from them have 
remained remarkably well-preserved despite the democratic transition. For this 
reason, among others, historical research on these interests and institutions and 
on the interconnections between rural and urban areas under apartheid has 
much to offer debates about how to approach more far-reaching reforms today. 
Similarly, a renewed focus on pass laws that situates them within a broader 
fabric of police, courts, jails, prisons, and rural labor markets may also highlight 
the extent of reform needs in the areas of prisons and criminal procedure. As I 




markets in modern South Africa and, later, helped manipulate them; since the 
country continues to be characterized by racialized dispossession and labor 
relationships marked by degradation, historians, political economists, and legal 
scholars would do well to better understand the breadth of institutions—some 
urban, some rural, but most that blur these lines—that brought about the South 
















‘A disciplining method for holding standards down’:  
The World Bank, Urban Planning, and South Africa’s Transition from Apartheid 
 
On April 30, 2008 the Johannesburg High Court ruled that prepaid water 
meters, which had been installed in poor townships in Soweto beginning in 2004, 
were a violation of South Africans’ constitutional right to access to sufficient 
water. Judge MP Tsoka ruled in favor of five residents of Soweto’s Phiri 
township who had filed suit against the City of Johannesburg and Johannesburg 
Water. The city had launched Operation Gcin’amanzi (‘Save Water’ in Zulu) in 
2001, in an attempt to reduce unaccounted water use in the city’s poorest 
districts. City officials had argued that poor township districts were wasting 
water because of their decrepit apartheid-era water infrastructure. In 2006, 
Operation Gcin’amanzi received a R320-million loan from the French 
Development Agency to complete installation of pre-paid water meters in 
Soweto.277 The city had hired a French multinational corporation, Suez, to install 
the meters, which automatically disconnected water supply after residents 
consumed a free allocation (of 25 liters per person per day, or the equivalent of 
two toilet flushes per day for a household of eight). Beyond the allotted amount, 
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the resident had to pay in advance for water. Although prepaid water meters 
were outlawed in Britain in 1998 because of public health concerns, South Africa 
sought to become a model for the technology—with an eye toward expanding its 
use on the African continent.278  
 Beginning in 2004 township residents were forced either to accept the 
prepaid meters or to face total disconnection from the city’s water supply 
(Lindiwe Mazibuko initially chose the latter option and, for seven months, 
resorted to walking three kilometers to obtain water from a reservoir). Residents 
in wealthier areas, with far larger water consumption rates, faced no such 
restrictions. Judge Tsoka highlighted the discriminatory nature of the 
municipality’s provision of water in his judgment, finding that:  
The underlying basis for the introduction of prepayment meters seems to 
me to be credit control. If this is true, I am unable to understand why this 
credit control is only suitable in the historically poor black areas and not 
the historically rich white areas. Bad payers cannot be described in terms 
of colour or geographical area. There may be as many bad customers in 
the historically rich white areas as they [sic] are in the historically poor 
black areas. Bad debt is a human problem not a racial problem.279  
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Citing Phiri residents’ poverty, high incidence of HIV and AIDS, and their 
reliance upon state pensions and grants to make ends meet, Judge Tsoka ruled 
that the city must provide Phiri residents with 50 free liters of water per person 
per day and give them the option of an ordinary credit-metered water supply. 
He argued that increasing the free water supply would not strain the city’s water 
and financial resources, especially if free basic water already supplied to rich 
households were redistributed to the poor through cross-subsidization of water 
tariffs. The city appealed Judge Tsoka’s decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal 
and the Constitutional Court. Ultimately, the country’s highest court ruled that 
pre-paid meters were consistent with the Constitution. In a blow to the Phiri 
residents, the Court held that Johannesburg’s free water allocation was 
reasonable and that prepaid meters were introduced in a manner that was 
lawful, procedurally fair, and not unfairly discriminatory.280 
The Phiri case—the first ever to deal explicitly with the right to water—
was the latest development in post-apartheid battles over the provision of 
housing and ‘basic services’ such as water and electricity. After the African 
National Congress came to power in 1994, millions of people were hooked up to 
water, electricity, and phone lines within a few years. Millions, however, were 
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later disconnected for being unable to pay their bills. At least 40 percent of new 
phone lines were out of service by 2003 and ten million people had been 
disconnected from water.281 Municipalities’ moves to privatize service provision 
and implement ‘cost-recovery’ mechanisms—with prepaid water meters as the 
most extreme example—gave rise to a number of social movements beginning in 
1999, including Johannesburg’s Anti-Privatisation Forum.282 Minister for Safety 
and Security Charles Nqakula reported that there were more than 6,000 recorded 
protests across the country in the 2004/2005 financial year.283 Quieter protests 
abounded as well; some people disconnected their prepaid water meters and re-
connected their households and neighborhoods to the city, circumventing the 
meters. Others reconnected their electricity following cut-offs. 284  Of course, 
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battles over urban governance and service provision were not new to South 
Africa; rent boycotts and calls for ‘one city, one tax base’ were key features of 
urban anti-apartheid activism from the mid-1980s.  
The ANC’s approach to urban governance and service provision aimed to 
overcome the spatial inequalities created by apartheid legislation. However, by 
adopting a range of techniques circulating at the international level, the ANC’s 
approach rapidly became a model for ‘public-private partnerships.’ The story of 
how private sector-led shelter and service provision became viable options—
while more direct state-led attempts at redistribution fell off the policy agenda—
reveals much about the structuring of urban space, permissible claims, and 
political demands at the turn of the 21st century. In South Africa and many other 
countries in the Global South, the World Bank had a large role in shaping the 
direction of urban governance and in framing the ideal relationship between 
states, markets, and citizens. This chapter will examine such framing processes 
through the World Bank’s trial-and-error efforts at urban assistance in the 1970s 
and 1980s. Specifically, I will trace the Bank’s arguments about the ideal role of 
the state in housing and service provision. Over this period the World Bank 
encouraged governments to withdraw from providing public housing directly, 




encouraged to construct ‘self-help housing’ through the Bank’s sites and services 
and slum upgrading approach.  
This chapter draws on World Bank internal memoranda, mission reports, 
and staff reviews found in the archives of Michael Cohen, a head staffer in the 
World Bank’s urban division from 1972-1999, as well as on speeches and 
publications.285 In contrast to other studies of public housing, urban assistance, 
and the role of international financial institutions, my study seeks to clarify the 
World Bank’s self-conceptions, rather than focusing solely on the outcomes of its 
actions. My inquiry is guided by the following questions: How was the 
relationship between the post-colonial state, market, and its citizens envisioned 
within the Bank? What was the state’s projected role as ‘enabler’ of market forces 
and the private sector meant to involve? Though focused on the 1970s and 80s, 
the chapter will conclude with a brief discussion of South Africa in the early 
1990s, when the World Bank (after two decades of practice in promoting 
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privatized land and housing markets) counseled the African National Congress 
on its post-apartheid policies. The ANC’s adoption of these policies has resulted 
in explosive confrontations with civil society activists who hold alternative 
visions of the role of the state in housing and service provision.  
The World Bank started to focus on urbanization and urban development 
in the late 1960s, paralleling a rising interest in urban space among social 
theorists. Beginning in 1970 with the publication of Henri Lefebvre’s The Urban 
Revolution, scholars began to theorize urban space and urban society as 
conceptual units in their own right. Contesting Marxist scholarship that focused 
on the shift from an agricultural to an industrial world, Lefebvre argued that an 
additional transition had occurred—from an industrial to an urban world—and 
that this shift had ushered in profound changes in social organization. Before 
1970, urban research in sociology and other social sciences had been largely 
descriptive, and research was usually framed in a technocratic fashion in order to 
meet the needs of housing and urban development policy.286 In this chapter, I 
approach the assumed divide between theoretical and technocratic approaches to 
urban space differently. My analysis of the World Bank’s urban assistance 
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projects focuses on understanding the theory implicit in such technocratic 
approaches, and how these theories have shaped urban possibilities by altering 
the way people think about the relationship between states and markets. My 
approach draws upon the work of scholars who have theorized the role of 
experts and expert knowledge in producing political and economic 
subjectivities.287 I will conclude with a discussion of how the African National 
Congress in South Africa relied upon such expert knowledge from the World 
Bank to construct a more palatable narrative of the post-apartheid economy. The 
narrative relied on advice from the World Bank that was based on the bank’s 
experiences in urban assistance elsewhere on the continent and in other parts of 
the world.  
Existing literature on the World Bank and its policies is polarized. The 
bank itself has published thousands of reports, policy papers, and other 
documents reflecting upon its mission and direction. Critics—and there are 
many—have savaged the bank, particularly after its forays into structural 
adjustment beginning in the 1980s. 288  For all their differences, both Bank 
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publications and the writings of critics tend to obscure the evolving relationship 
between what the bank set out to do, what it in fact did, and what it then had to 
say about its actions. The bank was indeed part of an effort to remake the 
relationship between states, markets, and citizens. But bank officials constantly 
traversed a wide gap between ideology and practice; this gap was particularly 
pronounced in the case of mission staff who were in charge of implementing 
bank policy in any given country. The World Bank often talked up a neoliberal 
approach, but its walk was sometimes more of a Keynesian stumble—revealing 
an awareness that the ‘free market’ is rarely ever free (or self-regulating), and 
that attempts to ‘jumpstart’ it often necessitate continued intervention.289 Such 
contradictions have been rife at the bank. For instance, neoliberal calls for the 
state to bow to private-sector service provision sometimes entailed voucher 
systems or other forms of government subsidy to ‘enable markets to work’ on 
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their own. And calls to minimize state intervention have often, in practice, 
resulted in bloated bureaucracies needed to manage unwieldy bank projects and 
to oversee cost recovery.290 On the other hand, the displacement of local public 
servants by World Bank consultants and by bank mandates that governments cut 
costs through payroll cuts has been significant. Given the scale and scope of the 
World Bank’s operations, it is worth understanding this disconnect between 
ideology and practice. The bank has attained a reputation as a polished neo-
colonial enterprise despite its daily actions, which look much more like over-
confident games of trial-and-error—with devastatingly high stakes. Nonetheless, 
the bank has managed to influence the relationship between governments and 
their citizens by reframing entitlements. Understanding the World Bank’s 
framing is essential to understanding the constraints it places upon current 
modes of political engagement.  
In examining accounts of Bank practitioners (some of which are discussed 
publicly for the first time in this study), the tensions between neoliberal theories 
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of urban development and the frustrations of implementing such theories come 
squarely into focus. Pure utopian accounts of how the market should be able to 
provide for the poor while reducing the burden on the state were forced to give 
way to practical realities. Within the bank, staff who recognized the failure of the 
neoliberal model saw a need for states to underpin markets while at the same 
time subduing popular aspirations for development. The gap between theory 
and implementation was thus filled by an explicit plan to hold standards down 
and to depress expectations. Although bank practitioners were constantly forced 
to navigate the gap between theory and practice—and between popular 
expectations and outcomes—throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the prominent 
account of the bank during this period is of a self-confident neoliberal institution. 
In contrast, this article explores the relationship between the recognition of the 
practical inadequacies of the market’s ability to ‘deliver’ to the poor and the 
resulting need to dampen popular expectations and radically reframe 
entitlements.  
First, some background on the World Bank. While the bank is typically 
associated with lending to ‘developing’ countries, this was not its original remit. 
The Bank was established in July 1944 during a conference of 44 countries in 




drafting plans for new international financial institutions for the post-war era 
since it entered the war in 1941.291 The architects of these institutions sought to 
stabilize the global capitalist system and prevent a situation like that following 
the 1929 stock market crash in which countries like France, Belgium, Italy, and 
Great Britain were unable to repay their external debts to the United States.292 It 
was thought that providing public capital through a number of public, 
multilateral institutions would mitigate the risk of private international 
investments.293 Officially called the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the bank focused overwhelmingly on rebuilding Europe after the 
war. Between 1946 and 1948 the bank granted over $500 million to countries in 
Western Europe, and granted just one loan to a developing country.294   
In 1947-48 senior World Bank officials took several steps toward 
surveying developing countries and determining a potential role for the bank in 
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development lending. Officials conducted survey missions in several countries 
(mainly in Central and South America) and began project discussions with 
officials in 20 countries.295 By the end of 1948 the bank had published its first 
income estimates for different parts of the world, showing that per capita income 
in ‘highly developed countries’ in North American and Europe was over ten 
times that in most ‘underdeveloped’ countries.296 The Chinese revolution of 1949 
further encouraged bank officials to incorporate an ‘under-development’ 
dimension into the bank’s work, as a means for combatting what they saw as the 
rising threat of Communism.297 The bank’s Fourth Annual Report, published in 
September 1949, expressed a newfound commitment to ‘economic 
development.’298   
The bank began lending money at high interest rates to developing 
countries for specific projects such as roads, port infrastructure, dams, and 
agricultural projects.299 Until 1962 the bank did not grant a single loan for a 
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school, health unit, drainage system or drinking water conveyance.300 The bank 
tried to ensure that its projects would be profitable and that money spent on 
infrastructure projects would go to companies based in industrialized countries. 
Based on the World Bank’s own annual figures, in its first 17 years more than 93 
per cent of the money lent came back each year to the most industrialized 
countries in the form of purchases of goods and services.301 The World Bank 
stopped making such figures public after 1962 when it became less politically 
palatable to boast about how much international aid was flowing right back to 
the United States and Western Europe.302   
Beginning in the early 1970s, the World Bank and other international 
agencies began to focus on housing and shelter provision as key elements in 
what they called ‘urban assistance’ programs. The scale of these urban assistance 
projects and the extent to which they sought to remake municipal governance 
was staggering. As Michael Cohen, former head of the World Bank’s urban 
division, wrote in a 2001 article that took stock of the Bank’s urban assistance 
programs: 
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Ten thousand urban centres in more than 150 countries received 
international aid. … From the Bank, projects, plans, investments, research 
and loans were used to mobilize and leverage local resources to provide 
needed housing, water supply, sanitation, transportation, environmental 
management, education, social services and community development. 
Some US $60 billion was transferred to these urban areas, in most cases 
through their national governments. The primary objective was to 
alleviate poverty…303 
 
A key element of bilateral and multilateral agencies’ shift toward shelter 
provision and urban poverty alleviation was the construction of the role of the 
state as an ‘enabler’ of market forces and private sector service provision, rather 
than a direct provider of housing and other services. The next sections will 
describe how this role came about, and how it fitted into the bank’s larger 
conception of its urban assistance work.   
 
 
Imagining ‘urban’ at the World Bank 
 
 The focus on urban development—or even ‘urban’ as a concept—is not 
intuitive. Throughout the 1960s, development donors preferred to focus on rural 
projects, as developing countries’ cities were seen as “inherently complex and 
difficult environments in which to operate.”304 Their populations—increasingly 
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composed of migrants between the ages of 15 and 29—were seen as ‘potential 
sources of upheaval,’ whose frustration over a lack of employment opportunities 
could easily be converted into a politically dangerous force.305 For their part, 
newly independent governments in Africa faced high levels of differentiation 
between urban and rural areas during the 1960s, as colonial attempts at “labor 
stabilization” begun in the 1930s had created a high wage urban sector and a 
large “urban-rural divide.”306 In the early to mid-1960s, government housing 
polices tended to focus on fostering a middle class by providing subsidized 
public sector housing, particularly to civil servants.307 In Lagos, for example, 62 
percent of funds spent on public housing from 1957 to 1966 went into projects for 
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high and middle income groups, while just 19 percent went to projects for 
middle or low income groups; the remainder went toward re-housing people 
who were displaced by clearance schemes.308 With increased migration to urban 
areas by the late 1960s, many African countries began to see rising 
unemployment levels and more and more squatters in urban areas. Governments 
were not able to keep up with growing demand for housing. In Nairobi, for 
instance, the annual need for new housing was 9,000 units by 1972—not 
including the accumulated backlog from previous years. The city was expected 
to construct roughly 5,000 units per year starting in 1965 in order to house the 
population at the prevailing growth rate, but they always fell thousands short of 
that target.309  
As governments began to puzzle over the new ‘unemployment problem’ 
in urban areas, new trends in economics and anthropology began to draw 
attention to high levels of self-employment, which official employment estimates 
had overlooked. Economic anthropologist Keith Hart coined the term ‘informal 
economy’ in the early 1970s, following dissertation fieldwork among self-
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employed migrants in Accra (which he deemed a “study of modernization,” 
indicative of the dominant vision in development economics at the time).310 Hart 
opened his 1973 article “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment 
in Ghana” asking: “Does the ‘reserve army of urban unemployed and 
underemployed’ really constitute a passive, exploited majority in cities like 
Accra, or do their informal economic activities possess some autonomous 
capacity for generating growth in the incomes of the urban (and rural) poor?”311 
Hart thus fueled a focus on the self-help, income-generating capacities of the 
urban poor—and a reification of the divide between what he deemed the 
informal and formal economic “sectors.”312  
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Around the same time, the work of British architect John Turner was 
stirring up great interest at the World Bank. Based on his experiences in the 
slums of Lima in the late 1960s, Turner argued that squatters tended to solve 
their own housing needs, and thus that the “‘problem’ might be more accurately 
described as part of the ‘solution.’”313 Turner’s work inaugurated a total shift in 
the conceptualization of slums. 314  According to researcher Lisa Peattie, “a 
differentiation was made between the ‘slums of despair’ of the non-upwardly-
mobile resident of old central cities in the USA and ‘slums of hope’ in the 
developing world, in which new urban migrants were struggling to make their 
way upward in a newly-industrializing economy. The shanties were not housing 
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in deterioration; they were housing in process of improvement.” 315  Between 
these two trends in the literature on urbanization, the focus in development 
circles turned to encouraging the “informal sector” and “slum upgrading.”  
 ‘Urban’ became a concept and catchphrase at the World Bank in the late 
1960s. It was thought that the bank’s work in various sectors, such as 
transportation, water, and sewerage, needed to be seen as being part of a “larger 
urban context.” 316 A working group under a Department of Special Projects 
“began to address the problem of describing what ‘urban’ might mean in Bank 
terms.”317 In 1971, the working group produced the bank’s first urban sector 
working paper, “Urbanization,” in which they identified concepts that, according 
to one bank staffer, “became basic tenets of urban practice in the Bank: for 
example, the focus on poverty in the urban context, on affordability and cost-
recovery, on replicability at large scale.”318  
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 Robert McNamara’s term as President of the World Bank began in 1968 
(he came to the bank directly after serving as US Secretary of Defense, acting as a 
chief planner of the Vietnam War). McNamara ushered in a shift towards 
focusing efforts more directly on the poor in developing countries.319 Initially, 
this meant focusing on the rural poor. In a 1970 speech to the UN Economic and 
Social Council, McNamara attested to the bank’s lack of knowledge about urban 
issues.320 In 1973, he reiterated the bank’s commitment to attacking rural poverty 
in a speech to the bank’s Board of Governors in Nairobi.321 Just two years later, 
however, McNamara made a speech at the bank’s Annual Meeting in which he 
committed the bank to assisting the urban poor, focusing on the organization’s 
responsibility to alleviate poverty among the people crowding cities in the 
developing world at an ever-increasing rate. McNamara’s argument turned 
largely on the potential of the ‘urban poor’ to be a destabilizing force that might 
upset efforts to spur economic growth. He framed the threat in no uncertain 
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terms: “Historically, violence and civil upheaval are more common in cities than 
in the countryside. Frustrations that fester among the urban poor are readily 
exploited by political extremists. If cities do not begin to deal more constructively 
with poverty, poverty may well begin to deal more destructively with cities.”322 
McNamara closed with an impassioned call to action, which would be quoted by 
bank officials throughout the ‘80s and ‘90s: “In the end, cities exist as an 
expression of man’s attempt to achieve his potential. It is poverty that pollutes 
that promise. It is development’s task to restore it.”323  
Given prevailing ideas about urban areas as inherently complex and 
dangerous, it is not surprising that in the early 1970s when bank staffers set out 
to tackle cities they began by quantifying everything they could about them. 
“Comprehensive city studies” were meant to “provide a systematic framework 
for Bank activity.”324 But by 1974, such comprehensive studies had already gone 
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out of fashion, as they were seen as being too time consuming. As one staffer put 
it, “They took a great deal of time, and at the end, we found that all the data had 
changed. People threw up their hands in frustration. There were too many ways 
of interpreting the data.”325 Instead, staffers decided to focus on “small, simple 
things that were clearly needed—projects that would ‘get us in the door, give us 
an opportunity to build expertise and earn our bona fides.’”326 Thus began the 
focus on “sites and services” and “squatter settlement upgrading” projects. 
 The World Bank’s first targeted attempt at urban development was in 
Dakar, Senegal. The World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors approved an $8 
million (USD) interest-free loan for fifty years to the Government of Senegal in 
June 1972. 327  The World Bank’s stated objective was to provide low-cost 
affordable housing and infrastructure (“site and services”) to urban residents in 
Dakar. 328  This represented a radical departure from public housing, as “the 
intention was to make housing affordable to low-income households without the 
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payment of subsidies, in contrast to the heavily subsidized public-housing 
approach.”329 Rather than seeing urban slums as something to be demolished, 
the World Bank embarked on a plan of “slum upgrading” and “sites and 
services” that valorized the “self help” capacity of urban residents and facilitated 
a withdrawal of state and local government support for public housing. Instead 
of supporting single family homes—an approach that had been favored by the 
United Nations’ Centre for Housing, Building, and Planning and the British and 
French governments’ bi-lateral housing and urban planning programs, and 
which had been implemented in Latin America—the World Bank sought “low 
cost solutions such as providing one water faucet for one hundred families.”330 
The idea was that individual families would be given loans to buy materials with 
which to build their own homes on the sites. Rather than being entitled to public 
housing, low-income individuals and families were meant to pay for 
construction—allowing the bank to recover any costs for the project from the 
poor.  
Drawing on economist Milton Friedman’s neoliberal theory of public 
choice, the World Bank’s Dakar experiment sought to shift from an emphasis on 
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supply to a focus on demand in housing provision. Michael Cohen describes the 
rationale for a ‘supply-side orientation’ thus: “…Infrastructure projects often 
reflect a large ‘supply bias,’ i.e. they reflect the design preferences of the 
engineers who build them, but such projects frequently are unconnected to the 
demand side or the potential users of these services. It should be no surprise that 
these projects frequently create services which the public utilities cannot sell. As 
a result, infrastructure projects frequently place local authorities in financial 
difficulties.” 331  The shift to a supply-side orientation limits the role of 
government-subsidized entitlements to housing, as the market is perceived as 
operating more efficiently if it takes its cues from people’s ability and willingness 
to pay for services. Limiting government subsidies was recognized early on by 
some within the Bank as a politically charged proposal. As an anonymous World 
Bank Transportation & Urban Projects Department paper put it in April 1974 in 
an extended discussion on the role of subsidies: “How far settlers can justifiably 
be subsidised in meeting the part of the total costs of the project allocated to 
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them is a troublesome issue since socio-political judgments are inevitably 
involved.”332  
In order to keep costs down, the bank devised a model for high-density 
residential areas with a minimum of public infrastructure, services, and space.333 
As Michael Cohen put it,  
The challenge for project design was to reduce the costs of the project and 
thereby increase its affordability for low income households. … Density was 
the decision variable which could make that possible. Reducing costs meant 
reducing the size of plots per hectare, and in so doing, increasing the density 
and the number of households per hectare. Residential densities were to be 
increased rather than creating either public space or additional space for 
social facilities.334  
 
Density was certainly achieved in the Dakar project; when the bank and the 
Senegalese Government declared the project “completed” in 1982, the project 
had 10,500 plots with 10 persons per plot, making it the second largest ‘city’ in 
Senegal.335 As of 2006, the population was home to somewhere between 350,000 
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to 500,000 people (from three to five times the originally projected population 
and density per hectare).336 
 The Dakar project got off to a slow start, which forced bank officials to 
reflect upon their endeavor and its shortcomings. They had an ambitious 
implementation schedule—it had been assumed that “14,000 plots could be 
constructed and services provided in six years, with households beginning to 
build their self-help housing as soon as they received ownership of the plot.”337 
While Michael Cohen (who worked on the implementation of the Dakar project 
in the 1970s) attributes delays, in part, to bank staff’s “underestimat[ing] the time 
for policy and institutional changes to occur,” he also points to disagreements 
between the bank and the government of Senegal about the merits of the project 
and its approach. He writes:  
Delays in implementation also reflected more profound second thoughts 
on the part of the Senegalese Government. … [T]hen President Leopold 
Senghor visited the site [in December 1974] and declared that all 
households in the project should have private water taps and toilets, both 
of which were clearly unaffordable by the majority of the intended low-
income population. This signaled Government interest in settling a 
wealthier population on the site. Despite mixed messages and 
contradictory policies, the Government was legally bound by agreements 
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it had signed with the World Bank, the implementation of the project 
continued…338  
 
Mission reports on urban assistance projects often referred to the socio-political 
difficulties of implementing sites-and-services and cost recovery programs. 
Although most governments may have been doing a dismal job of delivering 
housing and services to low income populations (and others were not attempting 
the job at all), they were often hesitant to formalize low standards. The reasons 
for this hesitancy varied. In the case of Kenya, reluctant politicians seemed to 
have tourism in mind, rather than the direct needs of Kenyans. According to 
political economist Richard Stern, “There was for some time considerable 
resistance—by President Kenyatta and other members of the indigenous 
bourgeoisie—to sites and services. The reasoning often heard was that, if 
building and sanitation standards were allowed to fall in Nairobi, tourism would 
suffer and international firms would hesitate to locate in Kenya. It was only 
when dilemmas and uncertainties developed within the governing coalition that 
the new international planning orthodoxy was grudgingly accepted.” 339  But 
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urban anthropologist and former consultant to the World Bank, UN, and USAID 
on settlement planning Lisa Peattie has pointed to the fact that governments 
faced problems of legitimacy when lowering standards. She put it succinctly: 
“Which government wants to be seen building slums?” 340  Letting slums 
proliferate was one thing, but “guiding” them was another.  
Implementing cost recovery mechanisms at the municipal level was often 
considered to be too politically dangerous; governments might have agreed to 
implement cost recovery schemes, but fail to put them into practice out fear of 
losing favor politically.341 Altering the role of the state and the market in housing 
and service provision promised to change not only senses of entitlement, but also 
conceptions of citizens’ obligations to the state. As a confidential interim report 
written by the Dakar project’s evaluation bureau (not dated, but likely written in 
late 1978) observed, the bank had failed to take such political implications into 
account as it defined its urban approach: “The seeds of many of the problems 
experienced in project implementation can be traced back to the period of 
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preparation (1969-73). During this time the Bank’s urban policy was poorly 
defined; the policy (such as it was) was the antithesis of the policy being carried 
out in Senegal; and the OHLM [Office des Habitations à Loyer Modéré] did not 
have the capability of carrying out such a large, novel and politically sensitive 
exercise.”342  
If in the early 1970s the bank was still struggling to define its approach to 
urban assistance, by the time McNamara made his speech on the need to tackle 
urban poverty in 1975, a fairly clear conception of the relationship between the 
state, the market, and ‘urban poverty’ had emerged in bank thinking. This view 
saw ‘urban’ as a distinct sphere facing a demographic threat. ‘Urban poverty’ 
was a function of economic dualism, with “two sectors”—the informal and 
formal—existing alongside each other. And ‘(central) government’ was an entity 
that needed to step aside and allow markets to function more efficiently in order 
to provide housing to the poorest. Standards should be kept low when it came to 
housing and services for the urban poor. This would keep costs down—not for 
the government, but for the poor themselves, who were now expected to pay for 
their own housing and services.  
                                                        




McNamara articulated this dualist perspective of urban poverty in his 
1975 speech: 
To comprehend the pathology of poverty in the cities, one must begin with 
an analysis of the employment opportunities of the poor. Employment in 
the urban areas of the developing world is a function of an economic 
dualism that is widespread. Two sectors coexist side by side. One is the 
organized, modern, formal sector, characterized by capital-intensive 
technology, relatively high wages, large-scale operations, and corporate 
and governmental organization. The other is the unorganized, traditional, 
informal sector—economic units with the reverse characteristics: labor-
intensive, small-scale operations, using traditional methods, and providing 
modest earnings to the individual or family owner.343  
 
After discussing the causes of urban poverty, McNamara focused more directly 
on what he saw as standing between the poor and access to housing and services 
such as water, sewerage, transport, and education. He argued: 
The whole question of ‘standards’ of urban services works to the 
disadvantage of the urban poor for they are often written with middle-
class or upper-income orientations, and have little relevance to the 
situation the poor find themselves in. Standards are important, but they 
must be formulated to meet realistic and attainable objectives. If the needs 
of the poor are to be met within a reasonable time span, public utilities 
and social services will have to be provided at costs which they can afford 
to pay.344  
 
McNamara went on to argue that the bank “can play a significant role in 
pointing out the extent to which governments’ present policies, practices, and 
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investment allocations are seriously biased against the poor.”345 McNamara’s 
solution for getting around what he deemed to be governments’ anti-poor bias? 
Sites and services projects, as piloted in Dakar: “Sites and services projects, then, 
stimulate self-help, and make it possible for the poor to house themselves in a 
viable, cohesive community with a minimum of public expenditure.”346  
The bank rapidly expanded its urban assistance programs throughout the 
1970s; by 1979, the bank had committed $1.84 billion (USD) to help finance 45 
urban projects in all regions.347 The World Bank had identified the subjects of its 
interventions as “the urban poor,” which its Urban Poverty Task Force estimated 
to be almost a third of the world’s urban dwellers or 280 million people in 1979. 
According to the bank’s definition, the ‘urban poor’ were officially “people with 
per capita incomes insufficient to meet minimum nutritional requirements (the 
absolute poor) or those with per capita incomes less than one-third the national 
average (the relative poor).”348 As the next section will explain, apart from the 
definition based on income, the “urban poor” were also conceived of as the 
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“customers” of World Bank urban assistance. The label succeeded in flattening 
various regional- and country-specific histories and forms of politics into a one-
size-fits-all model. Since the “urban poor” were to be found across the world—
from Latin America to the recently independent countries in Africa to Asia—the 
World Bank had a (seemingly identical) “customer base” around the globe. The 
World Bank similarly flattened questions of land allocation—often highly 
skewed given histories of colonial dispossession and spatial planning—and the 
prospect of land reform into a more manageable question of “sites” to be 
parceled out and serviced. This led one observer to comment in the late 1970s 
“that the World Bank was interested in sites, but not land.”349  
 
Institutionalizing urban and educating a customer base 
As “urban” was institutionalized at the bank throughout the 1970s and 
early 1980s, bank staff began to sense the standardization of the bank’s ethos and 
operations. Over the course of eight months in 1983-84, three MIT researchers 
conducted interviews and project debriefing sessions with members of the World 
Bank’s urban staff “as part of a pilot effort to encourage the staff’s reflection on 
                                                        





practice.”350 The staff’s reflection reveals much about how they conceived of 
urban assistance projects—and even more about the culture of “learning by 
doing” at the bank. In taking stock of the first 12 years of the bank’s urban 
assistance work, the MIT researchers stressed the pressures which urban staff felt 
to accommodate to the institutional structure: 
It is clear that [the] urban [division] has gone a long way toward 
establishing itself in the Bank. Staff has grown nearly ten-fold; projects, a 
hundred-fold. A body of professional expertise, skill and lore has been 
created. Throughout the developing world, a network of urban Bank 
customers has been nurtured. All of this has been done, however, in such 
a way as to require of urban staff and programs a fundamental 
accommodation to the dominant ethos of the Bank. In the wake of the 
McNamara era, and with the implanting of urban projects in regional 
departments, urban can survive only by continually maintaining its 
legitimacy, relevance, and credibility within a Bank context dominated by 
macro-economic ideas of Bank mission and by a control system closely 
bound to those ideas.351  
 
The extent to which project managers could actually adapt their strategies to 
situations in any given city varied—some urban staff complained that the bank 
tried “to make the context conform to the project rather than the project conform 
to the context” while others spoke of high levels of improvisation. 352  Such 
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improvisation was deemed necessary because, as one urban staffer said, “the 
typical highway or low-income housing project … will turn out wrong if done 
‘by the book.’”353 The example of one particular project in Calcutta circulated as 
“a moral about the need for a flexible and open-ended approach.” In that case, 
“the need to cope with a flooded area led to the idea of digging a drainage hole 
which led to the idea of creating a lake which led to the idea of fish-farming.”354 
Whatever their experiences in terms of flexibility in the field, most agreed that 
any learning done in a particular city was lost before it could benefit subsequent 
missions because of the pressure to show compliance with and support for the 
bank’s approach in mission reports.  
 In their interviews with the MIT researchers, urban staff describe the 
extent to which the bank had standardized both its “criteria of rational practice” 
and the specific “products” it offered in terms of urban assistance. Each project 
had to legitimate itself in terms of the bank’s key concepts: “affordability, cost-
recovery, replicability, efficiency pricing.” 355  Communicating these standards 
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involved a “teaching function”: “Interacting with the borrower involves a 
teaching function. Through conditionalities and through the process of 
negotiation itself, the host government must be brought to ‘understand things 
the Bank’s way.’”356 The bank offered not only money, but also a specific “tool 
kit” or product line to go with it. The key element was making governments 
adopt the bank’s language, conception and approach. As the MIT researchers 
observed: 
There is, further, the idea of building up a body of educated customers 
who not only have developed ‘institutional competence’ themselves, but 
can educate others; even the Saudis, we are told, now talk to the Turks 
about ‘cost-recovery.’ Within the Bank, there is the idea of building up a 
body of staff who ‘know the game,’ as well as building up a kit of tools 
which permit the fine-tuning of the Bank’s product line: sites-and-
services, trash collection, urban transportation, tenuring.357  
 
Despite the delight which staffers took in educating their “customers,” mission 
staff in various countries were not always confident about the extent to which 
technical assistance really sunk in. As the MIT researchers put it: “From the field 
mission perspective, the ‘economic policy dialogue between lender and 
borrower’ may appear as one in which borrowers ‘put up with the technical 
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assistance because of the money’ and conditionalities are negotiated with the 
understanding that there will be a degree of softness in their execution.”358  
 Some of these reservations made their way into mission reports. In 
December 1979, two Urban Division staff members submitted the first 
memorandum reviewing the bank’s experience with urban projects in Eastern 
Africa.359 The report was unusually lengthy, as it hoped to give other Urban 
Division staff a sense of the scope and underlying principles of the Eastern 
African project, and to situate the project within the overall context of urban 
operations for purposes of comparison with other projects. For these reasons, the 
report was remarkably candid; it offered frank assessments of the failures of sites 
and services projects to provide affordable housing for the poorest of urban 
households and to achieve cost recovery goals. Though none of the Eastern 
Africa projects had been completed yet, the authors set out to provide a 
preliminary review of several aspects of the implementation experience, 
including: “initial occupancy, cost recovery, user preferences, and community 
participation.”360 In terms of the scale of the projects, the East Africa region 
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accounted for a very small share of the bank’s urban projects in the 1970s; of the 
bank’s 45 urban projects receiving funding as of 1979, just seven of these were in 
East Africa. The bank provided $117.5 million in loans to projects in East Africa, 
spread across Botswana, Tanzania, Zambia, and Kenya.361 In each country, initial 
slum upgrading projects tended to focus on the capital or largest city, as it was 
hoped that success in such cities would have a positive demonstration effect and 
allow for expansion into secondary cities.  
 The authors began their description of the projects by commenting on 
how much the design of sites and services projects had evolved since the Dakar 
experiment began in 1972. The first East African projects focused on the 
provision of a few “standard features,” meaning relatively low-cost 
infrastructure standards and minimum services for dwellings. In each case, 
levels of services were bifurcated based upon the expectation that two different 
income groups would occupy the site. In Zambia I, for example, “basic” plots 
had standpipes and pit latrines, while “normal” plots had individual water and 
sewer connections. In Tanzania I, 10,600 sites were to be served by water kiosk, 
while 1,600 plots had individual water connections. As in Senegal, the bank ran 
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into problems involving the political viability of its slum upgrading and sites and 
services approaches. In Kenya, for instance, the government required that 100 
per cent of sites be provided with individual water and sewerage connections. By 
1975, the projects “had come to include a wider mix of options (serviced plots 
only; plot with sanitary core; plot with sanitary core and kitchen; plot with 
sanitary core, kitchen plus bedroom) and a spectrum of service levels designed to 
meet different needs at varying prices.” 362  This differentiation in terms of 
standard levels was further stretched in order to include “the very poor,” or the 
bottom 20 per cent of the income scale. When Tanzania II was initiated in 1977, it 
provided “19,000 basic surveyed plots with a communal water supply only—in 
effect, an attempt to guide squatting through provision of secure tenure and 
potable water. The other services were designed to be provided in subsequent 
states as incomes permitted.” Kenya II, on the other hand, stretched in the other 
direction; here the authors observed that “the concept of differential charging has 
been extended to the sale for profit of larger, commercial plots, to permit even 
larger numbers of the urban poor to participate in shelter schemes.”363  
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 The authors also highlighted what they considered to be the bank’s 
progress in terms of extending credit to individual occupants in order to build or 
improve their dwellings. The Dakar project had not contained such a credit 
mechanism, but by 1979, it had “become a standard feature in projects 
throughout the regions.” Botswana I was the first Eastern African project to have 
a building materials loan program. It made loans amounting to $450 (USD) per 
household to pay for bricks, cement, sand and other building supplies—an 
amount considered adequate for building two rooms. Each East Africa project 
differed in terms of which types of institutions administered the loans and 
whether the loans were paid all at once or in stages (with each tranche subject to 
verification of progress on previous construction phases). The second generation 
projects involved a shift from loans of materials to construction loans for the 
following reason: 
In the earlier projects, no provision was made in the loan amounts for 
hiring labor, since Bank policy concerns favored the promotion of self-
help defined in its very limited sense—each beneficiary household, itself, 
constructing a shelter. Experience, however, revealed a very different 
trend; most households (40-80%) used small contractors to build a major 
part of their shelter. Families appear to pursue this course because they 
lack certain building skills and experience and/or because they simply 
cannot afford to take time off from work.364  
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Thus the bank’s original conception of “self-help” needed to be revised in order 
to take into account other economic demands upon households (not to mention 
the need to move beyond the assumption that all locals were innately talented in 
home construction).  
The report’s authors were frank in their conclusion that, in several key 
aspects, the projects were failing on their own terms. They focused on failures in 
terms of actually providing housing to the poorest 20 per cent of urban 
households and cost recovery. On provision of affordable housing to the poorest, 
the authors made the following observation:   
With regard to the target beneficiaries in sites and services, plots are 
currently not affordable to the poorest 20% of urban households. But that 
is a social and political constraint to design; it has proven impossible to 
design technical solutions which at the same time are socially and 
politically acceptable to governments—thus ultimately to the users—at a 
cost low enough to be affordable to the poorest. Another observation 
arising from the experience is that the income groups benefitting from site 
and services appear to be slightly higher than anticipated at the time of 
project design. This is due to at least two factors: rapidly rising 
construction costs, requiring an upward adjustment in the income cut-off 
points of intended beneficiaries and pressure from middle income groups 
for whom few, if any, shelter programs usually exist.365  
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The authors acknowledged this as a “trickling up” of the project benefits. This 
chimes with the experience of the majority of bank urban assistance projects; 
though they had set out to rectify what they considered to be governments’ 
failure to provide housing to the poorest of their citizens, historian Mike Davis 
states that “even the World Bank’s most ambitious and touted projects tended to 
be poached by the middle classes or non-needy in the same way as had public 
housing.”366 In 1987, it would be estimated that “the bottom 30 to 60 percent, 
depending on the country, were unable to meet the financial obligations of sites-
and-services provision or loans for upgrading.” 367 Thus like the government 
programs they were meant to show up, sites and services programs ended up 
catering to a middle income population.  
On cost recovery, the report authors attribute the “dismal” record in the 
East Africa projects to an inability to reconcile technical solutions with social and 
political dynamics. As in other World Bank documents examined here, they 
describe cost recovery as being important because it “provides a disciplining 
mechanism for holding standards down to affordable levels.”368 However, not all 
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governments or urban residents were keen on having their standards adjusted in 
this way. The authors write: 
It is important to note here that collections performance in our project 
areas is necessarily linked to municipal collections of monies owed to 
them in property taxes, water and other utility tariffs, and public housing 
rents. The record in most municipalities is dismal. We believe that in 
earlier projects, Bank staff did not pay enough attention to the need to 
establish simple, workable, and well manned mechanisms for collections. 
But even more important, the analysis of social/cultural practices and 
political realities in project cities was not rigorous. The result is cost 
recovery targets for our projects which are completely out of touch with 
the social/political environments where the projects are located. Thus 
while the goal of full cost recovery should be maintained, the mechanics 
and setting of targets for achieving the same requires careful attention.369  
 
This is a telling moment, as the authors are wrestling with the tension between 
technical solutions and social, cultural, and political realities or, more precisely, 
expectations. The bank was becoming increasingly aware that it needed to 
produce citizens with lower senses of entitlement toward their governments—
educating them into being customers of the private sector, and to expect delivery 
of services and utilities not from their governments but from the market. At the 
time, however, the report’s authors ended on a discouraged note: “Until 
collections can be improved, the claim that it is possible to design and implement 
affordable housing solutions without public subsidies remains effectively in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 





doubt.”370 Thus there were concerns even within the bank about the possibility of 
providing for the poor without government subsidy.  
And yet, publicly, the idea of the state as an ‘enabler’ of the private sector 
was gaining a chorus of support on the international development scene. The 
concept of ‘enablement’ had been around for decades, but it was gaining a higher 
public profile among international housing authorities. Bilateral and multilateral 
agencies began targeting housing and shelter provision and urban poverty 
alleviation in similar ways in the 1970s and 1980s. In line with the World Bank’s 
approach, such agencies construed the role of the state as an ‘enabler’ of market 
forces and private sector service provision rather than a direct provider of 
housing and other services. The United Nations Center for Human Settlements 
(UNCHS/Habitat) began to articulate this role explicitly after 1976, 
recommending that governments concentrate on creating incentives for 
households, NGOs, and the private sector to provide shelter and services.371 This 
anti-statist and pro-market approach became even more fashionable in the 1990s, 
riding a wave of triumphalist rhetoric after the end of the Cold War.  
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 Indeed, the World Bank model had been conceived in the context of the 
Cold War in contrast to a Soviet model of centralized planning and public 
housing. At the end of the Cold War, the bank saw a ‘competing lender’ fold and 
it perceived an opportunity to consolidate a neoliberal world economy. In a 
September 1992 paper entitled “A New Focus on Aid for Urban Development” 
prepared by UN-Habitat and the World Bank and circulated to a restricted group 
ahead of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
Development Assistance Committee meeting in November 1992, the anonymous 
authors describe this opportunity under the heading “The ‘one-model’ world 
economy: the end of choice?”:  
The rapid collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union has had important 
consequences for macro-economic policy and for development strategy 
choice in the developing countries as well. The first consequence has been 
the termination of an important source of political, economic and 
technical support for those Third World countries which had attempted 
wholly, or in part, to emulate the centrally-planned model of economic 
development. The second consequence has been the reduction in policy 
choice. Although the “Third Way” appropriate for the “Third World” was 
never found during the Cold War struggle, a lot was learned. Innovation 
did take place. What the changed international political environment of 
the 1990s will do to this independent innovative spirit in developing 
countries is unclear. On the other hand, it has also been argued that the 




responsible for the absence of positive economic performance in many 
developing countries.372  
 
The document’s authors envisioned a rapid expansion of the bank’s urban 
lending in the early 1990s.373 In looking forward, the authors stressed that only 
through greater participation and accountability at the local level will goals of 
“better governance, democracy, and economic growth” be met. Later on, 
however, they defined participation in a peculiar way—as a willingness to pay 
for services. They wrote: “If the emphasis is on user satisfaction, if users are seen 
as clients, not as beneficiaries, then one would also assume that there will be a 
greater willingness to pay for these services. Participation can therefore be part 
and parcel of sound economic management.”374 They concluded by calling on 
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donors to support efforts to “create the policy framework conducive to an 
expanded role for the private sector.”375  
The World Bank would publicly declare its support for the “enabling” 
framework in a 1993 policy paper called “Housing: Enabling Markets to Work,” 
authored by Stephen K. Mayo, the Urban Development Division’s principal 
economist, and Shlomo Angel, a housing policy consultant. The policy paper 
began with a clear statement of the policy direction it recommended for the bank 
and its borrowers in years to come: “[The paper] advocates the reform of 
government policies, institutions, and regulations to enable housing markets to 
work more efficiently, and a move away from the limited, project-based support 
of public agencies engaged in the production and financing of housing. 
Governments are advised to abandon their earlier role as producers of housing 
and to adopt an enabling role of managing the housing sector as a whole.”376 
They specifically defined an enabling strategy as one in which “governments 
                                                        
375 Ibid., 17.  
 
376 Stephen K. Mayo and Shlomo Angel, “Housing: Enabling Markets to Work,” World 
Bank Policy Paper (1993), 1. Publicly available, but also found in Box: South Africa, 






move from producing, financing, and maintaining housing to improving housing 
market efficiency, particularly on the supply side.”377  
 
The World Bank and South Africa’s transition 
The same year that Stephen Mayo and his co-author published this policy 
paper advocating for the enabling framework across the bank’s urban policies, he 
also focused on how the framework might be applied in South Africa. In 1993, he 
drafted a paper called “Housing Policy Reform in South Africa: International 
Perspectives and Domestic Imperatives.” 378  Though the World Bank had 
refrained from lending to the apartheid state (it did, however, remain in 
conversation with the African National Congress in exile), the Bank sent a 
mission to the country in 1990 once it was clear that a transition was imminent. 
The bank would attempt to shape the ANC government-in-waiting’s urban 
policies into market-based programs in line with the “enabling framework.” 
It is important to clarify that what follows is not a comprehensive account 
of the emergence of the ANC’s neoliberal policies in post-apartheid South Africa. 
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The fact that the ANC was influenced by techniques circulating at the 
international level is well known, and has been ably discussed by others.379 In 
order to give a full account of the World Bank’s influence on the ANC’s 
emerging urban policy, it would be necessary to examine how proposals for 
state-led redistribution (such as the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development 
Programme, or RDP) fell off the table. Instead, this chapter’s final section makes 
a contribution to existing accounts by fleshing out the World Bank’s role in pre-
emptively de-legitimating certain forms of political engagement and protest.  
After decades of honing its approach to ‘urban assistance,’ the World 
Bank was prepared to lend its expertise to the transition from apartheid in South 
Africa.380 In his authoritative study of South Africa’s 1990-1994 transition period, 
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political journalist Hein Marais writes of early and extensive World Bank 
involvement in the transition, noting that “the World Bank soon after the 1990 
thaw had opened channels to the ANC and the trade unions, and enlisted 
researchers associated with the democratic movement in its projects. ‘This is the 
only country in the world where we speak to the opposition,’ its representative 
[Isaac Sam] later boasted.”381 South African journalist William Gumede describes 
the sheer force of the bank’s influence: 
It was an onslaught for which the ANC was wholly unprepared. Key 
economic leaders were regularly ferried to the head offices of 
international organizations such as the World Bank and IMF, and during 
1992 and 1993 several ANC staffers, some of whom had no economic 
qualifications at all, took part in abbreviated executive training 
programmes at foreign business schools, investment banks, economic 
policy think tanks and the World Bank, where they were ‘fed a steady diet 
of neo-liberal ideas.’ It was a dizzying experience. Never before had a 
government-in-waiting been so seduced by the international 
community.382  
 
For the ANC, which only formed a dedicated department of economic policy in 
1990 (after 80 years as a liberation movement), the prospect of sitting across the 
negotiation table from the ruling National Party, which was backed by big 
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business and state resources, was daunting.383 ANC officials with scant economic 
background or concrete policy ideas of their own often welcomed the authority 
that came with World Bank ties. For instance, when plans for a Durban regional 
economic development conference went sour in September 1990 (with the ANC 
claiming that the backroom preparations and politicking by representatives of 
white government and business “make President de Klerk look like an ultra-left 
radical”384), the ANC urged the World Bank to decline an invitation to attend the 
conference. They promised to keep the bank “informed of our discussions with 
the key actors in the region,” as they “trust[ed] these discussions might in the 
near future allow us to support such a visit by you to our lovely, but strife-torn, 
city.” 385 As much as the bank may have been shaping the ANC’s economic 
policies, the ANC was also strengthening its position by, to some extent, guiding 
the bank’s engagement in the country.     
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An analysis of World Bank publications and internal memos on the 
institution’s work in South Africa during the transition reveals the approach to 
economic policy it prescribed for the ANC government-in-waiting. Stephen 
Mayo pushed the Bank’s ‘enabling framework’ in his 1993 paper on housing 
policy reform. The paper draws on work done in the early 1990s in South Africa 
as part of a joint program of the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 
and the World Bank (the Housing Indicators Program), as well as part of several 
World Bank missions to the country. Mayo writes:  
An appropriate overall framework for housing policy in South Africa 
could be the ‘enabling framework’…. Within such a framework, the role 
of government is an important one, though one primarily of enabling and 
facilitating the activities of the private sector—individuals, businesses, 
and community based organizations—to provide and maintain housing. 
In South Africa, the key elements of such an approach involve action on 
three broad fronts: (1) stimulating the demand for housing, (2) facilitating 
housing supply, and (3) creating an appropriate institutional framework 
for the management of the housing sector.386  
 
Internal World Bank office memos and aide memoires dated February 23 and 
April 6, 1993 spell out the ‘enabling framework’ for South Africa in more depth. 
The February 23 memo, authored by Kyu Sik Lee and based on a five-member 
Urban Economic Mission to South Africa during January 23-February 13, stresses 
the importance of moving away from “supply-side” models of service delivery 
                                                        





towards “demand-side” ones. These would aim to jumpstart the market for 
housing, electricity, and other utilities by providing “the urban poor” with one-
time vouchers, which could be “cashed in” for such services. The rationale was 
that supply-side approaches, in which the government would build houses and 
provide services, might prove wasteful—houses might be built in areas where 
people do not want to live, for example. A demand-driven approach would help 
the government and private companies better understand the will of consumers, 
and allow the market to work most efficiently. The memo continues: “An 
additional feature of a cost recovery voucher would be that after it is initiated, 
there would be no financial justification for boycotts of tariff or tax payments.”387 
Given that non-payment of taxes and utility fees in black townships was used to 
protest the apartheid government, this feature aimed at preempting such forms 
of protest. The memo recommends the privatization of utilities and the 
implementation of user fees and full cost recovery mechanisms: “Infrastructure 
that may be financed fully by user charges (e.g. tariffs for electricity, water 
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supply and sanitation) should be reformed as independently managed and 
financially autonomous utilities, thus removing this type of infrastructure from 
the fiscal balance issue.”388  
 In November 1993, just months before the national elections which would 
bring Nelson Mandela and the ANC to power, the ANC’s acceptance of the 
World Bank’s economic recommendations was solidified when the party entered 
into a secret $850-million loan agreement with the IMF. The statement of intent 
attached to the loan expressed an acceptance of World Bank recommendations 
and would be fulfilled with the rapid introduction of neoliberal policies from 
1996 onward. As William Gumede writes, “The secret letter of intent that 
accompanied the loan pointed out the dangers of increases in real wages in the 
private and public sector, stressed the importance of controlling inflation, 
promised monetary targeting, and trade and industrial liberalization, and argued 
in favor of the virtues of market forces over regulatory interventions.”389  
Such policies would involve a very specific role for the state as an 
“enabler” of market forces—instead of the direct redistributor of resources for 
which most South Africans oppressed by apartheid had long struggled and 
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hoped. Such a policy direction would require the right kind of post-apartheid 
citizen—initially, the poor were meant to understand themselves as new 
‘consumers,’ equipped with vouchers to buy housing, land, and utilities on the 
market. Within a few years, cost recovery measures (without direct voucher 
assistance for utilities) became the norm. The 1998 White Paper on local 
government highlighted tough measures for implementing cost recovery, and 
the deputy director-general of the Department of Constitutional Development, 
Chippy Olver, stated: “Where residents fail to meet their obligations in terms of 
service payments and rates, they will be cut off and prosecuted. Only in this way 
can we build a local democracy that works.” 390  Inculcating a “culture of 
payment” was suddenly at the heart of local democracy. Municipalities 
implemented “credit control” measures and cut millions of families off of water 
and electricity between 1998 and 2000. 391  As Greg Ruiters of the Municipal 
Services Project writes, “By 2000, threats to law and order through illegal 
reconnections (theft of water and electricity) were managed by the state often 
using private security companies to whom law and order actions such as cutting 
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water, removing infrastructure, and carrying out evictions were outsourced.”392 
A series of social movements arose at this time, with several directly targeting 
the government’s push towards privatization of services. With little success at 
cost recovery, widespread illegal connections, and growing political unrest—and 
with municipal elections just around the corner—the South African government 
pledged in December 2000 to give all households a free ration of basic services.393 
However, in the case of water this free ration was soon accompanied by even 
harsher cost recovery in the form of prepaid meters.  
The World Bank has hailed its on-going work in South Africa as “a unique 
opportunity to pilot our evolving role as a ‘knowledge bank,’” strengthening the 
role of the private sector and cost recovery mechanisms to an extent unheard of 
in most other countries.394 In the early and mid-2000s, former President Thabo 
Mbeki relied heavily upon classic World Bank conceptions of urban poverty to 
justify prioritizing a business-friendly atmosphere over direct government 
investments in the poor majority. While the dual economy thesis has been 
discredited by social scientists and activists who point to the fact that the ‘two 
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economies’ actually represent a unified economic process,395 Mbeki relied on this 
thesis. In mid-2003, he began speaking of ‘two economies’ co-existing within 
South Africa’s borders. Though some hailed this as a step forward, arguing that 
it indicated a renewed commitment to addressing the needs of the country’s 
poor, it soon became evident that this constituted a way to leave certain divisions 
unaltered and to justify a lack of fundamental change in wealth ownership 
within the ‘first economy.’ Rather than focusing attention and resources on the 
‘second economy’ directly, Mbeki argued that investments and gains in the ‘first 
economy’ would eventually translate into benefits for the ‘second economy.’ As 
he stated in his February 2004 State of the Nation address: 
We must continue to focus on the growth, development and 
modernization of the First Economy, to generate the resources without 
which it will not be possible to confront the challenges of the Second 
Economy. This is going to require further and significant infrastructure 
investments, skills development, scientific and technological research, 
development and expansion of the knowledge economy, growth and 
modernization of the manufacturing and service sectors, deeper 
penetration of the global markets by our products, increasing our savings 
levels, black economic empowerment and the further expansion of small 
and medium enterprises.396  
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Mbeki’s comments resonate with earlier conceptions about the divide between 
the formal and informal “sectors” (as highlighted in McNamara’s 1975 speech on 
urban poverty). Despite the theory’s dismissal among many academics, it 
remained a favorite trope of the World Bank. In the World Bank’s 2003 Country 
Strategy Paper for Senegal (the site of the first urban assistance experiment), for 
instance, the authors write: “Senegal is two nations. One is approaching middle-
income levels. It has access to middle class levels of education, public services, 
health care, housing, financial services, social protection, and urban amenities. 
The other—larger—nation exists near or below the poverty line. It is rural or 
lives in urban slums and is ill fed, ill clothed, ill housed, insecure, and 
uneducated.”397 A bifurcated conception of “two economies” or “two nations” 
existing alongside each other—but only interacting with each other in a “trickle 
down” manner, never an exploitative one—has helped to justify market-based 
approaches with little role for direct government intervention to assist the 
poorest of its citizens.  
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Notions of rights, the role of the state, and the appropriate form of 
political claim-making represent key points of contention in the post-apartheid 
order. Despite its bold language on socio-economic rights, the country’s 
Constitution enshrined only a minimal role for the government in providing 
access to housing, health care, food, water, and social security. These are all 
included in the bill of rights, but it is immediately added that provision of such 
rights depends on the state’s financial and administrative capacity. (The right of 
children to adequate shelter in section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution has no such 
limitation, however, and it was on this basis that squatters won government-
provided alternative shelter upon eviction in the landmark Grootboom case in 
2000). 398  As the Constitutional Court’s 2009 decision on the right to water 
revealed, the government need only partner with the private sector to install a 
prepaid meter—whether or not Soweto residents can afford to keep them on is 
not of concern.399 The litigants, Soweto residents and the Coalition Against Water 
Privatization, had hoped that the Constitution would bear out a more active role 
for the state in ensuring real access to basic services. They brought the case out of 
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a hope that South Africans were not just customers, but citizens whose rights 
must be ensured by the state, not the market.   
Although the ANC’s policy decisions can be attributed to a number of 
factors, many of which are outside the scope of this chapter, the World Bank 
played a fundamental role in ensuring that private sector-led shelter and service 
provision were of central focus. The bank’s trial-and-error attempts to frame the 
relationship between states, markets, and citizens as one of government 
“enablement” of the private sector throughout the 1970s and 1980s were crucial 
in devising an urban policy framework for post-apartheid South Africa. As 
evidenced by Bank mission reports, one element that the Bank consistently 
underestimated was the difficulty of implementing cost recovery in light of 
socio-political concerns. Indeed, as the South African government has piloted 
ever more extensive cost recovery measures, the political reaction from its 
citizens—many of whom refuse to be customers in this way—has been explosive. 
South Africa is therefore an important case in terms of the political fallout of the 
bank’s “enabling approach” for governments, as activists continue to fight to re-









“To All Who Live In It”: Crime, Prisons, and Neoliberal Development 
 
I visited the new Kokstad Prison facility this morning and could not help but reflect on 
the irony of the potential of a prison to unleash such an abundance of opportunities for so 
many sectors of our society. 
 
-- Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, April 17, 1999400 
 
Introduction 
On the morning of April 17, 1999, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki visited 
Kokstad, a large town near the border of KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, 
two of South Africa’s poorest provinces. Mbeki had arrived to hail the town as a 
frontier of opportunity and a model for how the new South Africa would achieve 
economic growth in the years to come. The engine of that growth—the first and 
largest super-maximum prison in the southern hemisphere—was unusual, and 
Mbeki’s task was to garner support. In his post-site tour address, Mbeki briefly 
noted the prison’s role in addressing the problem of crime. He stated that the 
“efficient management of convicted persons under maximum-security 
conditions” would “fundamentally address what could be termed a societal 
‘burning issue.’”401 Nonetheless, Mbeki did not dwell upon the crime and safety 
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concerns—and recent prison escapes402—that had drawn newspaper headlines 
and raised questions about the ANC’s ability to maintain order. The Deputy 
President turned quickly to how the new prison fit into the ANC’s visions for 
governance and economic development. 
Mbeki explained that the prison would be a “launching pad for changing 
the lives of the people of Kokstad,” and he outlined the “socio-economic 
objectives” of the prison project.403 The Department of Public Works, he stated, 
would create more than 7500 jobs in the construction phase of the Kokstad prison 
facility, with more opportunities to follow once the prison was built. Mbeki 
touted plans to train youth in construction skills, and he made much of 
tremendous, if undefined, “downstream potential” for secondary industry goods 
and services. He hoped the prison project, and the government’s targeted 
procurement process that brought it about, would be a model for how local-level 
endeavors could generate “a substantial redistribution of wealth and 
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opportunities to the poor and historically disadvantaged.”404 In Mbeki’s framing, 
the prison was a promise kept. He stated that the ANC government’s R350 
million expenditure in the local economy “re-affirms the commitment of our 
government to deliver critical infrastructure and to meet your needs.” Echoing 
the language of the Freedom Charter that guided the ANC through decades of 
struggle, Mbeki declared, “For the first time in the history of this country, we can 
say with confidence that opportunity in South Africa belongs to all who live in 
it.”405  
Early on in his speech Mbeki acknowledged the uncomfortable tension of 
answering the calls of the Freedom Charter with a prison town. He stated that he 
“could not help but reflect on the irony of the potential of a prison to unleash 
such an abundance of opportunities for so many sectors of our society.” Yet, 
Mbeki maneuvered the contradiction by deflecting attention away from the 
brick, mortar, and barbed wire structure that would soon loom on the edge of 
Kokstad, and focusing instead on the metaphorical prison of South Africa’s 
apartheid past. He had opened his address with a quote from U.S. Supreme 
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Court Chief Justice Warren Burger: “the greatest prison is not the one with the 
most imposing walls but that which locks in our identity, potential for growth 
and a sense of self-worth.”406 For Mbeki, this quote “captures the essence of the 
challenges we face in South Africa.” He compared apartheid to a prison with 
imposing walls that had locked in the full potential of the country and its people. 
Freed from centuries of colonialism and decades of apartheid social engineering, 
South Africa could now chase economic growth, development, and opportunity. 
Now, at the Kokstad prison site, the country had “come out of the prison of 
despair into the radiant light of hope.”407  
The question of how the ANC reached this point—of promoting a new 
super-maximum prison as a triumph of economic development and service 
delivery—is this chapter’s focus. Given that so many individuals in the party’s 
leadership—and, as discussed in chapter two, so many in the broader 
population—had experienced prison, criminalization, and miscarriages of justice 
in the courts, it is odd, on first glance, that the party would herald the Kokstad 
super-maximum prison as fulfilling the dreams laid out in the Freedom Charter. 
Yet this development was in line with a broad range of criminal justice and 
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prison reforms adopted in the first five years after the end of formal apartheid. 
Within four years of the transition from formal apartheid, the government had 
passed legislation that imposed mandatory minimum sentences, made bail more 
difficult, imposed ‘truth-in-sentencing’ and limited parole, and allowed the 
government to enter into contracts for private prisons. The result of this and 
other legislation was a dramatic rise in the country’s prison population. Between 
1996 and 2003 South Africa’s incarceration rate rose from 280 to 402 per 
100,000.408 By 2000, sentences of seven to 10 years, 10 to 15 years, 15 to 20 years 
and 20 years to life had increased by 50 percent, 67 percent, 70 percent and 124 
percent respectively.409   
While there is much to be said and understood about the intense period of 
criminal justice reform in the first five years after apartheid and the resulting 
increase in the incarceration rate, this chapter will focus on an aspect that has 
received little scholarly attention. Other studies of post-apartheid criminal justice 
and prisons have tended to focus on: prison conditions (with a heavy focus on 
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violations of Constitutional law and human rights);410 prison privatization;411 or 
critical (most often Foucauldian) analysis of crime discourses and governance.412 
While these studies have contributed much, few studies link the broad literature 
on service delivery and market-driven development through austerity to prisons 
and criminal justice. I do so here. I contribute to the literature on private prisons, 
but also push further to understand the place of private prisons and harsh new 
criminal procedure and sentencing laws within a broader shift toward neoliberal 
economic development strategies. Since the vast majority of South Africa’s 
prisons remained under public control—only two of the country’s 240 prisons 
were privately-run—a focus on private prisons can overshadow more systemic 
trends. The relationship between criminal justice reform and neoliberal 
development goes far beyond the small number of “public-private” partnerships 
with U.S. and British consortia and companies like Wackenhut and Geo Group. 
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I argue that “tough-on-crime” criminal justice reforms and prison 
expansion helped to propel a neoliberal approach to economic development in 
the years immediately after South Africa’s democratic transition (1995-2000). 
While public safety and crime were no doubt valid concerns in this period, there 
are many possible solutions to these problems. South Africa adopted a particular 
solution, borrowing heavily, as we shall see, from carceral technology and “war 
on crime” rhetoric developed in the United States. Indeed, there exists no better 
model than the United States for expanding a national prison economy during an 
era of neoliberal austerity. I argue that, in South Africa, prisons and harsh 
criminalization were meant to spur the economy in two ways: 1) by showing that 
the ANC was “tough on crime” and committed to making the country safe for 
foreign investment and white commercial farming; and 2) by generating 
development through the punishment economy. That is, prison contracts were 
framed as a form of “service delivery,” as they were meant to create jobs in 
construction and corrections as well as secondary markets such as prison food 
vending. In reality, however, towns like Kokstad—where the government 
pinned its plans for economic growth on high-tech new prisons—continue to 
struggle to meet their residents’ basic needs. As for private prisons, they proved 




Deputy President Mbeki’s declaration that the super-maximum prison at 
Kokstad was a “radiant light of hope” begs the question: what are prisons for in 
post-apartheid South Africa?  Historians and social theorists from a range of 
disciplines have grappled with the role that mass incarceration plays within 
neoliberal democratic societies. While punishment and confinement are certainly 
part of prison’s function, historians and theorists (particularly scholars of late 
20th century United States, the most heavily incarcerated country on the planet) 
have sought to contextualize exploding incarceration rates within broader 
economic shifts—namely, the intensification of neoliberal deregulation and 
privatization over the past 30 years.413 Within this focus, scholars have expanded 
on Foucault’s call to understand incarceration as a form of statecraft,414 focusing 
on penal expansion as a political project, one that is fundamentally about the 
state’s continued control of poor, predominately black people. Specifically, this 
literature focuses on the role of prisons in: warehousing surplus labor; 415 
                                                        
413  See Wacquant, Punishing the Poor. See also Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets; 
Alexander, The New Jim Crow; Western, Punishment and Inequality; Thompson, “Why 
Mass Incarceration Matters.” 
 
414 Foucault, Discipline & Punish. 
 





maintaining a racial caste system; 416  and constituting a market for private 
interests. 417 In the South African context, Gail Super has made a compelling 
argument for understanding the ANC’s crime discourse as a way of 
consolidating power and defining “criminals” as traitors of the new nation in the 
years after the transition from formal apartheid.418 This chapter adds to this 
literature by examining how prisons came to be framed as a mechanism for 
nation-building and economic development by the ANC in the first years of its 
rule.   
This chapter examines the interplay of several factors that shaped the 
direction of prison and criminal justice reform during the first five years of ANC 
rule. Part I provides historical context for the reforms of the mid-1990s, 
describing characteristics of the prison and criminal justice system at the end of 
apartheid. Part II examines the move to public-private partnerships in the prison 
industry in the first years after the transition. Part III examines parliamentary 
debates that culminated in the passage of criminal justice reform legislation 
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including the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997. These sections will focus 
on understanding how prisons fit into broader economic reforms, as well as the 
role of international (largely American) influence on the direction of criminal 
justice and prison policy. As we shall see, this influence was both direct, taking 
the form of consultants and exchange visits, and indirect, in terms of the popular 
notions of crime and punishment that often shaped the terms of parliamentary 
debate. The concluding section will examine how South Africa’s experiment with 
private prisons failed, bringing the discussion up to 2011, when the Minister of 
Corrections decided to scrap plans for any more private prison contracts. 
My sources include Hansard parliamentary records, speeches, 
governmental reports, newspaper archives, and secondary literature. The 
parliamentary debates and media coverage from the time allow for an 
understanding of legislative moves toward private prisons and harsh 
criminalization as they unfolded. This allows us to see how media hype over 
rising crime rates created a sense of pressure to address crime. At the same time, 
the debates show the extent to which Cabinet ministers and parliamentarians 
were constrained by an overall push for austerity and budget cuts. The debates 
provide insight into how the government’s neoliberal economic approach, 




functions, was chosen and rationalized. The debates also show a heavy U.S. 
influence on the terms of the debate and in the solutions adopted; the U.S. was a 
reference point for how to fight an ambitious “war on crime” while also 
entrenching austerity and an increased reliance on the private sector.  
 
I. Historical Context: Prisons & Criminal Justice in Late Apartheid  
To understand what role prisons played in South Africa just after the 
democratic transition, it is necessary to understand what the prison system 
looked like in the last years of apartheid. Chapter one described the relationship 
between pass law arrests, jails, farm prisons, and the use of convict labor on 
farms. Although the pass laws were abolished in 1986, Black South Africans 
continued to face arrests and repression as authorities used trespass, illegal 
squatting, and vagrancy laws to restrict movement.419 And while South Africa 
formally dismantled the system allowing the private sector to hire prison labor in 
the late 1980s, prisoners were still released on “parole” to work in private sector 
businesses through the early 1990s.420 Convict leasing was a persistent feature of 
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South Africa’s jails and prisons, dating back to the colonial era (as chapter one 
discusses). But it is worth giving a brief overview of reforms within the broader 
prison system. While individuals arrested on pass law offenses faced only brief 
stints in jail before being leased out on parole, prisons were crowded with those 
serving longer sentences.    
The apartheid prison system was characterized by militarization, racial 
segregation, and overcrowding. The Prisons Act of 1959 applied the policy of 
apartheid throughout the Prisons Service, including racial segregation of 
prisoners and different diets and uniforms depending upon one’s racial 
classification.421 The court system was similarly divided by race, with the Bantu 
Affairs Commissioners’ Court serving as a district court for blacks only and the 
Bantu Appeal Court and Bantu divorce court handling only cases involving 
black people. Judges were generally poorly qualified to handle the matters before 
them.422 After the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, prisons were used increasingly 
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to repress political movements, with growing numbers of political detainees and 
sentenced political prisoners filling the prisons.423 As discussed in chapter one, 
apartheid prisons were closed institutions, as authorities banned all media, 
outside inspections, and publishing of photographs.424  
Beginning in the 1970s, the National Party government made a series of 
liberal reforms to the judicial and prison systems.425 In 1974, a Penal Reform 
Commission (the “Viljoen Commission”) was appointed to study the penal 
system and recommend improvements. (The question of whether the death 
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penalty should be retained was explicitly off limits).426 The Viljoen Commission 
was the first to investigate the prison system since 1947, when the Lansdown 
Commission published its report, and it saw a need to understand and address 
the country’s “alarmingly high prison population.” 427  The Commission 
published its findings and recommendations in 1976. The report criticized 
mandatory minimum sentences and called for the establishment of “pre-sentence 
diagnostic centres” staffed by probation officers, psychiatrists, doctors, and social 
workers who would write reports to influence a judicial officer’s sentencing 
decision.428 The report also promoted alternatives to imprisonment.429 The use of 
the death penalty and corporal punishment persisted after the Viljoen 
Commission’s report, but with some modifications. With the 1977 Criminal 
Procedure Act, the legislature placed age restrictions on the use of corporal 
punishment (lowering the maximum age from 50 to 30) and reduced the number 
of times someone could be lashed with a whip.430  
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Still, the Viljoen Commission released its report the same year as the 
Soweto uprising so, despite the commission’s calls for liberalization and 
alternatives to incarceration, the NP government was determined to continue 
using prisons to detain political activists and repress resistance.431 As Super has 
observed, the period following the Viljoen Commission report actually saw an 
increase in imprisonment and a lengthening of prison sentences.432 The rate of 
imposition of the death penalty increased over the 1980s as capital punishment 
was used a tool of repression against liberation movements; in 1987 a new 
category of death row prisoners was created, those sentenced to death for 
“political unrest.”433 Despite that, 42 percent of those sentenced to die received a 
presidential reprieve in 1987, and that rate increased until the last execution took 
place in November 1989.434 
However, the 1980s saw a distinct shift in penological focus toward 
rehabilitation.435 Beginning in 1981, prison staff was to become more involved in 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
431 Singh, “The Historical Development of Prisons in South Africa,” 26. 
 
432 Super, Governing through Crime, 108.  
 
433 Ibid., 114.  
 
434 Ibid.  
 




the treatment of prisoners and, beginning in 1983, prisoners were given more 
privileges such as increased visits and higher amounts of money permitted for 
purchases.436 Still, stark racial differences in treatment remained, with far more 
social workers on staff to “treat” white prisoners than coloured, Indian or black 
prisoners. 437 The government recognized that vast overcrowding remained a 
problem, and in 1984 the Krugel Working Group released a report calling again 
for alternative sentencing options. 438  In 1986, the legislature amended the 
Criminal Procedure Act No 51 of 1977 to institute community service sentences 
as a viable alternative to prison sentences.439  
The political changes of the early 1990s—including Nelson Mandela’s 
release from prison and the unbanning of the ANC and other banned 
organizations—also brought changes in the prison service. The government 
repealed racially discriminatory legislation regarding the treatment of prisoners, 
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and began to desegregate prisons.440 In 1991 the Prisons Service was separated 
from the Department of Justice and renamed the Department of Correctional 
Services. The new department was tasked with managing prisons and 
administering a new category of non-custodial sentence called “correctional 
supervision.”441 In light of this brief overview of penal reforms in the 1970s and 
1980s, it is clear that the “correctional supervision” system was not invented out 
of whole cloth in 1991, but instead can be seen as the legal implementation of 
steps that began with calls from the Viljoen Commission and then the Krugel 
Committee. While apartheid prisons remained horribly overcrowded and 
prisoners endured gross indignities and human rights violations, 442  the 
government had moved toward liberal reforms, some of which—including the 
“correctional services” appellation and approach—would endure through the 
democratic transition process. 
 
II. Crime, criminal justice & prisons during the transition period 
A. Visions & key players 
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As with nearly all policy changes during the transition from apartheid, the 
move to adopt harsh criminal justice and prison policies took place in a very 
compressed period. In its years as a freedom movement, the ANC had not 
developed clear policy prescriptions on crime, policing, courts, and prisons. Yet 
there is evidence that the party’s position on crime and punishment was once 
more skeptical of prisons as a solution for criminal activity. A 1992 ANC policy 
document on crime, crime control, and the role of the police characterized crime 
as linked to poverty and declared that prisons would not solve the country’s 
crime problem. The policy document “referred to ‘crimes of the poor such as 
street crime’ and attributed these to ‘the structural violence of the apartheid era.’ 
It stated that ‘our crime problems are NOT being solved by large-scale 
imprisonment’ and that ‘however much one condemns those deeds’ the State 
response should show compassion for the perpetrator.” 443  The ANC’s 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), the socio-economic policy 
framework it adopted in 1994, included a short section on prisons. The RDP 
stated that prisons must not only restrain but also rehabilitate and train 
convicted persons; that the military command structure of the prison service 
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must be transformed; that prisoners must enjoy human rights and that 
punishment that infringes basic human rights (including solitary confinement 
and dietary punishment) must be ended; that the Prison Act must be 
substantially reformed to allow the public to be informed about prison 
conditions; that all children should be released from prisons and police cells; and 
that special accommodations should be made for pregnant women and mothers 
with small children in prison.444 These were specific recommendations, but the 
space given to prisons paled in comparison to other socio-economic issues. 
 Ultimately, the direction of post-apartheid prison reform would be 
decided in large part by a political outlier: Dr. Sipho Mzimela, an Anglican priest 
who spent 33 years in exile, and had a tumultuous relationship with the ANC. 
He was an ANC loyalist until the late 1980s when he abruptly joined the IFP.445 
In 1993, he published a book, Marching to Slavery: South Africa’s Descent to 
Communism, in which he denounced Mandela and the ANC, charging that they 
were marching the country down a communist path that would spell “the end of 
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civilization in all of black Africa.”446 He would later distance himself from the 
book, but his career in the coming years would focus on proving his main 
political point: “a small decentralized government is best.”447 After delivering an 
impassioned prayer to open the IFP’s national congress in 1993, Mzimela became 
a fiery party leader who, within two years, would become national deputy chair. 
After the 1994 election, President Mandela appointed Mzimela as Minister of 
Correctional Services. Despite the ANC’s landslide victory, the interim 
constitution had provided for a controversial “government of national unity,” 
mandating that any opposition party that received more than 5 percent of the 
vote be represented in the cabinet.448 The Correctional Services portfolio was not 
a high priority for the ANC, and leadership over the portfolio was given to Dr. 
Mzimela. 449  Thus, Mzimela had little allegiance to the ANC’s vision or to 
President Mandela. Rather, Mzimela came into his post with strong U.S. 
connections and an affinity for U.S.-style incarceration, acquired from his years 
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as a former prison chaplain in the U.S.450 During his years in exile, he had met 
Goltz Wessmann, a businessman specializing in the use of technology to 
modernize prison systems, who would become his Special Advisor in 1995.451  
Still, the ANC did not cede the ground entirely to Mzimela. Responding to 
pressure from outside the department, Deputy President Thabo Mbeki convened 
a meeting in early 1995 of all key players in the corrections field, including the 
Department, the Minister, the parliamentary portfolio committee, and the newly 
formed Penal Reform Lobby Group.452  In July 1995, a Transformation Forum, 
funded by the Danish Government, was created to bring various stakeholders 
together to reshape the Department of Correctional Services.453 The forum was 
chaired by ANC politician Carl Niehaus, a former political prisoner who also 
chaired the parliamentary portfolio committee on correctional services. The 
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forum was made up of “a strange mixture of old-regime prison staff generals, 
former ‘common law’ prisoners, trade union activists and idealistic penal 
reformers.”454 In preparation for the forum’s work, a group of 22 individuals 
representing the Department, NGOs involved in correctional services, and 
members of the parliamentary committee on correctional services took a two-
week tour to Denmark, Holland and Britain to visit prisons and institutions.455  
Virtually from the start, the Transformation Forum was plagued by a total 
lack of coordination between it and Minister Mzimela’s office. The ministry did 
not send representatives to forum meetings as promised, and by February 1996 it 
announced that it was terminating the Department of Correctional Services’ 
participation in the forum.456 After a media fight between the forum and the 
department, President Mandela instructed the Minister to re-engage with the 
forum, which he did.457 Even so, the lack of communication and coordination 
continued. By late 1996 Niehaus had been appointed ambassador to the 
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Netherlands and the forum collapsed.458 With the collapse of the forum, idealistic 
reformers who clung to hopes for a prison system modeled after “more 
communitarian continental European notions” were upstaged by Minister 
Mzimela and his plans for American-style prisons.459  
While the members of the would-be Transformation Forum had toured 
Western Europe in 1995, Minister Mzimela had traveled to the U.S. That year 
Minister Mzimela went to the U.S. to attend the American Corrections 
Association conference and visit various prisons to, as he put it, “find solutions 
to overcrowding, poor building design and lack of programmes in our 
prisons.” 460  He visited the U.S. and U.K. with senior Correctional Services 
officials again in 1997 and, according to accounts, the 1997 trip confirmed his 
ideas that private prisons would be a cost-effective option for South Africa.461 
Mzimela and his staff delegation returned from these trips with two clear 
recommendations for South Africa: the privatization of prisons and the adoption 
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of American-style super-maximum security (“supermax”) prisons.462 As we shall 
see, he was a particularly strong proponent of private prisons.463 He played an 
enormous role in determining the direction that prison reform would take in 
South Africa, and he was eager to pattern the country’s system after the United 
States.  
Minister Mzimela wasted little time before opening a new high-security 
CMax prison in Pretoria in September 1997. The prison was described as a 
forerunner to the super-maximum prisons, with prisoners being kept locked up 
in a cell for 23 hours a day, with only one hour of exercise per day. Only minimal 
Constitutional rights were to be allowed, with all meals served inside cells, only 
three noncontact visits per month, and prisoners handcuffed at all times when 
moving around outside cells.464 Minister Mzimela had kept the CMax prison a 
secret from even top Department officials until a week before it was put into 
operation, reportedly out of fear that it might provoke protests or halt the 
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project.465 Afterward Mzimela said that he could not risk discussing the project 
before implementation, stating, “If you think what you are doing is good, you act 
first and apologize later. The reason why we could not develop the mine-shaft 
prison idea was that we said it first. We learned from that.”466 Mzimela was 
referring to a controversial plan to house prisoners down defunct mine-shafts. 
He had let the plan slip at a press conference several months earlier, and was met 
with enough backlash that the project could not go forward.467 Indeed, CMax 
drew criticism from human rights groups when it was revealed, drawing charges 
that the 23-hour lockdowns were solitary confinement, a contravention of 
international human rights conventions. Mzimela denied that this was solitary 
confinement, instead calling it “high security.”468 While human rights groups 
may have been upset by the opening of the CMax prison, politicians from all 
parties were quick to praise Mzimela during parliamentary sessions for being 
tough on crime and assuring against prison escapes.  
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The similarities between the CMax prison—and the super-maximum 
prisons that followed in its wake—and US maximum and super-maximum 
facilities was no accident. As Buntman and Munthing write in their study of the 
adoption of super-maximum facilities in South Africa, “The two South African 
supermaximum security facilities were strongly modeled on U.S. 
supermaximum security facilities.”469 They continue:  
Then minister Mzimela spent part of his years in exile (early 1960s 
through early 1990s) in the United States, where he met up with his future 
advisors, Golz Wessman and Sishi Mthabela. When Ebongweni [the 
super-maximum prison at Kokstad] was still at a conceptual stage, both 
Wessman and Mthabela returned to the United States on a study tour, 
including to a supermaximum security facility in Colorado. Once the idea 
for Ebongweni was approved, a team including architects was also 
dispatched to the United States to study supermaximum-security prisons; 
Ebongweni was ultimately modeled on Marion, a supermaximum prison 
in Illinois.470 471 
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While the move to construct super-maximum prisons was largely driven by 
Minister Mzimela and his advisors, the broader shift toward tough-on-crime 
criminal procedure and sentencing legislation was a more communal effort, with 
support from across the political spectrum. This adoption of a “War on Crime,” 
driven from the highest levels of the ANC, is the focus of the next section. 
 
B. Perceptions of a ‘crime wave’ 
The debate over a post-apartheid “crime wave”—its existence, its size, its 
cause and its implications—was, and remains, hotly contested. But without a 
doubt, nearly immediately after taking power, the ANC government faced 
increased pressure to deal with what press was reporting as a “crime wave.” 
Whatever the ANC’s position on the appropriate response to crime before taking 
power and during the transition period, it was now compelled to respond with 
decisive action. According to the typical narrative, the transition to democracy 
led to an increase in crime, with some press reports going so far as to call it a 
“descent into barbarism.” 472 An in-depth discussion of whether and to what 
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extent crime increased after the transition from apartheid lies outside the scope 
of this chapter. Nevertheless, several caveats about the post-apartheid crime 
wave narrative are worth noting.  
First, apartheid statistics did not include the Bantustans, thus resulting in 
an unknown amount of unrecorded crime during apartheid. In the same vein, 
crime in Black townships (which had low police resources) went greatly 
undercounted.473 Thus post-apartheid crime statistics included vast locations that 
were previously unaccounted for, making comparisons between apartheid and 
post-apartheid crime rates dubious at best. Similarly, the Institute for Security 
Studies, among others, has argued that South Africa’s spiraling crime rate may 
be a statistical illusion, the product of improved reporting.474 ISS’s 2002 study of 
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police statistics found that commonly underreported crimes were on the increase 
after 1994, but those most likely to be reported (murder, car theft, and business 
burglary) declined between 1994 and 2001.475   
Second, social theorist Gail Super has written at length about how official 
statistics show a rise in crimes such as murder, housebreaking, and robbery 
dating back to the mid-1980s, with a dramatic rise in official crime statistics in the 
1980s.476 Such data refutes the notion that it was the transition to democracy that 
caused an increase in crime, and instead pushes the timeline back, locating some 
causes of increased crime in the late apartheid era. Finally, as Super has 
highlighted, there was an increase in two types of crimes beginning in the early 
1990s that reflected a shift in the patterns of victimization: 1) attacks on ‘civilians 
in their own homes’ (ie. white senior citizen victims); and 2) car hijacking and 
cash-in-transit heists.477 Khehla Shubane dates the first use of car hijackings back 
to the 1980s—a tactic used by “comtsotsis” who argued that they were advancing 
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the goals of struggle.478 It is no wonder that home invasions and carjackings 
would draw more attention than other types of crimes, so this may have 
contributed to the sense of a dramatic rise in crime. 
Indeed, whether there was an overall increase in crime or not, popular 
perceptions about crime and the government’s ability to control it did change 
between 1994 (when the ANC was elected to power) and 1995. Whatever the 
reality of crime, these perceptions demanded a response from the government. A 
1994 Human Sciences Research Council survey found that 75 percent of South 
Africans believed that government had crime largely under control. By early 
1995, more South Africans believed that government had little or no control over 
crime than believed the contrary.479 When President Nelson Mandela gave an 
extended address at the opening of parliament in mid-February 1995, he was 
compelled to address the problem of crime at length, as I will expand upon in the 
next section.480 
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By 1997, reports of South Africa’s “crime wave” filled national and 
international media. Consensus said that the crime wave was bad for business 
and tourism, thereby threatening prospects for international investment and 
economic growth. In the first half of 1997, South Africa’s four largest banks faced 
a wave of robberies; almost 300 banks were robbed, nearly three for each day the 
banks operated.481 In an unprecedented move, Nedcor announced that it would 
close nine of its branches in central Johannesburg, “in response to the reputation 
earned by the country’s main commercial hub as a popular weekend robbing 
ground.”482 The Council of South African banks reported that the bank industry 
would spend about R376 million to protect bank branches and cash-in-transit 
operations, but maintained that private security expenditure would not do 
anything to abate crime rates. For that, the Council called for “a far more 
diligent, less corrupt, law-enforcement system.”483  
                                                        
481 “Focus on South Africa: Surge in Armed Robberies Propel Banks to Action,” The Wall 
Street Journal Europe, Jun. 10 (1997), p. 24. 
 







In a response to public demands for decisive action,484 the government 
named Meyer Kahn, the head of South African Breweries Ltd., one of South 
Africa’s largest industrial conglomerates, as new chief executive of the national 
police force. The New York Police Department’s former chief Bill Bratton, 
notorious for implementing “broken windows” policing, had offered his 
services, but the government declined.485 Kahn’s appointment as chief executive 
of the South African Police Service (SAPS) resulted, as van Zyl Smit writes, in 
“the importation of many familiar managerial credos. The SAPS was introduced 
to ‘policing by objectives’ and ‘performance-based indicators’ intended to 
increase the efficiency of this intractable bureaucracy. [T]he latest managerial 
techniques that South African big business had adopted from its western 
counterparts were deployed—with limited success—towards the goal of 
improving policing capacity.”486 
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When it came to prisons and criminal reform legislation, proponents of 
private prisons and new super-maximum security technologies—including 
officials in the Department of Correctional Services—drew a straight, causal line 
from the post-transition crime wave to the need for more prisons and ‘modern’ 
technology. In this framing, the transition to democratic rule precipitated a crime 
wave, which led to overcrowded prisons and a need for more prisons, which 
would lead to a budget crisis, which led to the solution of public-private sector 
partnerships for constructing new prisons. This is the narrative favored by, for 
example, Goltz Wessmann, Special Advisor to the Minister of Corrections:  
A dramatic increase in the crime rate severely overcrowded prisons. This 
led to a chain reaction because as more prison space was required, 
constant staff shortages emerged due to poorly designed prisons, which in 
turn resulted in more prison escapes and therefore increased pressure 
from the community. An increase in staff and prison space meant higher 
budgets, which was not available and still is not. Alternatives had to be 
found and the Minister turned to the Private Sector, who jumped at the 
opportunity to participate in the process.487   
 
However, there is reason to doubt this “chain reaction.” In the next section, I 
argue that the plan to move toward public-private partnerships in prison 
construction existed earlier, and that it was not a direct outgrowth of a rising 
crime rate. Although crime was a serious problem during the transition period, 
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public-private partnerships in prisons were part of a larger development 
strategy. When government officials declared a “war on crime” and passed 
legislation to help fight that war, there were larger socio-economic objectives at 
hand beyond just decreasing crime rates. 
 
C. Declaring a ‘War on Crime’ 
In February 1995 South Africa’s first democratic and non-racial parliament 
was new and still finding its way—its first members had been sworn in just nine 
months before. President Mandela delivered an address to open the 
parliamentary session in which he outlined the central problems facing the 
country and the work that lay ahead. The government faced monumental tasks: 
creating and staffing institutions; attempting to “bring the government to the 
people” by opening up national and provincial legislatures to scrutiny and 
accountability; drafting and passing legislation; rooting out corruption; building 
infrastructure for upcoming local elections; transforming the judiciary; creating a 
budget that would balance fiscal discipline with the need to provide basic 
infrastructure for millions who were previously un-served.488 The tasks were 
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enormous and, Mandela wished to reiterate, resources were not. Already the 
ANC government was focused on budgetary and economic policies that 
privileged deficit reduction, foreign direct investment, and privatization; at the 
same time, this would require a tamping down of popular expectations about the 
government’s ability to directly provide for its citizens.489  
President Mandela asked people to lower their expectations for what the 
government could deliver because the government did not have “a big bag full 
of money.” 490  Instead, given binding contractual obligations and carry over 
expenditure, the government had “extremely limited resources to address the 
many and urgent needs of our people.” Mandela urged people to rid themselves 
of the “culture of entitlement which leads to the expectation that the government 
must promptly deliver whatever it is that we demand, and result in some people 
refusing to meet their obligations such as rent and service payments or engaging 
in other unacceptable actions such as the forcible occupation of houses.” At the 
same time, the government would continue to “ensure the creation of an 
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investor-friendly climate” and continue its commitment to fiscal discipline and 
reducing the budget deficit.  
Near the middle of his address, President Mandela turned to what he 
portrayed as related problems with the potential to interrupt the government’s 
progress on many fronts: anarchy and crime. Mandela condemned “the attempt 
by some in our country to introduce anarchy into our society.”491 He continued, 
“I speak of those who engage in such totally unacceptable practices as the 
murder of police officers, the taking of hostages, riots, looting, the forcible 
occupation of public buildings, blocking of public highways, vandalization of 
public and private property and so on. Some of those who have initiated and 
participated in such activities have misread freedom to mean license.” 492 
Mandela warned such elements that his government and the masses who put 
them in office were not afraid of struggle; “we are, after all, a product of 
confrontation and struggle.”493 In doing so, he framed his opposition as enemies 
of the government and the people, and made it clear that his government would 
battle and defeat them. “In the same vein,” he continued:  
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[W]e must address the question of crime. The situation cannot be tolerated 
in which our country continues to be engulfed by the crime wave which 
includes murder, crimes against women and children, drug trafficking, 
armed robbery, fraud and theft. We must take the war to the criminals 
and no longer allow the situation in which we are mere sitting ducks of 
those in our society who, for whatever reason, are bent to engage in 
criminal and anti-social activities.494 
 
Mandela explained that the Minister of Safety and Security, the National 
Commissioner of the Police Service, and the security organs as a whole had 
already been instructed to take all necessary measures to bring down crime 
levels. But he also stressed that the matter of safety and security should not be 
left to law enforcement alone. The police would need the full and active support 
of communities, and Mandela lauded the police-community fora that had 
already been established as important to increasing the capacity of the country to 
deal with the problem of crime.495 Already crime and crime control were high on 
the agenda, and President Mandela had declared a war on crime. As we shall see, 
the concept of a “war on crime” introduced by President Mandela would become 
a familiar refrain from Cabinet members and members of parliament. 
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The phrase “war on crime” will be familiar to many readers, particularly 
those in the U.S. who have heard it echo for decades. It followed alongside 
President Johnson’s “war on poverty” and was a forerunner to the “wars” on 
drugs and terror. Indeed, the notion of a “war on crime” originated with 
President Johnson in the mid-1960s.496 His Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 increased federal funding and involvement in state and local 
law enforcement. President Nixon famously reiterated the ‘war on crime’ 
rhetoric in his 1970 State of the Union address. Nixon said there would be no 
increases in the forthcoming federal budget, save for one area—law enforcement 
agencies, and specifically federal spending to assist local law enforcement. He 
asserted, “We must declare and win the war against the criminal elements which 
increasingly threaten our cities, our homes and our lives.”497 Addressing the 
members of the legislature in the audience, he added: “I doubt if there are many 
members of this Congress who live more than a few blocks from here who would 
dare leave their cars in the Capitol Garage and walk home alone tonight.” 
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Playing on visceral fears, Nixon urged Congress to pass anticrime legislation that 
would give the executive “new and stronger weapons” in the fight against crime. 
As the next section shows, South Africa’s war on crime did not entail a 
massive spending outlay but instead involved new “public-private partnerships” 
and tougher criminal procedure and sentencing legislation. Rather than 
justifying huge budgets for policing and prisons, the post-apartheid war on 
crime justified austerity, a focus on creating secure conditions for foreign 
investment, and experiments in privatization. Although department ministers 
and parliamentarians called for larger policing and corrections budgets, it was 
nonetheless clear that the private sector would have a large role to play. Indeed, 
Minister Mzimela moved fastest of all. As we shall see, when he presented his 
budgets to parliament, he stated that he had anticipated that there would not be 
sufficient public funds, so he had taken the initiative to bring the private sector 
on board. 
 
III. Fighting the ‘War on Crime’: Post-apartheid criminal justice legislation and 
parliamentary debates 
 
After the Transformation Forum collapsed in late 1996, Minister Mzimela 
was freed to pursue his vision for an American-style prison system with little 




some of his proposals required legislation—for that, he needed to work with 
parliament. This section will examine parliamentary debates about criminal 
justice reform legislation and appropriations for policing and prisons. These texts 
reveal much about the level of debate and its terms, but especially about the level 
of consensus. Debates over appropriations also show how prisons—and the 
budget for them—fit into broader, neoliberal economic development priorities. 
In the first five years after the end of formal apartheid, the parliament passed a 
wave of legislation reforming the criminal justice system. In this section, I will 
examine two types of parliamentary debates: appropriation debates tied to 
specific departments (e.g. corrections, safety and security) and debates over 
proposed legislation (e.g. the Correction Services Amendment Act and Criminal 
Law Amendment Act of 1997). The debates show how a focus on austerity, 
combined with loud calls for a stepped up war on crime, would see departments 
across the justice system turning toward privatization. This privatization took 
different forms across various departments—for policing and the courts, this 
meant a push for “community policing” and “community fora” to handle and 




bureaucracies. 498  For correctional services, this meant “public-private 
partnerships” to build and maintain prisons. 
 
A. 1996 budget debates: Police, courts, and prisons 
i. Police 
In May 1996, the Minister for Safety and Security, Sydney Mufamadi, 
described the budget he had proposed and expressed a strong need for the 
country to deal with crime. He noted that high levels of crime were “not 
uncommon for a society in transition.” Crime had become “the common enemy 
of all citizens of South Africa, so it is not an overstatement to say that we are 
fighting a war against crime.”499 Mufamadi used the metaphor of waging a war 
on crime repeatedly, and pointed out that the Cabinet had “reaffirmed its belief 
that crime poses a serious threat to our democracy itself” by adopting a National 
Crime Prevention Strategy the previous week.500 He highlighted the importance 
of this war against crime, stressing its financial costs. Although the exact figures 
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were disputed, the South African Police Service had estimated the value of 
commercial crime reported in 1995 at R2.6 billion, with some in the private sector 
claiming the true figure was five times as high.501 Mufamadi expressed gratitude 
that the private sector had stepped in to help the government in waging the war 
on crime. A consortium called Business Against Crime had paid for an 
international management consultancy to assist 100 of the country’s poorest-
performing police stations. “This,” Mufamadi declared, “is an example of the 
kind of public-private sector partnership that is essential if we are to wage this 
war successfully.”502  
In the parliamentary debate that ensued, there was little disagreement 
over what was at stake. Opposition party parliamentarians and the ANC alike 
were clear that crime was a test of the ANC’s ability to govern, the new 
democracy’s ability to function, and the economy’s potential to expand. What is 
striking is the language of the debate, both here and in debates in the following 
weeks about appropriations for the court system and prisons. There is an 
indisputable U.S. influence, with references to New York-style policing, U.S. city 
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curfew policies,503 former New York Police Chief William Bratton, and more. As 
one official remarked, “My initial feeling is that it looks very much like the 
American system. I am just wondering whether the [honorable] Minister got his 
inspiration from LA Law.”504  
This influence resonated across the political spectrum—from the Freedom 
Front (FF), National Party (NP), and African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP) 
on the right, to the Democratic Party (DP) in the middle, to the ANC, and to the 
Pan African Congress (PAC) on the left. For example, MP Andre Fourie of the 
NP stated: 
A lot has been written about the so-called New York option. Perhaps we 
should seriously consider the New York option, as opposed to the 
Washington option, and create an anticrime culture in the hearts and 
minds of every single South African. New York, once the crime capital of 
the United States of America, through the perseverance of newly-elected 
mayor Rudolf Giuliani, who fought with vigour any attempt to cut the 
budget of the police, and with his police chief William Bratton pursuing 
crime aggressively, saw crime dropping by 11% in 1994 and 17% in 1995.  
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In contrast, Washington mayor Marion Barry, with a lukewarm approach, 
campaigning with promises of giving conjugal visits to convicts and more 
exit money on their release, is trailing far behind in combating crime. 
 
The question is: What is the philosophy and approach of the Minister? Is 
he going to opt aggressively for the New York option or is he going to 
stick to the Washington recipe? We say, and we would like to advise him, 
that if he wants to be totally committed to eradicating crime in South 
Africa, let him opt for the New York option. [Interjections.] It is no good 
for the Minister to say that he has declared war on crime when he is not 
prepared to shoot in that war. [Laughter.]505 
 
Notably, the references to “New York” and “Washington” options were not 
fleshed out with any specific recommendations for what the Minister could be 
doing differently to be more in line with each approach. The two options were 
rhetorical devices used to ask whether the Minister and his party would be tough 
or soft on crime. The takeaway was that the Minister must have the guts and 
political will to ask for a robust budget for the police service, and demonstrate 
that he would not be soft. Tying the fight against crime to prospects for economic 
development, MP Fourie stated: “[The Minister] will have to prove to the 
international community, potential investors, the bankers of the world and 
potential tourists that South Africa can become a sound and safe country to come 
to and invest in.”506 
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 ii. Courts 
Two weeks later a debate over court system appropriations showed the 
difficult tension between the challenge to focus on a “rising crime wave” while 
also making budget cuts. ANC MP Fatima Hajaig’s comments are indicative of 
the way in which many members framed the problem of crime (heavily couched 
in concerns for business investment and economic growth) and the problem of a 
lack of funding to deal with it: 
As we all know, the most challenging and formidable problem facing us 
in our country is the stranglehold crime has on our people and on the 
growth of our economy. Figures put forward by Nedcor in a recent study 
are devastating. A staggering R31 billion per year is lost through crime. 
 
… [U]nless crime is addressed in a meaningful way, nothing, but nothing, 
will grow in terms of our economy and providing a better life for all our 
people. 
 
We all recognize that we need to combat crime. It therefore seems illogical 
that State Expenditure has cut the Justice budget by more than R500 
million. This means that more or less 1,400 posts which are sorely needed 
in the Justice Department have to be shelved. I must point out that if we 
are serious about crime and serious about entrenching the rule of law in 
South Africa, we need to increase the budgets of departments which are 
involved in minimizing crime.507 
 
MP Hajaig went on to discuss two related solutions for addressing this problem, 
namely, increasing the legitimacy of community policing and establishing a 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
507 Hansard, “Appropriation Bill,” Debate on Vote no 19—Justice, Vols. 9-10, col 2914, 





system of lay judicial participation to “link up with a community law-and-order 
system.”508 In one of the few mentions of rural areas in the appropriation debates 
on criminal justice, Hajaig argued that efforts to enhance access to justice would 
have to take a “rural bias,” as those areas were previously neglected.509 She 
pointed out that traditional or customary courts in rural areas had suffered a 
degree of illegitimacy in the past because they had been abused by “repressive 
tribal authorities.” Yet, such courts had several advantages, including 
opportunity for mediation, informal inquisitorial procedures (rather than a 
public trial with a win-or-lose result), and low running costs. With this in mind, 
she proposed that “a conscious program of reconstruction to restore legitimacy 
should be undertaken. These courts can be adapted to meet the new challenges 
of a constitutional State and a human-rights culture by serving as lay community 
courts for the rural sector of our society.”510 
 iii. Prisons 
In June 1996, Minister Mzimela of the Department of Correctional Services 
would have his turn to present his budget to parliament. The most striking thing 
                                                        
508 Ibid. 
 
509 Ibid., 2915. 
 





about the budget discussion is how far along the move to public-private 
partnerships in prison construction and management had come in the short 
period since Mzimela had assumed leadership. Mzimela began by pointing out 
that the country’s prisons were highly overcrowded and that the department was 
under budget. The department’s budget catered for 97,000 inmates and 33,000 
probationers while the projected number of inmates for 1996 was 125,000, along 
with 47,000 probationers. 511  While the department was already bracing for 
another year of overcrowding, Commissioner Fivaz of the Department of Safety 
and Security had announced just days before that he had “identified some 10,000 
criminals” to be arrested in the next 30 days. If convicted at previous rates, 60-
70% of those would be found guilty and sent to prison.512 While the sweep of 
arrests never happened, 513  the move toward private prisons to deal with 
overcrowding and budget shortfalls did.  
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513 Commissioner Fivaz’s promise to arrest the 10,000 criminals within 30 days fell flat. 
Safety and Security secretary Azhar Cachalia criticized the announcement as “ill-
conceived … media hype.” Another senior player told the Mail & Guardian that “because 
the 10 000 weren’t caught, and could not even be identified, it was a disaster, leading the 
public to believe that the whole excellent 12-month plan—of which it was really only a 




Indeed, cost was a huge factor in decisions about how to reform the prison 
system the country had inherited from apartheid. Given the need for drastic 
change in other areas of the economy such as housing, education, and healthcare, 
prisons were low on the list of budgetary priorities and received a relatively 
small budget.514 Meanwhile, prison overcrowding was a pressing concern.515 In 
August 1992, Human Rights Watch found that Pollsmoor Prison in Cape Town 
held 6,631 people in a space designed to accommodate 4,598—an overcrowding 
of 48 percent. 516  Overcrowding was even worse in Pollsmoor’s maximum 
security section, which had an overcrowding of 97 percent. 517  Although the 
government undertook several large-scale amnesty and mass release efforts, this 
did not solve the problem of crowding. The Correctional Services Department 
saw a need to embark on a rapid prison-building program to alleviate 
overcrowding. 518  Faced with these problems and an inadequate corrections 
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budget, it is unsurprising that private-sector alternatives were appealing to 
department officials and policymakers. 
Against the backdrop of needing to house, feed, provide with medical 
care, and supervise the targets of Fivaz’s sweep on top of an already 
overstretched budget, Minister Mzimela revealed that the department had 
already approached the private sector. He stated: “Against this background of 
insufficient funds and rising numbers in our prisons, we have taken the initiative 
of looking for alternative ways of providing suitable accommodation to inmates. 
We approached the private sector and discussed with them measures which 
would lead them to finance, design, construct and maintain new facilities, and 
lease them to the Government over an agreed period. This would enable the 
Government to provide up-to-date facilities without getting into too much 
debt.”519 His main argument in favor of bringing the private sector in was that it 
would be cost effective, and would allow the department to avoid asking for 
billions of dollars for capital projects. He also noted that the department would 
be able to offer things like “workshops and even factories for inmates to be 
                                                        
519 Hansard, “Appropriation Bill,” Debate on Vote no 10—Correctional Services, Vol. 9-





trained and to work productively in”—what he posed as rehabilitative activities 
that the government would not be able to finance.  
The government had already begun a pilot program of privately-run 
juvenile prisons. Mzimela explained that the Department of Correctional Services 
had approached the private sector and asked, not for a loan, but “an outright 
donation” to fund a pilot project. A program called the Private Sector Initiative 
contributed R50 million to build the first juvenile detention center financed 
entirely by the private sector. According to Mzimela, the project was meant to 
demonstrate three things: 1) that facilities could be planned and constructed 
within a period of 15 months, as opposed to previous practices of seven years; 2) 
that facilities could provide education, training and counseling with the aim of 
rehabilitation; and 3) that there could be a healthy relationship between the 
Government and the private sector.520 Mzimela went on to announce that the 
first youth detention center financed entirely by the private sector would be 
opened in Newcastle in September 1996, with the process of admitting the young 
people already underway. The building had already been built, an education 
curriculum and staffing plan had been developed, admissions had begun—all 
within a very short period of time. By Mzimela’s own 15-month timeline, the 
                                                        





Private Sector Initiative began less than a year after he assumed the head of the 
Department of Correctional Services, and before the Transformation Forum had 
an opportunity to begin its work or chart a course for South Africa’s new prison 
system. 
Carl Niehaus, the Chair of the Portfolio Committee on Correctional 
Services and Chair of the Transformation Forum, spoke immediately after 
Minister Mzimela and raised concerns about the privatization model that he had 
announced.521 He was concerned that the proposal for private financing and 
construction of prisons was not clearly accommodated in the current budget and 
that it would prove too costly. He pointed out that the private sector borrows at a 
higher interest rate than the government, and that this cost would have to be 
covered by the rent that the government would pay. The Department of Finance 
had also expressed strong concerns, asking questions about the details of the 
plan which the Department of Correctional Services apparently had not 
contemplated. Niehaus said he had a Department of Finance document that 
asked questions about the duration of the required head lease, the prevailing 
inflation rate over a period of time, and the effective costs of government 
borrowing, averaged over time. The Department of Finance document concluded 
                                                        





that the proposal was “too costly and hence unacceptable” and requested further 
negotiations.522 Notably, there was no discussion of the incentive perversion that 
privatization would cause. 
By November 1996, the Department of Correctional Services and the 
Department of Public Works had secured Cabinet approval for a joint venture 
with the private sector to build and operate private prisons.523 The program was 
called Asset Procurement and Operating Partnership Systems (APOPS) and was 
announced to the public in April 1997.524 The press release by Minister Mzimela 
stated that the new APOPS prisons would ensure that the Department of 
Correctional Services could house offenders arrested under the National Crime 
Prevention Strategy, which was “gaining more momentum every day.”525 He 
also highlighted the potential of the APOPS prisons to create jobs, anticipating 
that they would “create thousands of new jobs as well as other opportunities.”526 
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The press statement also included an addendum with more details about the 
envisaged features of the new APOPS super-maximum prisons and an invitation 
for companies to bid for the contracts, with construction of all seven prisons 
expected to begin before the end of the year.527  
 
B. 1997 Criminal Justice Legislation 
i. The Parole and Correctional Supervision Amendment Act 
In mid-1997, a package of bills was introduced to make criminal justice 
punishments harsher and to give the government more ammunition in its “war 
on crime.” The Parole and Correctional Supervision Amendment Bill, the 
Correctional Services Amendment Bill and the Criminal Law Amendment Bill all 
came up for their second reading debate in the last week in October and first 
week of November 1997. As with the previous appropriation debates, the “tough 
on crime” sentiment was shared across the political spectrum, and there was 
near unanimous strong support for all three bills. The Parole and Correctional 
Supervision Amendment Bill made it more difficult to obtain parole and 
required that prisoners serve at least half of their sentences before they could be 
considered for parole. The bill’s premise was similar to “truth in sentencing” 
                                                        




laws first adopted in the United States (by some states as early as 1984, and 
federally in 1994) and in Australia in 1989. The bill did away with the “credit 
system” which allowed for shorter sentences based on good behavior; since it 
had been used to advantage only white inmates in the past, the abolishment of 
the system was presented as a move toward “equality” and “equity” and away 
from “discriminatory” parole practices.528 
Given the extent of the overcrowding problem in the country’s prisons, 
one might have expected the parliament to move toward shortening sentences, 
rather than lengthening them. Yet Minister Mzimela began the debate with a 
sentiment that resonated throughout everyone’s remarks: “We are sending a 
message to those who want to commit crime, but we are also assuring the South 
African people that once people have been convicted of crimes, they are going to 
serve their time.”529 Nearly every speaker spoke of the need for a “hardline 
attitude” and the need to send a message that the state was not “soft on 
criminals.”530 The ACDP opposed the bill, but for the reason that it was not harsh 
enough. The party’s MP Meshoe began his remarks by reminding all present that 
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the Nedcor Project on Crime, Violence, and Investment had released a report in 
June which calculated that South Africa lost no less than R18.5 billion to crime 
every year. Explicitly against this background, he stated that the ACDP strongly 
opposed parole altogether, and that people convicted of crimes should serve 
their full sentences.531  
 ii. The Criminal Law Amendment Act & the Criminal Procedure Amendment 
Act 
The Criminal Law Amendment Bill introduced minimum sentences of 5, 
7, 10, 15, 20, 25 years and life for certain crimes, including categories of rape, 
murder, assault, theft, drug-related offences, corruption, and arms dealing. The 
Minister of Justice framed the bill as responding to public demand for more 
stringent punishment for convicted offenders, helping to restore confidence in 
the ability of the criminal justice system to protect the public against crime, and 
confirming the government’s policy which aims to curb the increasing crime rate 
and protect the community against criminals.532 While the implementation of 
minimum sentences was portrayed as an emergency measure to address crime 
rates and the sentences were enacted on a temporary basis, they have been 
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continuously extended.533 As a result, the number of people serving long and life 
sentences has increased, rising from only 24 percent of the prison population 
serving a term longer than ten years in 1998 to 48 percent in 2004.534 
While the Criminal Law Amendment Act dealt with sentencing, the 
Criminal Procedure Amendment Bill dealt with the question of bail. The bail 
legislation made it more difficult to receive bail, a response to public criticisms 
that arrestees were being released back into communities too easily. In the debate 
on the bill, the Minister of Justice said that the provisions were comparable to 
those in other open and democratic societies.535 While many noted that the bail 
provisions were “drastic measures” and that such laws needed to take the rights 
of the accused into account, several speakers noted that the harsher bail 
conditions were a temporary measure, which could be adapted later on once 
South Africa was no longer in the grips of a crime wave.536 For now, members 
                                                        




535 Hansard, “Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Bill,” Second Reading Debate, Vol. 
15, cols 6121-4, Nov. 6, 1997. 
 
536 Ibid., 6128 (MP De Lange: “We may find that in five years’ time, when crime has 
subsided somewhat, and we can actually move more freely in our country, we may have 
a different set of norms and a different set of values. We then draw the line, in terms of 





reiterated that South Africa was still in the midst of an “increasing crime wave,” 
pointing to recent media headlines about crime rates and crimes being 
committed by people released on bail. 537 This bill, along with the others on 
parole reform and minimum sentencing, was “being sent out with the message 
that hardened criminals should be placed in prison and kept there.”538 
Of course, the bail provision, like the minimum sentencing and parole 
reform measures, would only exacerbate the Department of Correctional 
Services’ overcrowding problem. All of these measures were intended to keep 
people in prison for longer periods, with less opportunity for release. At the close 
of the debate on the bail provision bill, the Minister of Justice acknowledged as 
much. He stated that the prisons were very overcrowded and that many people 
who were awaiting trial—not yet convicted of any crime—were contributing to 
the overcrowding.539 He described an ongoing project at Mitchells Plain in Cape 
Town to investigate how many people who had been granted bail had actually 
paid bail and been released. He stated that “according to the project it has been 
discovered that over 70% of people to whom bail has been granted have in fact 
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not paid their bail, and are therefore awaiting-trial prisoners at Pollsmoor 
Prisons. In some instances they are women, and in other instances they are 
accused of the types of crimes which we would not categorize as serious 
crimes.”540 Although the Minister did not say the reasons for these people not 
paying bail, one can assume that a reason for many of these people to continue 
sitting in jail is that they or their families were too poor to bail them out. The 
Minister stated that there needed to be a better system “which will result in 
people who do not have to be in prison being kept out of prison, and the creation 
of space for those who have actually committed serious crime, or who are 
charged with having committed serious crime, and who in the interests of the 
safety of the public ought to be kept behind bars until their trial takes place.”541 
He said his department would be looking into this matter with the Department 
of Correctional Services. In the meantime, however, the problem would remain.    
iii. The Correctional Services Amendment Act 
The Correctional Services Amendment Act of 1997 amended the 1959 
Prisons Act in two key ways: 1) it provided for an inspecting judge to oversee the 
department and allow for more transparency; and 2) it allowed the Minister of 








Corrections to partner with the private sector to build and manage prisons.542 In 
introducing the debate over the bill in November 1997, Minister Mzimela 
highlighted several reasons for “bring[ing] the private sector on board in 
partnership”—he was careful to point out that the government was not 
privatizing, but was instead entering into a public-private partnership.543 This 
move was necessary, he argued, to solve the problem of overcrowding; the 
department simply did not have the financial resources to provide “the kinds of 
facilities we need.” Those facilities, he said, would be “modern” and would 
include schools, training schools and vocational schools, skills-training programs 
and workshops, and counseling—programs that would stretch the department 
far beyond its budget. He said the department was “convinced that we need 
people from outside our systems to come in and bring in fresh ideas” and that 
bringing in the private sector was bringing South Africa into line with “what is 
done in the rest of the world now.”544 Minister Mzimela stressed that this would 
bring a “transfer of technology from abroad to South Africa, free of charge” 
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bringing modern skills and modern buildings as well as significant training. He 
went on: “That means that those who come here from abroad, who have not just 
the skills but the experience in this field of modern management, will transfer 
that to us free of charge. From our human vantage point, everything that this 
project promises is going to be a plus for us.”545  
Although the Cabinet had approved the APOPS procurement process a 
year ago, the Minister acknowledged that the department now needed legislation 
so that the program could be properly regulated. He reminded the House that 
the department had already started providing these new facilities, but that they 
needed a legal framework within which to work. Inserting a new section in the 
Prisons Act of 1959 would give the Minister legal authority to “enter into a 
contract with any private entity to – (a) design; (b) construct; (c) finance; (d) 
manage and operated, any prison…” While the press release about the APOPS 
program had called for bids for seven prisons, the number for the initial pilot 
had now dropped (without explanation) to four. The Minister reiterated that, 
based on “experiences overseas,” these prisons would be better facilities, better 
managed, and “cost-effective.”546 
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Once again, all the parliamentarians who participated in the debate on the 
bill offered their support for it. But some raised concerns about irregularities in 
the tender process; an NP member said that the Committee on Correctional 
Services had received a letter stated that an ANC Youth League member had an 
interest in one of the consortia bidding for one of the APOPS contracts.547 The FF 
also expressed concerns about “alleged irregularities in the handling of the 
tender procedure of the APOPS project.”548 The NP was adamant that the entire 
process of tendering and short-listing should be reopened so that details about 
the composition of the private consortia could be made public. They were 
dismayed that when they raised this concern and called for the process to be 
reopened, they had been told that that would open the government up to legal 
action—and that “investors have spent a lot of money up to now and they may 
pack up and leave the country.”549 
While a thorough investigation of corruption in the tender process lies 
outside the scope of this chapter, the response from members of the ANC in the 
debate is interesting for what it reveals about its notions of economic 
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development and empowerment. ANC MP Bathabile Dlamini stated that the 
ANC had taken calls to reopen the tendering process very seriously, but 
questioned whether the NP was raising this issue “because the Department of 
Public Works issued an instruction demanding of shareholders that a minimum 
equity of 40% should be given to black people?” “Is it because consortiums are 
supposed to be led by African people who have been previously disadvantaged? 
Is it because each of these projects is envisaged to generate R15 million per 
annum?”550 She went on to reference the Freedom Charter: “The ‘verkrampte 
boer’ thought that the congress of the people in 1955 was mad when it said that 
the people should share in the country’s wealth. This is the process of restoring 
wealth to the previously deprived, and the empowerment of black people.”551 
She closed by stating that the process was going to move forward, and needed to 
do so quickly because “it is our people who are overcrowded in prisons.”552 
ANC MP Barbara Thompson reiterated this point about the need to move swiftly 
to ensure black empowerment on two fronts: 
At the end of process there were 42 consortia, which were shortlisted to 
five. Unfortunately, this is not acceptable to the NP, because 40% of the 
                                                        









consortia are comprised of black people. This exercise is most welcome as 
this will certainly contribute to the black empowerment. In conclusion, I 
would like to stress that both the Department of Correctional Services and 
the Department of Public Works are moving faster than before in 
implementing the APOPS process. After all, it is mostly our black people 
that are suffering because of overcrowding in prisons, and naturally the 
one who is hardest hit feels it most.553 
 
While these arguments serve as handy deflections from the corruption 
allegations, more relevant here, they also show that members of the ANC saw 
private prisons as part of a redistributive project and one of racial uplift—ie. 
partly Black-owned consortia would be enriched while also improving 
conditions for Black people who were the majority of those crowded in the 
country’s prisons. This may have been a convenient talking point or an actual 
conception of economic development—or both—but it does chime with the 
ANC’s overall Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) approach, which mandated 
black representation on private consortia bidding for government contracts, 
thereby increasing the number of blacks among the millionaire ranks.  
 Many accounts of the move toward private prisons in South Africa declare 
that APOPS began with the 1998 Correctional Services Act, which replaced the 
1959 Prisons Act entirely and made provision, in one section, for the building 
                                                        





and management of private prisons. 554  However, as the foregoing account 
shows, the legislative authority for private sector involvement in prisons came 
with the Correctional Services Amendment Act of 1997 (which merely amended 
the 1959 Act), and the process of engaging the private sector came even earlier 
than that. In 1998, the Correctional Services Act was passed and reiterated the 
legal framework for the Department’s relationship with private contractors. Civil 
society groups raised concerns about the policy before parliament, pointing out 
that the proposal did not have a provision for any regulation or oversight to 
ensure that the terms of the public-private partnerships would be implemented 
properly. Nonetheless, the legal framework was approved as proposed (with no 
oversight mechanisms) over objections.555 I will discuss how that fared (and US 
involvement) in this chapter’s conclusion. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
Within just a few years of the parliamentary debates examined above, 
South Africa would see its first private prisons. The first private prison in post-
apartheid South Africa, run by the U.S-based conglomerate Wackenhut (now 
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GEO Group), opened in Bloemfontein in 2001. The same Wackenhut-led 
consortium (including their South African partner, Kensani Corrections) opened 
a second prison the following year at Louis Trichardt in North Province. By 2010, 
MPs on parliament’s correctional services and public works committees were 
lashing out at Correctional Services Department officials about the costs of the 
two prisons, which had spiraled beyond all projections.556 As we have seen, this 
cost spiral was not entirely unanticipated, as Carl Niehaus and the Department 
of Finance had warned about the danger of high interest rates and untenably 
high costs. The prisons are both very large maximum-security facilities—the 
Manguang Prison in Bloemfontein is the second largest private prison in the 
world. The two private facilities were initially projected to cost the government 
R143 million a year in 2001-2002,557 but annual expenditures had swollen to R786 
million by 2010.558 As the MPs also complained, the cost overruns have been 
enormous. The per diem rate for the Manguang prison at Bloemfontein increased 
from the originally contracted R154 to R215.559 While these cost spirals stretched 
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the country’s resources nearly to the breaking point, Geo Group reported a 30 
percent profit margin for the Manguang Prison.560 In order to pay for the two 
private prisons, the government has been forced to lay off public sector 
employees.561 As Kentor and Prior concluded in their study on the globalization 
of private prisons: “South Africa’s developing government appears to have fallen 
victim to a contractual obligation that benefitted the private corporation far more 
than the government.”562 
Under the terms of the government’s contract with the private 
consortium, the companies designed, constructed, and managed the prisons and 
the government would pay in installments, eventually taking ownership of the 
buildings after 25 years.563 This lease-purchase arrangement provided a short-
term benefit for the government since the private sector covered the costs 
upfront, but the government would end up paying far more in the long term.564 
In 2011, as the Department of Corrections was considering contracts for four 
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more private prisons, MPs of all parties insisted that parliament would not 
support the plans until the state could show how it would get value for money 
from the deals.565 Many MPs objected to the cost, raising arguments about the 
relative efficiency of the public and private sectors, but others voiced moral 
objections. “We are privatising a security facility, which to my mind in principle 
is wrong,” said ANC MP Salam Abram. He added an objection about this core 
state function being handed over to others: “A security facility should be 
controlled by the state, not by a private entity.”566 Vincent Smith, chair of the 
correctional services committee, demanded to know why the government was so 
keen to delegate its responsibility to private firms: “[F]or some reason [the] 
government is trying to force this thing through,” he said. “Everybody is kicking 
and therefore the question that was raised initially—whose agenda are we 
pushing here?—becomes very critical for me.”567 As we saw in the previous 
section, veiled (and less so) accusations of graft and of undue foreign influence 
had been buzzing for years. 
 By October 2011, the Minister of Corrections scrapped all plans for more 
private prisons. Local and foreign investors, who had awaited a decision on the 
                                                        






tender process since being shortlisted in 2008, were incensed. 568  The tender 
procurement process had been initiated in 2003, and the new Correctional 
Services Minister, Nosiviwe Mapisa Nqakula, inherited it when she took office in 
2009. Rather than evaluating the bids, she undertook a review of the entire 
public-private partnership model and found a number of problems. 569  Her 
review found that the model conflicted with policy stipulating that the state 
could not hand over certain security and custodial operations to third parties. 
Her objections were not only technical; she also insisted that South Africa needed 
to find new solutions to dealing with people convicted of crimes besides 
incarceration.570  
 This chapter has shown the variety of forces that kept the ANC from 
pursuing that kind of criminal justice model in the first five years of democratic 
rule. By 2011, the experiment with public-private partnerships in prison 
construction and maintenance had proven costly and was ended. As the next 
chapter will discuss in more detail, other types of privatization had also come 
under fierce scrutiny from civil society groups. Soweto’s Anti-Privatisation 
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Forum, for instance, was founded in 2000 and challenged the privatization of 
water, electricity, and universities under the ANC. 571 However, even though 
prison privatization ultimately failed, the overall neoliberal approach was 
embedded in various aspects of South Africa’s “war on crime,” including the 
framing of projects like the construction of the super-maximum prison at 
Kokstad as an instance of black economic empowerment and service delivery. In 
this way, the post-apartheid “war on crime”—and the harsh criminal justice 
legislation and public-private prison ventures that it spurred—was an integral 
part of the move to shrink the state and to shrink expectations of the state when 
it came to directly meeting the needs of citizens. The fact that prison construction 
via a private sector tender process could be framed as service delivery 
exemplifies a neoliberal approach to economic development. As people looked to 
the government to provide houses, electricity, and clean water, they were met 
with assurances that the government was indeed meeting their needs—by 
creating the conditions for trickle-down local economic revitalization.   
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Perhaps nowhere else is this more apparent than in the town of Kokstad 
itself. Thus, we end this chapter where it began, in that town of 50,000 people 
limning the border of two of South Africa’s poorest provinces. Deputy President 
Mbeki had made his site tour and address in April 1999 and the super-maximum 
prison was slated to open in early 2000.572 Yet the project was delayed and, even 
after construction was completed in August 2000, the prison could not open. The 
R500 million prison stood empty until May 2002. The reason Kokstad 
municipality gave for the delay was that it could not sustain the water and 
electricity supply to both the high-tech prison and the town.573 Poignantly, the 
town was struggling to supply water to both the prison and a new low-cost 
housing development.574 Kokstad municipality borrowed R20 million from the 
central government to upgrade its infrastructure in an attempt to meet the 
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demands of both the prison and the residents of 3,000 newly built low-cost 
houses in town.575 Still, the municipality could not afford further upgrades that 
were needed to supply the prison’s state-of-the-art electronic and hydraulic 
facilities.576 The municipality proposed in March 2001 that the Department of 
Correctional Services and the Department of Public Works take over its loan 
repayments for three years, so that the town could stabilize its finances. The 
Kokstad municipal spokesman cited “documented proof of correspondence in 
which we warned them (the departments) that they should not build a super-
max prison in Kokstad,” yet the prison had been built over the municipality’s 
objections. 577  By 2005 the prison was operating far below capacity, with a 
“skeleton staff” and sections closed off and in need of expensive upgrades.578 
Before its opening and for many years, the prison would be criticized as a “white 
elephant.”579 Kokstad residents would continue to experience intermittent water 
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shortages and periods when they were forced to drink unpurified water.580 At 
times the town’s hospital had to operate without water.581 Rather than living up 
to hopes for “service delivery,” the super-maximum prison project had become a 
direct competitor for scarce essential resources, threatening the well-being of the 
town’s residents. Far from delivering on the promises of the Freedom Charter, 










                                                        
580 Kamva Mokoena, “Kokstad on the Boil Over Water Crisis,” Sowetan, Jul. 18, 2007; 
Republic of South Africa Department of Water Affairs, Reconcilitation Strategy for Kokstad 
Water Supply Scheme Area—Greater Kokstad Local Municipality, Contract WP 9712, Sep. 
2009, https://www6.dwa.gov.za/iwrp/DSS/UserFiles/IWRP/Documents/ 
KZ_DC43_KZN433_Koksta_F.pdf; Luyt, “Contemporary Corrections,” 184.  
 





Rights Beyond the Urban-Rural Divide: South Africa’s Landless People’s 
Movement and the Battle for Post-Apartheid Democracy 
 
When a series of urban land occupations in South Africa garnered media 
attention around July 2001—most notably at the Bredell farm on the outskirts of 
Johannesburg582—President Thabo Mbeki was quick to deflect attention away 
from not only his government’s failure on land reform, but from the very issue of 
unequal land distribution itself. In fact, he declared that “the problem in South 
Africa is homelessness, not land.” 583  Speculation over the possibility of 
Zimbabwe-style land expropriation in South Africa’s future had government 
officials scrambling to dispel investor fears. The Bredell occupation and similar 
occupations near Cape Town and Port Elizabeth were thus construed as 
outcomes of failed housing and ‘basic services’ (water, electricity, etc.) delivery. 
Those occupying land were portrayed as homeless, not landless, actors; they 
were acknowledged as having land needs insofar as they needed land for 
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building homes, but not necessarily for other purposes. Their relationship with 
urban land was thus mediated through a right to housing lens, but did not 
consist of a direct right to land.  
Yet squatters facing eviction from urban high-rises in Johannesburg’s 
Hillbrow and Berea districts and others contemplating occupations of vacant 
state-owned land near shack settlements such as Protea South persisted in calling 
themselves “landless” rather than homeless or poor. As members of the Landless 
People’s Movement (LPM), these urban residents were articulating land rights 
claims rooted in historical land theft which did not fit easily within the 
government’s rigid separation of urban housing policy and rural land policy. The 
creation of this landless subjectivity and its explosive confrontations with state 
power lie at the heart of this chapter.   
At the core of the LPM’s definition of “landless” lay a rejection of South 
Africa’s “rural-urban divide.” The country’s urban and rural spaces—and the 
boundary between them—have been constituted through centuries of power 
struggles, policies, and shifting theoretical justifications. 584  Historically, these 
politicized urban-rural distinctions have alienated the poor and landless from 
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power-holders and, more relevant to the arena of struggle, have divided landless 
actors among themselves. By defining “landless” as a population which knows 
no rural and urban bounds, the Landless People’s Movement challenged the 
constitution of the country’s urban-rural divide, opening up possibilities for 
linkages among seemingly disparate struggles for land, employment, housing, 
HIV treatment, basic services, and more. Through their organizing practices and 
demands, LPM members revealed that urban and rural spaces—and experiences 
of urban and rural poverty—were far more linked than a politicized dichotomy 
would allow.  
As this chapter will examine in depth, the ANC government propped up 
the urban-rural divide through a separation between urban housing and rural 
land policy, and thus sustained a certain truncated conception of rights. The 
ANC government’s bolstering of urban-rural division allowed it to avoid a 
fundamental shift in property relations and carried deep implications for rights 
and entitlement in post-apartheid South Africa. Through this move, the 
government was able to avoid the issue of land rights by denying the problem of 
landlessness itself. In fact, through a limitation within the country’s Constitution, 
it could deny any problems that could not be solved by the market. As Michael 




“are provided as ‘human rights’ in the South African constitution, although it is 
quickly added that such provision is contingent on the state having the financial 
and administrative capacity to do so. As a result, legal arguments revolve around 
the ‘reasonableness’ of such provision in specific circumstances. Political issues 
are in this manner turned into legal ones.”585  
A contradiction thus emerged between the state’s conception of rights as 
“deliverables” (along with the passive subjectivity this implied and entailed for 
its citizens)586 and the LPM’s conception of rights as something to be defined and 
demanded through popular struggle and ultimately to be won, not given. The 
subjectivity associated with the latter conception of rights, that of the “landless,” 
was deeply politicized.587 The state’s conception entailed the death of the subject 
as constituted by popular anti-apartheid struggle documents such as the 
Freedom Charter (which held that the people shall govern, the land shall be 
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shared by all who work it, etc.).588 Propping up the urban-rural divide meant 
propping up a certain truncated conception of rights—rights to houses that could 
be “delivered” but not rights to land, which would require a complete 
restructuring of the distribution of wealth and privilege, a distribution that was 
largely left untouched during the transition to democracy.  
 Thus the LPM’s No Land! No Vote! campaign during the 2004 national 
elections was significant not least because the “hard-won right to vote” had been 
integral to legitimating the transition from one conception of rights (and its 
accompanying subjectivity) to the other—from a struggle for liberation to a time 
of rights given from above. As I will explore, the LPM made it clear with this 
campaign that any democracy which granted the right to vote but denied rights 
to land (and the problem of landlessness itself) was a democracy at odds with 
their conception of themselves not as passive recipients of rights but as people 
still struggling to give weight to the demands of liberation struggle.  
In South Africa, where land dispossession had long been associated with a 
denial of citizenship rights and political control, access to land now shaped the 
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very possibility of democracy in the country. For many in the dispossessed 
majority, it was assumed that the advent of democracy and broadened political 
control could only be facilitated by a widening of access to land. In this way, the 
“land question” and the “national question” were bound together. Therefore, as 
we shall see, some of those who were still denied land came to question the 
legitimacy of South Africa’s democratic transition. Their questioning constituted 
a challenge to the reigning silences around property relations that threatened to 
void human rights and democracy of content.  
This chapter includes a range of secondary and primary sources. In 
addition to newspaper articles, speeches, LPM publications and press statements, 
research reports, and secondary literature, the chapter draws on interviews I 
conducted with 35 Landless People’s Movement members and organizers 
between 2003 and 2006. The urban component of the interviews was conducted 
in Johannesburg and its surrounding townships. I conducted interviews in areas 
where LPM activity was particularly intense, including the townships of Protea 
South in Soweto, Eikenhof, and Thembelihle, and in the township of Orange 
Farm, where it was less robust. In inner-city Johannesburg, I interviewed LPM 
members in the neighborhoods of Hillbrow and Berea. For the rural component, 




Natal, located about 60 miles from Newcastle. Ingogo was home to the LPM’s 
national organizer at the time, Mangaliso Kubheka, and so was selected as the 
rural basis for the study because of the level of LPM involvement and activity 
surrounding Kubheka’s presence.589  
 
I. Defining a ‘landless subjectivity’ in post-apartheid South Africa 
A. Background on the LPM 
 In 2003, the strength of the demands of landless people led land researcher 
Wellington Thwala, among others, to predict that land distribution “will either 
be resolved through a fundamental restructuring of the government’s land 
reform program, or it will be resolved by a fundamental restructuring of 
property relations by the people themselves.” 590 Throughout the 1990s, most 
were optimistic that land reform could be achieved through governmental 
policy. The role of land sector non-governmental organizations (NGOs) quickly 
shifted from supporting opposition struggle to carrying out the technical work of 
information dissemination, capacity-building, legal support, research, mediation, 
and other forms of intervention aimed at identifying and closing the legal and 
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bureaucratic gaps in the new land reform programs.591 After the ANC came to 
power in 1994, the role of the landless was merely to complete the necessary 
organizational and bureaucratic requirements to “place themselves in the 
relevant queue, and then wait for the promised land.”592 Landless communities 
filed restitution claims with the Department of Land Affairs or made applications 
for land through new reform programs.593   
The impetus for the Landless People’s Movement grew in the late 1990s as 
the slow pace of land reform was combined with growing unemployment and 
rising food costs.594 These factors worsened socio-economic conditions for urban 
and rural poor. However, as Ann Eveleth and Andile Mngxitama have observed, 
rural land restitution claimants and labour tenants on white-owned farms lost 
their patience most quickly; they were particularly frustrated by the worsening 
conditions on white commercial farms, on-going evictions from farms (which the 
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state declined to act upon), and continuing farm violence and human rights 
abuses by white farmers. In the months before the July 23-24, 2001 national 
meeting of landless people that led to the birth of the LPM, such frustrations 
increasingly took the form of land occupations by landless groups in various 
stages of self-organization. Disparate groups of labour tenants, loosely linked 
through the National Land Committee’s national network, began to realize that 
they shared common concerns.595 
Though the LPM began as a rural-based movement, it spread rapidly into 
the urban center of Johannesburg and then throughout Gauteng province during 
2002. Informal settlements surrounding Johannesburg were facing a new wave of 
forced removals. As rent levels rose, people increasingly faced evictions carried 
out by government-contracted private security forces in red overalls dubbed 
“Red Ants” (Wozani Security). When asked to compare the situations faced by 
urban and rural landless, then LPM Gauteng regional chairperson Maureen 
Mnisi zeroed in on evictions: “I think everywhere they are fighting for land. 
Some of the problems are the same. It differs, but the thing is that for the 
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eviction, people are crying everywhere.”596 The LPM’s daily efforts were thus 
largely defensive, focused on preventing evictions from rural farms and urban 
settlements and apartment complexes. In 2004, the LPM counted roughly 90 
percent of its membership base in rural areas (with strongholds in the 
Wakkerstroom area of Mpumalanga, the Free State, and the Eastern Cape), 
though strong branches were also formed in informal settlement areas of 
Johannesburg—including Orange Farm, Protea South, Eikenhof, Thembelihle 
and several others—and in the inner-city flats of Hillbrow and Berea. In 
interviews, LPM leadership found it difficult to draw distinct boundaries 
between urban and rural membership, since some rural land claimants lived in 
urban areas (often subsidized by the pension grants of relatives living in rural 
areas).  
This organizing across urban, rural, and peri-urban areas was unique 
among post-apartheid South African social movements at the time and rare in 
the country’s history, as evidenced by the urban biases of anti-apartheid 
struggles such as the United Democratic Front (UDF).597 The apparent lack of 
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urban-rural linkages within social movements—and the lack of attention paid by 
academics and policymakers to the importance of creating such linkages—is far 
from natural or inevitable. It is instead indicative of more fundamental biases 
that had their roots under segregation and apartheid and that persisted after 
1994, as the next section will discuss. 
 
B. Law and rights along the urban-rural divide: Housing, land, and security598 
Apartheid’s strict separation between urban and rural, along with the 
ANC’s urban organizational bias, helped ensure that urban and rural issues 
remained separate during the constitutional negotiation process of the early 
1990s. Negotiations over land and property rights took place separately from the 
broader economic policy debates of the constitutional negotiations—as “one of 
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several parallel ‘specialist’ streams.”599 However, as we saw in chapter three, the 
World Bank was heavily involved in promoting market-based approaches to 
both land redistribution and urban housing and utilities provision.  
At the World Bank’s urging, the ANC government adopted a market-
based approach to land redistribution, based on the “willing buyer-willing 
seller” principle. This approach has been rationalized on the basis of maintaining 
efficiency in the agricultural sector and retaining investor confidence. Critics 
argue that efficiency and equity are not—and cannot be—achieved 
simultaneously when it comes to land redistribution, and thus maintain that the 
landless poor cannot find redress through the market.600 As Stephen Greenberg 
has argued, any reliance upon markets will be skewed against the poor, since 
markets respond to effective demand, or the ability to pay for commodities at 
prevailing prices.601 Resources will continue to flow towards those who are able 
to pay for them, thus ensuring the continued build-up of resources by this small 
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minority. Even though the state may assist people in buying land and starting 
agricultural production, it is unlikely that effective demand would be generated 
or that these new landholders would ever be able to compete with large-scale 
owners within the market.602 Greenberg, Lahiff, and others have argued that a 
market-led development model cannot work in a context with such extreme 
inequality. In South Africa, the market-based approach maintained existing 
white commercial farmers while attempting to promote a class of black 
commercial farmers (with little success). Thus it failed to meet the needs of 
subsistence farmers and others who wished to access land outside of an agri-
business framework.603  
Crucially, the market-based approach also elided the history of land theft, 
flattening questions of justice and redress. The descendants of colonizer and 
colonized were portrayed as two equal players confronting each other before the 
market. As former LPM Gauteng regional chair Maureen Mnisi stated: “The 
government in 1994, it promised people about land reform and land 
redistribution. But in his constitution, he put the Property Act in which there’s a 
‘willing buyer-willing seller’ clause. And he made the people to lose their rights 
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because they can’t pay. Most of the people they are unemployed … instead of 
making a land reform they say you must buy. So you can even see the Freedom 
Charter when they say the land shall belong to those people who work it, but 
now it’s not that. The land shall belong to the people who buy it. And because 
we don’t have the money to buy the land, we are getting more suffering about 
that.”604  
The division between urban housing rights and rural land rights persisted 
in a series of policies after 1994. The contrast between housing and land rights 
was highlighted when the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act 52 of 1951 was 
replaced by the Prevention of Illegal Evictions and Unlawful Occupation of Land 
Act (PIE) in 1998. Under the former apartheid-era act, black Africans in urban 
areas had no formal housing or land rights, and the government was allowed to 
evict them arbitrarily to settler camps. Though the act was applied infrequently 
in the years immediately following the democratic transition, it was not repealed 
and replaced with PIE until 1998. The new act, rather than focusing solely on 
“illegal squatting,” sought to protect the property of landowners and protect 
illegal occupants from eviction without due notice and a court order. However, 
PIE also reinforced the fact that, as Andre van der Walt writes, informal housing 
                                                        





rights were “not allowed to actually compete with the inviolable right of a 
landowner. [The legal system’s largely negative attitude towards informal 
housing rights] illustrates the supremacy of landownership vis-à-vis informal 
housing rights in terms of the dominant theory of land rights.”605  
PIE also created “a framework for evictions rather than an end to 
evictions.”606 If the state considered it necessary in some way for the public good, 
then those living in informal settlements could be evicted through a legal 
process. In January 2002, thousands of residents had their shacks demolished 
during their removal from Mandelaville in Diepkloof, Soweto. They were moved 
to the Roodepoort Durban Deep hostel to make way for a multimillion-rand 
development plan.607 Other communities were evicted to make way for new 
cultural districts, such as Newtown in Johannesburg, to promote new tourist 
areas, or to push shacks further from major highways and thus out of sight. 
Residents were often moved from informal settlements or townships onto state-
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owned land left over from apartheid zoning.608 These sites were usually remote 
areas, further from health facilities, jobs, schools, and transportation.  
Long-awaited tenure security legislation for rural areas was only passed 
in February 2004, and the Communal Land Rights Bill was criticized by many in 
the land sector as being antithetical to rural democratization. 609  Passed just 
months before the April 2004 general election, the CLRB bolstered the ANC’s 
position with rural traditional authorities, but exemplified for many in the LPM 
the growing distance between the ANC and landless poor populations. The 
legislation gave chiefs in former apartheid “homelands” the responsibility of 
administering land communally, with the intended result of extending tenure 
security to a third of South Africans. (As Mamdani has highlighted, the ANC and 
other urban-based parties have long been loath to challenge rural hierarchies, as 
traditional authorities were often relied upon to deliver rural votes).610 Critics 
argued that it was undemocratic to give such power to un-elected chiefs, since 
rural communities and individuals would have no choice over their land rights 
or land administration arrangements. They also argued that stark gender 
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inequalities were likely to be exacerbated; the land rights of rural women were 
likely to be undermined by placing their administration in the hands of mostly 
male chiefs. The bill stated that 30 per cent of elected traditional councilors must 
be women, but there were no sanctions described for enforcing this percentage.  
The LPM waged a campaign against the CLRB prior to its adoption. The 
movement criticized the lack of consultation with rural communities throughout 
the years of the government’s drafting process. 611  The bill was not widely 
disseminated to those communities which would be most affected by its 
provisions; instead, consultative workshops held by the government were 
targeted at organizations of rural traditional authorities. In a November 2003 
submission to parliament, the LPM complained: “From our perspective only 
traditional leaders were consulted. The people invited to consultation meetings 
were the National House of Traditional Leaders, the Provincial Houses of 
Traditional Leaders, the Coalition of Traditional Leaders, Contralesa, and the 
Ingonyama Trust Board.”612 The movement went on to detail the principles of 
land tenure reform policy they deemed essential: 
(i) it must be the product of a thorough consultation with the 
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(ii) it must provide for democratic institutions to allocate, 
administer, and control communal land 
(iii) ‘democratic’ means that institutions must be elected by both men 
and women of the affected community and must be accountable 
and transparent 
(iv) it must redistribute land beyond the 13 per cent allocated to black 
people by the previous regime 
(v) land allocation and access must be equal for both men and  
                     women 
(vi) it must address the institutions of traditional leadership created 
 by apartheid.613 
 
The LPM concluded their submission in no uncertain terms: “The LPM cannot 
endorse the bill. In fact we reject the current bill outrightly.”614 Such an explicit 
call for rural democratization was a sharp departure from the previous course of 
national social movements in South Africa. 
Policies regarding rural farm dwellers in the first decade of ANC rule 
were characterized by neglect. The rural agricultural sector was arguably the 
most shielded from post-apartheid reforms and conditions for farmworkers 
remained, on the whole, abysmal. The power relations established under 
segregation and apartheid—in no small part through the convict labor schemes 
described in chapter two—continued to shape the experiences of farm laborers. 
South Africa’s seven million farm dwellers, or 15 percent of the population, 
                                                        







continued to face arbitrary eviction, brutal assault, murder, and denial of burial 
rights.615 There remained too few government inspectors to ensure meaningful 
checks on labor violations.616  
Farmworkers and their families were still at constant risk of eviction at the 
farmer’s will; while their land tenure rights were technically protected under the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997, these legal protections did little to 
change the precarity of farmdwellers’ existence on white-owned farms. Farmers 
were now required to give notice of eviction, but many evicted workers 
complained that they did not receive a notice or that they could not read it. In the 
first ten years of democratic rule, nearly 950,000 farm workers and dependents 
were evicted from white-owned farms—200,000 more than were evicted during 
the previous decade of apartheid rule and more than the total number of people 
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who had benefited under all aspects of the official land reform program since it 
began.617 Seventy-seven percent of the evictees were women and children related 
to deceased or retired farm laborers. 618  In areas such as Wakkerstroom, 
Mpumalanga and Ingogo, KwaZulu-Natal, LPM members fought for the release 
of impounded cattle, set fires and destroyed fences to undermine white authority 
and profit, performed burials against the will of farmers (who refused interment 
rights because that would allow families the right to subsequently return or 
remain on familial land619), fended off eviction, pursued land restitution claims, 
and more. 
Meanwhile attacks on white farmers overshadowed other types of 
violence taking place on farms, such as evictions of labor tenants and violence 
against farmworkers. Media reports of South Africa’s “crime wave” were not 
limited to cities; violence against white farmers also received a great deal of 
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media attention. 620  By October 1997, a delegation led by the South African 
Agricultural Union (SAAU) had demanded a meeting with President Mandela to 
address what news outlets called “the continuing slaughter of white farmers.”621 
The previous week over 600 farmers had gathered in Bultfontein in Free State 
province to protest the murder of four farmers in their region in the past three 
weeks and the death of roughly 250 farmers countrywide since the 1994 
elections.622 Farmers threatened to “form vigilante groups, sack farm workers, set 
up roadblocks and withhold taxes to force the government to act upon their 
grievances.” 623  The farmers threatened vigilante action if Mandela did not 
respond with “concrete results.” The SAAU delegation sought Mandela’s 
approval for a plan they had developed called “Management Programme for 
Platteland (Rural) Security.”624 As a result of the SAAU’s demands for action, a 
task team of Joint Security Staff was convened to visit all provinces and assess 
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the problem.625 By July 1998, the New York Times carried a story with the headline 
“South African Farmers Reach for Their Guns,” which reported that: “Attacks on 
white farmers have been mounting. In the past four years, nearly 500 farmers 
have been killed. Since January there have been 371 attacks on farms, resulting in 
75 deaths.”626 
The ANC’s response was an extension of the “war on crime” approach 
described in chapter four. While much of the “war on crime” was focused on 
cities, rural areas were also targeted—with a privatized solution to safety and 
security. In October 1998, President Mandela convened a Rural Safety Summit to 
address the violence on farms, but the primary focus was violence against white 
farmers. Mandela began his address on the first day of the summit by stating that 
“this is first and foremost a summit for action against crime, in particular the 
killings and violence against members of the farming community.” 627  He 
reassured the farmers there was no conspiracy to run them all off their land. And 
besides, “There is in the first place no force in this country which has the capacity 
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to do that.”628 He stated that in addition to the immediate human suffering that 
came with violence against members of the farming community, the lack of 
security and stability in the rural and farming community also posed serious 
disruption to the economy: “It threatens to bring reduced growth or production, 
loss of wages and profits and in time unemployment. It brings the spectre of 
deepening poverty, and potential social instability and upheaval.”629   
President Mandela spoke of the efforts that the government had made in 
the previous few years to address crime, highlighting the tough-on-crime 
provisions of the 1997 Criminal Law Amendment Act and Criminal Procedure 
Amendment Act described in the last chapter: “In order to strengthen the hands 
of judicial officers we have tightened the laws on bail, on parole and on 
organised crime and increased minimum sentences for serious crimes.”630 He 
stated that, in addition to these efforts, communities had a crucial role to play. 
Similar to the community policing strategies being promoted in urban areas, 
Mandela proposed community involvement in the rural commando system: 
“There are many ways in which members of the public could be part of or 
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reinforce our men and women in uniform. One example is the low level of 
participation in the commando system. I am therefore giving instructions to the 
Minister of Defence to immediately investigate mechanisms to ensure maximum 
participation in the commando system…”631  
The Rural Safety Summit would culminate in the creation of a Rural 
Safety Plan, which had two main pillars: 1) home and hearth protection; and 2) 
area bound reaction forces (commando units).632 Mandela’s encouragement to 
community members to join the commando units combined old and new 
policing strategies. The commando units were at once a revival of apartheid-era 
patrols and in-line with the “community policing” strategy that South Africa had 
adopted in its urban areas as part of its move toward a neoliberal privatization of 
policing efforts. 633  As the New York Times wrote of the Rural Safety Plan, 
“Actually, it is a dusted-off apartheid-era idea—training and arming civilians as 
army commandos ready to respond to the Communist threat. Only these days, 
the threat is crime.”634 A 2001 investigation of the commando system by Human 
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Rights Watch revealed sharp racial divisions in the composition of the 
commando units. Commando units were seen as catering to and being composed 
of white farmers, while Community Policing Forums (CPFs), begun in the early 
1990s and enshrined in the 1995 South African Police Service Act, were seen as 
directed at the black community. 635 The Rural Safety Plan thus did little to 
address violence against farm laborers, and instead addressed violence against 
farm owners through a privatization of police efforts and renewal of commando 
units. Meanwhile, land redistribution remained elusive.  
 
 C. Urban and rural in post-apartheid civil society 
The LPM could have gone the route of a completely rural social 
movement given its beginnings in the rural bases of National Land Committee 
affiliates. However, the movement spread to an urban constituency when the 
connection between urban and rural evictions (attributed, in part, to the 
insecurity of tenure in both spaces) was recognized. Urban land issues 
(portrayed by the government as problems of housing shortages) were 
highlighted by the Bredell occupation and other urban occupations of its kind. In 
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this vein, the burgeoning LPM was able to make the link between the sources of 
urban and rural poverty as shared outcomes of historical land dispossession.  
The LPM was effective at drawing links between land and other sources of 
poverty stemming from macro-economic policies, especially in urban areas. 
According to a study conducted by Bongani Xezwi, an LPM member at the time 
living in Protea South, Soweto, the vast majority of urban Gauteng province 
members interviewed (87 percent of 90 interviewees) clearly understood that the 
LPM’s primary aim was to struggle for land, but at least 50 percent of 
respondents also understood that the LPM was fighting for other basic needs for 
the landless. Almost all respondents (96 percent) believed that the LPM would 
still need to struggle after getting land, indicating a widespread understanding 
of the links between land and other struggles for basic needs. Xezwi also found a 
variety in types of land demands. Ninety-six percent of those surveyed needed 
land for housing, but a full 66 percent of this urban constituency also needed 
land for farming. Fifty-seven percent also wanted land for business purposes, 
and 64 per cent for community services.636 The LPM created space for the diverse 
experiences of individuals occupying over-crowded apartments in downtown 
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Johannesburg, living in informal settlements surrounding the city, working on 
rural farms, and commuting between urban and rural areas.637  
This organizing across urban, rural and peri-urban areas was unique 
among post-apartheid South African social movements of the period. The lack of 
urban-rural linkages in civic struggles—and the lack of attention paid by 
academics and policymakers to the importance of creating such linkages—was 
far from natural or inevitable. Instead it was indicative of more fundamental 
biases formed during segregation and apartheid and that persisted years after.638 
As researcher Cecilia Tacoli writes, “The division between ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ 
policies is based on the assumption that the physical distinction between the two 
areas is self-explanatory and uncontroversial.” 639  These assumptions cannot 
accurately be made in any context, and are especially troublesome in the South 
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African case where physical distinctions were politically re-engineered. 
Economics, modes of governance, and the urban-rural divide were so linked 
under apartheid that it would be difficult to tease them apart or make 
substantive change in one area alone.  
This carries implications for how we think about dispossession. At the 
heart of urban-biased economic policy and analysis lies the assumption that 
dispossession from the land is a natural historical precursor to capitalist 
development, “an inevitable part of the creation of an urban, industrial working 
class.”640 The on-going interconnections between rural and urban areas become 
obscured as the rural is associated with a “pre-modern” way of life, hardly 
considered a hotbed for effective anti-capitalist resistance. Such a naturalized 
conception of dispossession has grave implications for how we understand, not 
only the relationship between urban and rural spaces, but also the continued 
reproduction of economic relationships and political power. As Gillian Hart 
argues, dispossession (and, conversely, the retention of access to land) must be 
understood as an ongoing process that continues to shape the conditions of 
                                                        





reproduction of labor and to infuse people’s understandings of themselves as 
political actors.641   
Dichotomous conceptions of urban and rural areas, and their 
accompanying assumptions about capitalist development, have undermined 
much intellectual work, particularly on social movements. As Hart and Sitas 
argue, most researchers have pursued “the land question,” “the labour 
question,” and “the question of livelihoods” (or “non-formal employment”) in 
isolation. Post-1994 labor studies became heavily focused on metropolitan areas, 
ignoring the persistence of migrancy and instead focusing on black workers “as a 
class of brand new wage-earners and stake-holders. In other words, as a 
collective tabula rasa without a history rooted in prior struggles and negotiations 
across different socio-spatial arenas of practice. As a consequence of such 
representations, this research lost track of enduring and changing urban-rural 
interconnections.”642   
 
D. The ‘landless subject’  
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The dichotomous conceptions of urban and rural that characterized 
academic analysis and policy were not overtly challenged by the broad range of 
post-apartheid social movements. 643  Given this, the LPM’s definition of 
landlessness and its ability to organize (however unevenly) across urban and 
rural areas constituted a significant turn. Andile Mngxitama, former land rights 
coordinator of the National Land Committee and activist with the LPM, 
described the position thus:  
We define landless as all people with land needs, and we do not make a 
distinction of whether people need land for housing or farming. However, 
it is clear to us that the majority of landless are people who want land for 
building livelihoods. What we have also discovered is that the ‘rural-
urban divide’ is actually false. Many workers in the urban centers can no 
longer hope to find work in industry, so to feed themselves and their 
families are increasingly looking to produce on land. So you will find in 
our definition of ‘landless’ people who have made land claims, and those 
who have made requests for land through government processes. The 
concept ‘landless’ is also about what kind of society we desire. We 
understand that on land rest many processes that go deep in 
understanding how people live and relate to each other and to nature. So 
defining oneself as landless implies that you are calling for fundamental 
change in relations in the broader society.644 
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By declaring the rural-urban divide “false,” the LPM also discarded the range of 
dichotomies and substitutions that had immiserated the majority of South 
Africans under apartheid and democracy alike. Rather than seeking 
incorporation into the ANC’s capitalist project, landless activists identified the 
roots of that project in the geography of apartheid and its accompanying modes 
of wealth production and identity formation. As the LPM charter stated: 
We fought for the end of colonialism and apartheid, and welcomed the 
birth of a new South Africa. But for us there is nothing new because there 
is still no land, no services and no growth in our areas. We will no longer 
sit back and watch as the wealth builds up in the hands of a tiny urban 
elite, while on the edges of the cities, in the small towns and in the 
countryside, we continue to suffer and starve.645  
 
Political subjectivities are hardly a given; not all—or even most—of South 
Africa’s dispossessed readily declare themselves “landless.” In a country where 
the vast majority of the black African population was dispossessed of land, 
where forced removals and evictions re-engineered the economic, social, and 
political landscape throughout the 20th century, and where such evictions and 
removals persisted, choosing to define oneself as landless rather than homeless, 
unemployed, or poor was an expression of broader emancipatory aspirations.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
 







With this definition, the LPM identified persistent poverty as a result of 
both the economic policies of the current ANC-led government and apartheid-era 
inequalities and historical dispossession. According to Gillian Hart: “What 
makes this redefinition of the land question potentially very powerful is its 
grounding in pervasive histories and memories of racialised dispossession. This 
in turn makes it possible to frame demands for redistributive social and 
economic justice in terms of citizenship rights rather than welfare handouts.”646 
Claims rooted in a sense of dispossession lent themselves to demands for 
redistributive justice and citizenship rights imbued with practical significance. 
The LPM tended to focus less on individual ANC councilors or city managers 
and more on the national government and the interests it represented. As one 
LPM leader from the Thembelihle settlement told a meeting in July 2002, “When 
it comes to development, the government only consults amabourgeois. If you 
don’t have work, you are an eyesore to them. The whole system is stinking—it’s 
about the oppression of the majority by a minority.”647  
 
II. We won’t buy our land back: The landless confront the market  
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 After four years of LPM demands for a national land summit, the 
government convened such a summit in July 2005.648 The summit was touted as a 
platform for a large variety of land reform “stakeholders”—here, the Landless 
People’s Movement was one among many called upon for input. These included 
seven political parties (ranging from the Azanian People’s Organization, the 
Inkatha Freedom Party, and the ANC to the New National Party), academics, 
Latin American and African country representatives, the World Bank, a range of 
land NGOs, the Department of Land Affairs, and white agri-business. White 
farmers were assured that their views would be taken into consideration; “We 
can assure them,” said Director General of Agriculture Masiphula Mbongwa. 
“They must be frank, fearless and open about their views.”649 Still, the LPM’s 
demands came through clearly; at one point, they prevented the World Bank 
representative from making his speech. 
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 The LPM took aim at the market-led approach to land reform in its 
memorandum of demands to the summit:  
The 28-million poor & landless black majority of South Africa are poor 
and landless today mainly because of our land was stolen from us 
through centuries of brutal and violent wars and laws of dispossession 
that began in 1652 and continued throughout colonialism and apartheid. 
Our ancestors fought valiantly against this theft and we fought to end 
apartheid so that this land would be returned to us. We are not willing to 
buy back our stolen land! We are not willing buyers! Today, more than 80% of 
the land of our ancestors remains in the hands of less than 60,000 white 
farmers who inherited the land from this colonial and apartheid theft. We 
do not care whether they are willing to sell it back to us or not – we demand that 
our land be returned to us! The market-led land reform model that the post-
apartheid government copied from the World Bank has not worked 
anywhere in the world! In South Africa, it is an insult to our ancestors that 
we must buy back our stolen land! The entire South Africa ‘land market’ 
on which our stolen land is bought and sold at price determined by the 
beneficiaries of apartheid is nothing but a continuation of apartheid. We 
demand that the state and the landless organise to ‘take back the land’ that 
was stolen from us!650  
 
The summit marked the first time the ANC government openly called the 
‘willing buyer-willing seller’ program into question. Commentators were quick 
to highlight the ANC’s promises at the summit to revisit the policy; scholar 
Patrick Bond declared that the summit “was, at least rhetorically, the death knell 
for the commodification strategy of willing seller-willing buyer.”651  
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 Yet, in the months that followed, LPM activists recognized that this 
“promise to revisit” did not signal a break in the prevailing approach to land 
reform. Paul Tikoane, an LPM activist based in Gauteng and the Free State, 
pointed to President Mbeki’s speech before Parliament in February 2006:  
The president said actually they have to review the willing seller-willing 
buyer. But now, I still have a concern about that: ‘to review it in the 
international norms’. … He doesn’t say the government must review the 
willing seller-willing buyer. He says within international norms. So it 
looks like we must review it in relation to the situation happening 
internationally. To me that is a problem. … In some areas it’s okay to work 
with international people and so forth. And there are some other areas 
where you don’t want to hear what some other people are saying about. 
When you talk about the land, this land belongs to us. It’s our land. So we 
must not ask somebody from somewhere, ‘must I divide this kitchen of 
mine?’. That’s where my problem is.652 
 
Indeed, international interests seemed never to have been far from sight. As 
Patrick Bond observed, the “Zimbabwe” factor may have come into play in the 
government’s decision to revisit the policy, though not in terms of quelling 
investor fears of Zimbabwe-style land takeovers. Now the “instability” caused by 
a lack of redistribution seemed more immediate.653   
 As time went on, it became clear that “reviewing” the market-led 
approach would not actually mean departing from that approach anytime soon, 
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or alienating foreign investors and speculators. There were quieter signs, 
however, that the LPM’s demands struck a chord with some within the ruling 
ANC. According to Tikoane:  
Even at the end [of the summit] the [Land] Minister, Thoko Didiza, came 
to us again, just outside there discussing and feeling very free about the 
LPM now. And saying, exactly, I think the LPM is really the right 
movement in this country because of the history that the ANC was 
involved in. It was a problem what happened in CODESA.654 In CODESA 
it was actually three things which the ANC didn’t agree with the National 
Party there. It was the land issue, it was education, and the third one was 
labour. It was those three issues where they did not agree. The ANC 
didn’t agree with the National Party when they were in discussions in 
CODESA at Kempton Park. … It was just a compromise there. So, now 
Thoko is saying exactly that—that it was this thing, the property clause, 
that was a problem, and they [the ANC] see it afterwards.655  
 
Researcher Stephen Greenberg has recounted similar interactions: 
 
At a meeting between Gauteng’s agriculture MEC and the LPM, the 
SACP, the Homeless People’s Federation and other organisations in 
October 2004, the MEC said ‘the people must rewrite the laws with their 
feet,’ suggesting that small-scale occupations of unused land for 
agriculture purposes would change the dynamic of landowning and assist 
the government to restructure laws.656 
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Due in part to the presence of the LPM, there was a growing sense that South 
Africa’s problems stemmed from mass dispossession and the on-going effects of 
unequal land distribution. Any “promises to re-visit” which did not 
fundamentally re-orient approaches to land reform remained problematic in the 
eyes of those who declared themselves landless. Similarly, any democratic 
project in South Africa that asked for votes but that had not proven itself to be a 
legitimate break from its predecessor was one that the landless refused. 
 
III. No Land! No Vote!: The ‘landless subject’ confronts ballot box democracy 
In 2004, South Africa held its second national election after the democratic 
transition. Most adults had clear memories of casting a vote for the first time in 
the election that would bring Nelson Mandela to power just ten years before. 
Therefore the LPM’s calls to boycott the elections and to occupy land instead, as 
part of a “No Land! No Vote!” campaign, were deeply controversial. The LPM 
argued that South Africa had achieved only a “ballot box” democracy with the 
shift from apartheid. The state had systematically transformed a revolutionary 
politics into a technical, liberal democratic process in which politics was reduced 
to voting. 657  Yet voting would not satisfy the needs of those who expected 
                                                        




democracy to entail an end to political and economic exclusion. The LPM issued 
demands that it argued would give teeth to the democratic project: a moratorium 
on all evictions and immediate delivery of land to the landless. 
Maureen Mnisi of the Protea South settlement wrote a letter to the editor 
of the Mail & Guardian in response to the editorial page’s criticism of the No 
Land! No Vote! campaign in early November 2003. Her letter, which the paper 
declined to print, summarized the LPM’s conception of the campaign, 
underscoring the sentiment that democracy under the ANC did not constitute 
the political change struggled for under apartheid: 
The impression given [by your editorial] is that the LPM is irresponsible 
to a point of disenfranchising the landless majority. We need not be 
reminded that we struggled for the vote during apartheid. It was us who 
bore the brunt of the apartheid repression here in South Africa. But we 
did not struggle for the vote so that we may be treated worse than dogs. 
It is the landless who voted for our government since 1994 in every 
election, but we have to ask this, why are we still landless and homeless 
ten years into our democracy? Is this the democracy we suffered so many 
years for? As if that is not enough, we are being told to ‘register where 
we live,’ but we are facing forced removals…. We demand respect and 
our full citizenship rights.658 
 
The No Land! No Vote! campaign constituted the LPM’s most pro-active strategy 
to date. With the No Land! No Vote! campaign, LPM members took matters of 
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land reform into their own hands, in a very public show of force. Prior to this 
campaign, the proactive strategies carried out by some landless on a local level 
had not been recognized by the general public as a coherent line of attack. LPM 
members in parts of Mpumalanga, KwaZulu-Natal, and elsewhere had been 
carrying out burials against the will of farm owners, while others were re-
opening closed access roads. 659  Still, the No Land! No Vote! campaign was 
widely criticized by the media as a reactionary strategy which crudely neglected 
the hard-won right to vote. Most critics focused their attentions on the LPM’s 
boycott of the vote, rather than on the actions the movement intended to carry 
out in lieu of voting. Land occupations were a significant worry to many, but this 
threat was not new; the LPM had been threatening a wave of land occupations 
around the 2004 elections for some time. Pairing land occupations with a boycott 
of the vote was a new element of the campaign—and a sharper critique of South 
Africa’s new democracy.   
A. From rural to urban and back 
The progression of the No Land! No Vote! campaign between urban and 
rural areas followed the trend of the LPM as a whole; the impetus was found in 
rural areas but only transformed into a national campaign through the actions of 
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urban areas (with more media exposure and ease of communication). The No 
Land! No Vote! campaign was pursued most strongly by LPM members facing 
direct attacks either on farms (in Mpumalanga, North-West, and, to a lesser 
extent, KwaZulu-Natal) or from government-led removals (as in Johannesburg). 
The idea for the No Land! No Vote! Campaign began among rural farm workers 
in Mpumalanga province, but urban LPM members in Johannesburg brought 
visibility to the campaign. Gauteng province was the first to officially launch the 
campaign, with a march to the Union Building in Pretoria in November 2003.  
LPM members in Johannesburg argued that politicians were unresponsive 
to the needs of communities facing eviction, and said they were not willing to 
lend their vote to a government that was forcibly removing them from their 
homes. As Sisi Zulu of Orange Farm stated:  
For us, it’s like we’ve been applying and applying, begging, having 
meetings and meetings, spending a lot of money to say, ‘Government, we 
do want to speak to you.’ But it’s like there’s no action. We don’t get any 
answers. We fax them, even march to our councilors. We didn’t even get 
any response. So that’s why we are telling ourselves that during the 
elections, LPM is going to take back their land. We are saying, ‘no land, no 
vote’ because where people will be voting is a land that is being rented by 
somebody, so that building is being rented, even the land on it is being 
rented. So we don’t see any necessity to vote if you don’t have a place to 
stay. Because it’s like you are chaining yourself again to another 
government that is going to promise and do nothing. We say: no land, no 
vote.660  
                                                        





Maureen Mnisi of Protea South described the government as not only 
unresponsive, but antagonistic:  
We’ve been writing those letters to the government and we’re marching, 
trying to show them that is what we want. The only thing: there’s no 
results that we’re getting. You get guns and laws, is what we get. So is that 
an answer from our government?  It’s guns and laws, just putting to the 
poor people. When you fight, they resist instead of replying. And then 
they put those forces to shoot you and they put the bulldozer to destroy 
your shack and you don’t have any say, but you have to listen to what 
they think because there’s a gun. They fight, you know.661  
 
The evolution of the LPM’s increasingly radical tactics is evident, as both women 
describe attempts to work first through governmental channels by requesting 
meetings with councilors, sending letters and faxes, and marching to politicians’ 
offices. Nevertheless, LPM members engaged the government on the land issue 
more often through eviction processes than through discussion meetings in 
government offices—which gave the impression that the government was more 
an adversary than an ally. 
The No Land! No Vote! campaign took hold unevenly across rural 
constituencies. Still, there were several rural actions around the campaign. The 
North-West province branch had at least four actions. The Eastern Cape and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 




Mpumalanga branches (also composed of mostly rural membership) had their 
first actions in February 2004, including a continuous sit-in at the Umtata offices 
of the Department of Land Affairs. On March 4, one month before the elections, 
more than 300 members of the LPM marched to their premier’s office in the 
Eastern Cape provincial capital of Bisho. Upon arrival, they declared that the 
government had seven days to respond to their ultimatum: “Give us land, or we 
will take over farms forcefully on April 14.”662 LPM members traveled to Bisho 
from across the province, gathering from Umtata, Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth, 
Bizana and Grahamstown.  
The common complaint of LPM members, urban and rural alike, was that 
this was “not the democracy we struggled for.”663 As Sylvia Matshoba of Protea 
South explains: 
Mbeki said to us on TV, I still remember, said ‘I am going to make your 
lives better.’ Electricity. Even water. Nothing of that sort is happening. It 
seems maybe he was speaking to someone else. We used to fight with 
them, for this ANC to be in government today. But all the grassroots, left 
with nothing. We lost our children here fighting for this democratic 
government. We lost our daughters. We lost our sons. We lost our 
children for this democracy. They fought for this democracy, this 
democracy to be today. But what did we get: nothing. Just left with tears. 
Because our children, we used to tell them ‘The Boers are going to shoot 
                                                        
662 SAPA, “South Africa: Threats of Election Day Land Occupation,” Afrika.no. Mar. 4, 
2004. 
 





you!’. They said ‘All the children that are being shot, mama, they are also 
human beings. Their mothers and fathers loved them like you love me. So 
if I die there, I will die like a soldier. I’ll be fighting for my country 
because this is our country. We must fight for it’. They fought for it, but 
they got nothing. Other people that fight for this land, they didn’t get 
anything.664  
 
Matshoba and others expressed a dual sentiment of dashed expectations. They 
referred to specific promises made by the ANC—land, housing, electricity, 
water—which had not been followed through upon during the previous decade. 
But they also described a more profound expectation of what ‘democracy’ itself 
might bring. 
The ANC’s response to the No Land! No Vote! campaign evolved 
dramatically over the course of several months from a position of disregard to 
one of strict denunciation. Upon the LPM’s national launch of the No Land! No 
Vote! campaign in November 2003, officials in the ANC government discounted 
the LPM as a “fringe” group which could not seriously affect voter turn-out, the 
electability of the ANC, or the overall integrity of the elections.665 The ANC 
never expressed worry in these respects, but it began to react sharply to the 
LPM’s threats of land occupations. The party also denied the LPM’s charges that 
it had failed in the land reform process. 
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In a press statement released just six weeks before the election and in 
response to the No Land! No Vote! campaign the ANC maintained that it had not 
strayed from its land reform commitments as adopted in 1994. 666 The party 
stated that it “has made significant progress over the last ten years in ensuring 
the progressive redistribution and restitution of land.” The ANC further 
expressed its intolerance of the LPM’s plans to occupy land and the movement’s 
characterization of official land reform policy:  
South Africans will not tolerate hooliganism that is only aimed at 
misleading people and creating chaos and discord. Those with designs to 
deliberately flout the law and occupy land illegally will be met with the 
full might of the law. South Africa is a constitutional democracy that 
enshrines the right to demonstrate and freedom of expression, but such 
rights do not include a right to perpetuate lies, violate the law and act in a 
manner calculated to polarize society.... The ANC indeed respects the 
right of the Landless People’s Movement to choose to forgo their right to 
vote, but will not tolerate any act calculated at intimidating people and 
stopping them from exercising their right to vote…. If the LPM has 
legitimate concerns regarding the land restitution process, these can and 
should be dealt with through the appropriate government departments.667  
 
The government cracked down harshly on No Land! No Vote! campaign 
protests. On election day, 57 LPM members were arrested in the settlement of 
Thembelihle for attempting to hold a protest. The LPM members were arrested 
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as they disembarked from their bus in Thembelihle, and thus were prevented 
from holding their demonstration. They were charged in terms of the Electoral 
Code of Conduct and the 1993 Prohibition of Illegal Gathering Act.668 Activists 
were held in jail over night and four of them were subjected to physical and 
psychological abuse by members of the police’s Crime Intelligence Unit.669 Their 
case dragged on in court for over two years, and was only dropped in July 2006. 
The majority of those arrested came from the LPM strongholds of Thembelihle 
and Protea South. The court battle took its toll on the movement’s Johannesburg 
leadership. As Bongani Xezwi of Protea South observed, the LPM became 
equated with arrests and court battles in Thembelihle and Protea South. This, 
according to Xezwi, resulted in significant de-mobilization of the movement.670  
And yet the No Land! No Vote! campaign remained as evidence of how 
much the LPM’s radical position owed to its bridging of the rural-urban divide. 
In its early months as an exclusively rural initiative, the LPM was limited by its 
dependency upon the National Land Committee and its affiliated NGOs. The 
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careful positioning of these NGOs as mediators between the government and the 
rural landless and their role as service providers hindered the development of a 
more radical ideology. In addition, since the NGOs work in cooperation with all 
aspects of rural societies, including traditional leadership, the democratization of 
rural authority had not been a central concern. The links between land 
distribution and the poverty and mass unemployment perpetuated by the ANC’s 
macro-economic policies were amplified by joining forces with urban landless. 
From this mix came a searing critique of South African democracy which drew 
its fire from urban and rural experiences alike. In lifting cries of “No Land! No 
Vote!” the LPM criticized the government in radical terms that would not have 
been foreseen without the process of invalidating the urban-rural divide.  
 
III. Conclusion 
From 2005 on, it became unpopular to write about the Landless People’s 
Movement in the present tense. Beginning in 2004, commentators took to writing 
about its implosion, collapse, and decline. Yet, in their focus on turmoil in the 
national executive committee, fraught relationships with donors, and a sharp 
decrease in media presence, observers overlooked persistent local-level activity. 




movement. In a May 2006 interview, Paul Tikoane described his hopes for future 
LPM action, highlighting urban-rural ties. Based in Welkom in the Free State, 
Tikoane had been a member of the LPM since the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in 2002. Tikoane was once a miner in Anglo-American’s 
Free State mines, and spoke with devastating insight about the impact of the 
mining system, particularly in terms of the spread of HIV. Before joining the 
LPM, Tikoane was an ANC councilor from 1995-2000. He was elected into the 
national leadership of the LPM, and moved into the Brixton, Johannesburg office, 
doing construction work by day (when jobs were available) and attending LPM 
meetings in the evenings. His ties to Welkom remained strong. There he had 
been working with others to coordinate a joint campaign between the LPM and 
the mineworkers’ union to confront Anglo-American about their labor practices 
and land holdings. Tikoane spoke of the need to urgently re-launch the urban 
branches of the LPM, and spoke with just as much force about his family’s claim 
to the Tikoane River.671  
Along with Tikoane’s plans for a partnership between landless and 
unionized mineworkers, other LPM members in Gauteng contemplated pro-
active strategies around HIV and treatment access. The LPM’s Hillbrow branch 
                                                        





fell apart after a key leader died of AIDS in 2004, and many other members fell 
sick or were otherwise affected by HIV and AIDS. Speaking in 2006, LPM youth 
activist Bongani Xezwi conceded that the LPM was at a weak point, but likened 
the LPM’s problems to those of other South African social movements 
overwhelmed by donor funding and demands and by overly-bureaucratic 
national structures which did not always maintain strong ties to the grassroots.672 
LPM activists in Gauteng (the area hardest hit by in-fighting associated with the 
demise of the NLC, donor-movement tensions, and arrests) were trying new 
ways to become independent of donor funding. Members who had the means 
were now asked to make monthly donations to a transportation fund. Though it 
would mean much less funding in the short term, they saw it as a sustainable 
way of generating funds. 
Still, the LPM never rebounded to the same level of organization. Other 
organizations sought to organize in a similar vein, including the Alliance of Land 
and Agrarian Reform Movements (ALARM), which was founded around the 
2005 Land Summit. ALARM did not have the same level of activity and local 
organizing as the LPM had, as it was intended to be an alliance of local 
                                                        
672  The LPM has been funded by Oxfam-Belgium and War on Want. Activists 
complained of signs of the movement ‘being run from Europe’ when, for example, the 
LPM was forced to hold national elections following funders’ demands (rather than at a 





movements. From 2005, the Abahlali baseMjondolo (shackdwellers) movement 
began organizing in Durban and the Anti-Eviction Campaign continued in the 
Western Cape. These organizations borrowed and adapted some of the LPM’s 
slogans—“No Land! No House! No Vote!”—and sought to draw connections 
between land, housing, and service delivery issues. The epilogue discusses the 
trajectory of these organizing efforts in more detail. 
Though the LPM was relatively short-lived, it left some lessons for 
researchers and historians that are potentially quite profound. The movement’s 
efforts to bridge urban and rural constituencies challenged researchers to pay 
attention to how the urban-rural divide might constrain their own work. Indeed, 
historical and contemporary urban-based struggles around evictions, electricity, 
housing, water and other ‘basic services’ may owe much of their strength to 
strong personal connections to family, friends, and livelihoods in rural areas. As 
researchers, our urban biases may prevent us from asking or writing about such 
connections across the ‘urban-rural divide’ and how they fueled and shaped 
political activity. Urban shack dwellers and flat dwellers may very well conceive 
of themselves as being engaged in struggles for land, but commentators may 
unwittingly fall into the same trap as policymakers who consider these to be 




dynamism of such struggles, silencing an entire range of motivations and 
activities. No doubt many academics and policymakers will continue to re-
inscribe urban-rural division, defining differential access to rights, citizenship, 
and “the good life” based on naturalized dichotomies. Among the many lessons 
of the Landless People’s Movement is the argument that prospects for South 
African democracy—in the Mbeki years and beyond—may rest on the landless’ 









Ten years into ANC rule, the Landless People’s Movement declared South 
Africa’s democracy null and void. The LPM demanded a deepening of South 
African democracy based on liberation from the effects of historical 
dispossession and market-based macro-economic policy alike. Until such 
freedom came, the movement refused to validate what they deemed a “ballot 
box democracy.” This dissertation has examined some of the historical reasons 
that the lack of economic redistribution seemed to threaten the very premise of 
South Africa’s experiment in democracy. I have sought to deconstruct the 
historical relationship between land dispossession, citizenship, and politics in 
South Africa. In later chapters, I have shown why the country’s leadership has 
been unable, or unwilling, to reckon with this history.  
Land dispossession was intimately linked with legal status over the course 
of colonialism and apartheid. Forced removals and the creation of fictional 
‘homelands’ not only dispossessed black Africans of land, but also citizenship.673 
Once stripped of land and citizenship, one’s presence in urban areas was 
criminalized. Under apartheid pass and vagrancy laws, gaining entry to cities 
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depended upon having a labor contract and being able to show proof of it on 
demand. As described in chapter two, those picked up on pass law violations—
as an estimated 20 million black men were between 1920 and 1980674—were often 
ordered to work on white-owned farms as punishment. It is not difficult to 
understand why, in the expectations of many, a democratic transition needed to 
untangle this knot.  
However, for reasons discussed in earlier chapters, the ANC government 
adopted a neoliberal approach to development that foreclosed a large role for the 
state in directly redistributing land and other economic resources. South Africans 
who were once dispossessed of land and relegated to poverty now also were 
dispossessed of their claims for redistribution. South Africa’s neoliberal 
democracy required that they give up their claims as dispossessed, landless 
subjects and instead compelled them to look to the market to ‘deliver’ services 
and jobs. The government would be an “enabler” of market forces and, rather 
than redistribute land and wealth, it would enter into “public-private 
partnerships for service delivery.” For local economic development, this might 
mean a new super-maximum prison compound and promises of jobs and skills 
                                                        





development, as it did in Kokstad.675 For the water supply in Soweto townships, 
this meant the government contracting with a French company to install pre-paid 
water meters.676 For urban landless, it meant awaiting ‘housing delivery’ and 
facing eviction and demolition of one’s informal housing settlement in the 
meantime; it did not mean land redistribution. In each case, one’s relationship 
with the state was meant to be closer to customer than citizen.677 And for those 
who resisted, their status was increasingly close to criminal. This became widely 
apparent when the dynamics underpinning South Africa’s dispossessed 
democracy played out in a devastating confrontation on August 16, 2012. 
* * * 
In the Rustenberg area of North West Province, less than two hours’ drive 
from Pretoria and Johannesburg, a handful of corporations run the world’s two 
largest platinum mines and the world’s largest platinum refinery. About 70 
percent of the world’s platinum—used in jewelry and vehicle catalytic 
converters—originates here. Platinum mining began in 1929 and, as in the gold 
industry, mining companies relied on contractors to recruit cheap, disposable 
                                                        
675 See chapter five.   
 
676 See chapter three.  
 
677 See chapter three for a discussion of how this relationship was conceptualized at the 





labor from Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, and the Bantustans.678 Under the 
conditions of their labor contracts, black African mineworkers were allowed to 
stay only for their specified term of employment; at the end, they were required 
to return home to renew their contract. Their stay was temporary, at the will of 
their employer.679 Just as South African agricultural development was subsidized 
by apartheid laws regarding labor and movement, 680  the mining companies 
“harnessed the services of the state to shape labor supply conditions to their 
advantage.”681  
                                                        
678 See, e.g., Jonathan Crush and Clarence Tshitereke, “Contesting Migrancy: The Foreign 
Labor Debate in Post-1994 South Africa,” Africa Today, 48(3) (2001): 49-70. Jonathan 
Crush, Alan Jeeves, and David Yudelman, South Africa’s Labour Empire: A History of Black 
Migrancy to the Gold Mines (Cape Town: David Philip, 1991); Tshidiso Maloka, “Mines 
and Labour Migrants in Southern Africa,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 10(2) (1997): 213-
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679 As Crush and Tshitereke write, “Miners were encapsulated in massive single-sex 
barracks and forced to work in degrading and inhumane conditions. At the end of a 
contract they returned home and, if not physically maimed or crippled with lung 
disease, earned the ‘privilege’ of another contract. A lifetime of work in South Africa 
never qualified a single miner for permanent residence.” Crush and Tshitereke, 
“Contesting Migrancy,” 50.  
 
680 See chapter two.  
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After 1994, the South African government took some steps to transform 
the migrant labor system and conditions on mines, including legislation such as 
the Labour Relations Act and the Mineral and Petroleum Resources 
Development Act, but the system remains largely intact.682 Mines employ few 
locals and still rely heavily on contract labor from afar.683 Most mineworkers 
migrate from the Eastern Cape, South Africa’s poorest province, and send 
remittances home to their families.684 Workers live in shacks in the Nkaneng 
informal settlement or in the backyards of homes in Marikana West township.685 
                                                        
682 As Kally Forrest writes, “Mines now have to accommodate the Labour Relations Act, 
but employers see the Act as giving legitimacy to brokers, who become the primary 
employer. Many retrenched gold miners and low-skilled young workers register with 
contractors. Young workers, in particular, are recruited by the unregistered “bakkie 
brigade,” who pay as little as R60 a day and may demand a R150 registration fee. 
Workers recruited in this way enter very short-term work, making union recruitment 
impossible.” Kally Forrest, “Marikana Was Not Just About Migrant Labour,” Mail & 
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The circuit of migrancy, distinguished by dispossession and cheap labor, looks 
much the same as it did in previous eras.    
During the platinum boom between 2000 and 2008, mining companies 
were able to restore old mines and hire more workers. The population of 
informal settlements outside Rustenburg and Kroondal grew quickly.686 When 
the Lonmin mining company successfully applied for a new-order mining license 
with the Department of Minerals in 2006, the company agreed, under the Mineral 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act, to build 5,500 houses for its workers 
in Marikana within five years.687 Yet Lonmin only managed to build three show 
houses, and blamed its failure on the 2008 financial crisis.688 However, observers 
noted several realities that undercut Lonmin’s argument about being cash-
strapped. For one, Lonmin had accepted a $150-million loan from the World 
Bank’s International Finance Corporation in 2007, in part for a “comprehensive, 
                                                        
686 Paul Hendler and Tony Wolfson, “The Planning and ‘Unplanning’ of Urban Space 
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687 See, e.g., “Lonmin Housing Commitments Scrutinised,” The Citizen, Sep. 16, 2014.  
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large-scale community and local economic development” program. 689   Two, 
while Lonmin workers made increasingly insistent demands about the need to 
raise wages and deliver on housing promises, the company opted to meets its 
Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) targets instead.690 Lonmin pleaded that it 
was too poor to meet wage demands, but the company paid hundreds of 
millions of rands in dividends to its empowerment partners, including (current 
South African Deputy President) Cyril Ramaphosa’s Shanduka Group. 691 
Meanwhile, sections of Marikana township that Lonmin had previously built 
went for weeks without electricity and living conditions remained abysmal.692  
On August 16, 2012, these problems came to a head in the bloodiest 
massacre by South African police since the apartheid era. Thousands of workers 
at Lonmin’s Marikana Shaft had gone on strike to demand higher wages. In the 
days before August 16, the strikers gathered at the top of a small hill near the 
mining compound and demanded that Lonmin management come and negotiate 
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with them.693 After four days, police moved in, encircled the hill with barbed 
wire, and attempted to disperse and arrest the strikers. The scene quickly turned 
violent and the police opened fire, killing 34 miners and injuring 78 others. The 
Marikana Massacre drew international headlines and comparisons with the 
Sharpeville Massacre of 1960, where South African police shot into a crowd of 
pass law protestors, killing 69.694 As South African author Mark Gevisser wrote, 
“Both massacres represent thresholds. After Sharpeville, the state clamped down 
as never before, banning the liberation movement and forcing them into exile 
and underground; the African National Congress responded by turning to 
armed struggle. The consequences of Marikana might be less dramatic, but the 
massacre will nonetheless come to draw a similar line between one era and 
another, with the suggestion of innocence lost at the crossing. There will be pre-
Marikana and post-Marikana, just as there was pre- and post-Sharpeville.”695    
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Immediately, government officials labeled the strike as “illegal” and 
“criminal.”696 Police Commissioner Riah Phiyega said that police “shouldn’t be 
sorry” about the shooting. 697  Two hundred and seventy-nine miners were 
arrested and jailed on charges of public violence, illegal gathering, possession of 
dangerous weapons and intimidation.698 In a move that shocked legal experts 
and the public, prosecutors also charged the striking miners with the murder of 
their 34 co-workers under the “common purpose” doctrine.699 The prosecutors 
argued that the protestors were complicit in the killings—even though the 
miners had been shot dead by police—because they were arrested at the crime 
                                                        
696 This characterization began earlier in the strike. On the eve of the massacre, Cyril 
Ramaphosa, who sat on Lonmin’s board, sent a series of emails to Lonmin management 
and government ministries. Following a number of casualties after the strike began, 
Ramaphosa wrote to Lonmin’s chief commercial officer: “The terrible events that have 
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2014.  
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scene with weapons.700 The apartheid government had used the law frequently 
to discourage political demonstrations and secure convictions against march 
organizers.701 Legal experts viewed the Marikana murder charges as a politically 
motivated attempt to stigmatize and intimidate the miners ahead of their bail 
hearing.702 The court provisionally withdrew the murder charges in short order, 
but it was two years before the rest of the charges were dropped.  
Marikana is an extreme example of the crackdown on and criminalization 
of protest in recent years. Two years earlier, community leader Andries Tatane 
was killed by police during a service delivery protest in Ficksburg.703 Footage of 
his death was broadcast on national television, sparking outrage about police 
brutality. While many commentators make comparisons to the draconian tactics 
of the apartheid government, we can also locate the roots of this period in the 
‘war on crime’ that the ANC launched shortly after coming to power.704 In his 
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presentation to the Marikana Commission about how the South African Police 
Service might prevent another massacre, researcher Gareth Newman identified 
some of the main problems as politicization of the police force, the close 
relationship between the police and Lonmin, and the ‘tough on crime’ stance 
adopted by police leadership. As an example he quoted Deputy Minister of 
Safety & Security Susan Shabangu who had told police members at a 2008 
meeting: 
You must kill the bastards if they threaten you or the community. You 
must not worry about the regulations. I want no warning shots. You have 
one shot and it must be a kill shot. I want to assure … policemen and 
women … that they have permission to kill these criminals. I will not 
tolerate any pathetic excuses for you not being able to deal with crime. 
You have been given guns, now use them.705   
 
In March 2010, the Minister of Police announced that the police service would re-
militarize its rank structure, in line with its approach of “fighting crime and 
fighting it tough.” The step was necessary, he said, to “ensure we win this war … 
This is a people’s war against criminals.”706  
A study by South Africa’s Socio-Economic Rights Institute (SERI) found 
an “alarming trend” in which the criminal justice system is being used to 
                                                        
705  Cited in Gareth Newham, “How Can the South African Police Service Prevent 
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suppress popular dissent. 707 For instance, in Mitchell’s Plain, Cape Town, in 
February 2014, the police raided a shack settlement, kicking down doors, 
breaking windows, and arresting four community leaders. 708  Days before, 
residents had protested against political parties’ attempts to solicit votes in the 
neighborhood. The protestors argued that it was insulting to electioneer after 
ignoring peaceful petitions asking for electricity and more water taps.709 Mandisi 
Ngcwanu, secretary of the Siqalo residents’ committee, was one of the arrested 
leaders; he was jailed for a week and charged with public violence (the charges 
were later dropped for lack of evidence). Of his arrest, detention, and charges, 
Ngcawangu said, “We are not surprised. We know that these tactics will be used 
to intimidate us, because we speak on behalf of the community and we protest 
against the government ignoring us. We were not arrested as criminals, but as 
leaders of the community.”710  
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 Though the years since Marikana have witnessed the criminalization of 
dissent, they have also included protests for land inspired by the striking miners. 
Days after the strike, Durban’s Abahlali baseMjondolo (shackdwellers’) 
movement released a statement saying, “The progressive middle classes are 
struggling to defend the freedom and democracy that they received in 1994. We 
are still struggling for freedom and democracy to come.”711 In March 2013, about 
a thousand people occupied land in Durban and called it the “Marikana Land 
Occupation,” after the strike. In Cape Town, members of the Western Cape Anti-
Eviction Campaign occupied land in Philippi East, naming it Marikana and 
themselves Abahlali baseMarikana. 712  When the municipality demolished the 
Cape Town Marikana Land Occupation, the Cape Town High Court declared 
that the demolitions violated the Constitution. 713  Abahlali baseMjondolo 
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welcomed the court victory, saying “We will continue to struggle in the streets, 
in the communities and in the courts. We will continue to democratize our cities 
and country from below. We will continue to struggle to ensure that the social 
value of land is put before its commercial value.”714 
 Protests continued in Marikana as well. In May 2014, sixteen people—14 
women and two men—were arrested for “public violence” in Mmaditlokwe, 
near Marikana. 715 They were protesting against blasting at a nearby chrome 
mine, and argued that the mine should stop blasting until after they had been 
relocated to new housing. They also wanted the mine to employ local people and 
provide them services such as electricity and water. The protestors blockaded 
roads with burning objects and burned down their ward councilor’s house.716 It 
would appear that, in Marikana at least, protestors had given up on the 
government and were turning directly to the mine, a private corporation, to 
“deliver services.” In this case, the state was present as enforcer—to arrest and 
jail—but it was not the target of delivery demands. Here, the Marikana residents 
seemed to have given up on the claims of citizens.  
                                                        
714  Abahlali baseMjondolo statement, “Marikana Land Occupation Wins Important 
Victory.” 
 
715 Molaole Montsho, “Mmaditlokwe Protesters Released,” IOL News, May 15, 2014. 
 





 In South Africa’s dispossessed democracy, the stakes remain high and 
prospects unclear. With this dissertation, I have attempted to think across 
dividing lines to uncover historical links between issues that are not often 
considered together: criminal law and agricultural development; land reform 
and citizenship; international financial institutions and domestic social 
movements. A decade after the transition from apartheid, the Landless People’s 
Movement insisted that political democracy could not be achieved without 
rectifying historical and ongoing injustices that dispossessed people of land, 
economic means, and robust citizenship. Two decades on, those insights and 
demands persist—in the face of increasing criminalization and persistent 
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